Sunday, May 11, 2014

A New Look at Human Trafficking: Book Reviews

A New Look at Human Trafficking: Book Reviews

Kara, Siddharth. 2009. Sex Trafficking: Inside the Business of Modern Slavery. New York: Columbia University Press

Shelley, Louise. 2010. Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press
Kara and Shelley both emphasize the need to approach and understand human trafficking as a business if truly effective countermeasures are going to be designed. Both authors focus primarily on the sex trafficking aspect of the phenomena, but Shelley does expand into the other modes of exploitation human traffickers rely on, such as forced labor or begging. If we look at human trafficking as a business, the authors argue that in order to combat it we must change the calculus of the rational actors involved whose primary motivation is profit. Costs must be increased on perpetrators and potential profits reduced to make trafficking in people less lucrative.

Kara argues that globalization has made it easier to find and transport victims for traffickers. As the world becomes more interconnected, traffickers can find potential targets across the globe, and once ensnared can move victims hidden within the legitimate migration flows. Globalization has also brought poverty to many regions of the world, where local businesses are pushed out by global competition. This increases the ‘supply’ of victims, boosting profits, as people unable to find work at home fall for tempting false offers put out by traffickers. Moreover, a greater supply also has the effect of lowering prices, which in turn increases the number of customers. This situation allows traffickers to exploit large numbers of people to meet this high demand, and when coupled with the low risk of being caught, makes the business highly lucrative.  

Shelley puts forth a similar model that focuses on the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors within human trafficking. Push factors in source countries primarily stem from a lack of opportunity, as desperate locals look abroad for any opportunity and unwittingly become trapped by a trafficking ring. Additional push factors include both weak law enforcement and trafficking laws in source and destination countries, and corrupt officials and business owners that assist traffickers in return for a portion of the profits, all of which make the trade possible on a global scale. Facilitators are across society, from border guards, police officers, immigration officials, night-club owners, taxi drivers, bankers, lawyers, real-estate agents, all play a critical role in the capture, transportation, and exploitation of victims. Pull factors center on rising demand, mostly in developed countries, that make the trade so profitable. Individuals who compose demand come from an even broader swathe of society.

                The authors both recommend targeting the cost-benefit economic basis of the trafficking industry to have a significant effect on the industry. Engaging in trafficking must be made exceptionally costly to discourage potential traffickers from becoming involved. This would not only reduce the number of traffickers, but would also push up the cost for customers as supply decreases, which should decrease demand. Both authors also emphasize the need to target the financial resources of traffickers. Large amounts of money must be exchanged and laundered internationally, and by targeting these flows, costs would increase and profits would decrease for traffickers, making it harder to conduct business. This should be combined with stricter punishments for traffickers and the individuals and businesses who help them.
               
                Recognizing the limited resources available to anti-trafficking efforts in many parts of the globe, Kara argues for the creation of an international task force that would specialize in countering slavery. Such a task force should be composed of professionals from a broad array of fields, enabling a more comprehensive and effective effort. Local monitoring should also be supported, ‘neighborhood watches’, to watch for suspicious activity and enable more efficient law enforcement operations. On the enforcement side, raids on suspected establishments should increase, and a more efficient judicial process that hands out punishments quicker is needed. Finally, salaries should be increased for officials involved in anti-trafficking efforts to discourage bribery, and victim protection programs must be set up to protect them and their families. However, while such measures would certainly be welcome and likely highly effective, where the resources would come from, and how effective such an international effort would be when dealing with states highly protective of their sovereignty, is not entirely clear.

                Shelley provides less specific measures, but addresses a key weakness in Kara’s anti-trafficking argument. She specifies that any anti-trafficking program must be contextually designed for the region of the world it is targeting. Shelly’s five case studies show significant differences in how human trafficking is conducted across regions. There is no clear cut model that can be applied to trafficking globally. For example, many source countries are also destination countries, therefore any anti-trafficking effort in such an area must be prepared to comprehensively address the economic conditions that fuel the supply of victims, the traffickers themselves and the corrupt facilitators who bring victims in and out of the country, the customers who ultimately provide the profits, and the victims themselves, who are practically destroyed mentally and physically.

While approaching human trafficking as a business does help us better understand the motivations of the actors involved, it is crucial to not limit the anti-trafficking response to strictly institutionalist measures that focuses primarily on increasing costs to participants. Such approaches have been used to target drug trafficking across the globe with varying results. In fact, such crackdowns can have a converse effect by making the commodity scarcer, pushing up prices, and thus increasing the possible profits exponentially. As long as large amounts of money are to be made in any form of trafficking, there will be willing perpetrators. Understandably, it is difficult to target the benefits side of the rational calculus with law enforcement and legislation, which cannot exert control over a freely traded good. However, both authors remind us that there are enablers in legitimate positions who are crucial to both human and drug trafficking. Perhaps more needs to be done to increase the costs on corrupt government officials who facilitate the trade. A key aspect that both authors also touch on is the societal acceptance of victim blaming, particularly of women within the sex trade. Female victims are seen as willing participants looking to make easy money by selling their body, which is very rarely the case in reality. By changing societal perspective on this issue, greater pressure and disapprobation would be brought down upon corrupt officials who participate in the trade and on law enforcement, which often ignores or makes minimal efforts to punish traffickers. Finally, the economic source of the problem is also emphasized within the literature. Traffickers are able to lure victims into vulnerable situations where they can be enslaved because the victims are in dire straits in the first place, unable to find work in poorly performing economies. As with so many issues across the globe, economic growth will be key to truly addressing the problem.



Saturday, May 10, 2014

Summary of Findings

                During my research this semester I have delved deeper into how human trafficking functions in Kazakhstan, and made several interesting findings on the primary actors in the drug trafficking and human trafficking/smuggling organizations, obtained more information on the methods these groups rely on, found official governmental support and complicity within these illegitimate markets, described the role of clan politics in perpetuating official corruption, and finally analyzed what the Kazakh government has done to address the problem.
The literature indicates that the human trade has likely brought established drug organizations into human trafficking. These organizations already have the needed financial resources built up from their profits in the drug trade, and they are able to utilize existing means of transport previously used for running drugs. Their logistical resources can be put to work moving either drugs or humans, and enable them to create more profitable economies of scale.
Nonetheless, smuggling people differs significantly from smuggling drugs. People are difficult to hide. For this reason, traffickers and smugglers try to sneak people past authorities in the open whenever possible. The Yasiel Puig case showed that with the proper paperwork, it is much easier to move an individual across borders, as they essentially become a legal immigrant.[1] However, obtaining the needed paperwork typically requires the cooperation of corrupt officials.
As crucial as the means of transport are to smuggling people, equally important are the facilitators who have legitimate occupations. In both drug and human trafficking, criminal organizations must enlist the support of collaborators in border guards, law enforcement, immigration officials, lawyers, accountants, bankers, and real estate agents who are called upon to provide the false travel documents, safe houses, profit laundering, and willful ignorance to successfully move their product, for which they are amply rewarded.
Trafficking and smuggling organizations have been extremely adaptable and clever at moving their products. To bring their product into and out of Kazakhstan, these organizations have discovered the routes of least resistance that lie along the porous Kyrgyz/Kazakh border. Lightly traveled areas are often sought to avoid detection by law enforcement, but traffickers have also relied on the established networks of fuel smuggling from Kazakhstan, which allows them to bring large vehicles through and thus more cargo. Narcotics are typically brought across the border in larger batches, stockpiled outside of large cities such as Astana, and are then broken down to supply low-level dealers.               
The membership of these illegitimate organizations has shifted over time. The original Russia-based criminal groups who dominated drug trafficking in Central Asia during Soviet times went into decline following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent decline of the “symbiotic relationship” these organizations had with the government. Soviet officials had provided tacit official acceptance and protection of the trafficking organizations in exchange for their acceptance of a degree of governmental control over the level and locations traffickers did business in. The privatization of the Soviet economy in the 1990s also allowed serious competition to emerge. The lack of regulation and rule of law resulted in various criminal gangs across Central Asia seeking profit from the black market and establishing protection rackets on legitimate businesses, and an increase in the number of government officials seeking to exploit their position for personal gain by collaborating with traffickers.
Official corruption ranges from tacitly ignoring narcotics trafficking to direct participation in the trade, and likely has been prevalent into the highest offices. Beyond participating in the black market, many officials have also engaged in establishing protection rackets. Many contemporary businesses in Kazakhstan must pay for a reliable ‘roof’ in order to avoid harassment, and the best guarantor has become government officials as opposed to gangsters. These official rackets are more likely in Kazakhstan than traditional extortion by independent criminal groups. However, this ‘bureaucratic extortion’ is still less common in Kazakhstan than it is in Russia.
Official corruption has been further enabled by the prevalence of clan politics in Kazakhstan. After independence, zhuz and clan distinctions have become intrinsically tied to power and goods distribution. To gain access to the lucrative posts in state bureaucracy that allow access to extortion rackets and rents from the extractive industries, elites continue to rely on their clan connections. Through these ties they distribute the spoils to their key supporters in this patron-client system in order to maintain their position. Local elites push their kin-based connections to potential supporters, and emphasize the likely benefits to be received in reward for their support. Additionally, they use scare tactics to emphasize the need for clan-based loyalty to protect fellow members from the ambitions of competing clans.
The clan-based identities have persevered despite the declared push in the Soviet Union for erasing class distinctions by the Communist Party. Individual Kazakhs still strongly identify with their historical zhuz. Under the Communist system, these identities became crucial in an era of scarcity. Individuals relied on familial networks to not only secure employment, but also to obtain basic goods and services. Contemporary elites are able to access, and manipulate this near universal possession of extensive individual genealogical knowledge that has become as easy identifier and rallying point to utilize for their own individual goals.
The prevalence of official corruption has made the effort to curb both human and drug trafficking weak and inefficient. The Kazakh government was initially slow to address the development of human trafficking during the 1990s, only the growth of problems such as the spread of HIV/AIDS that accompanied the rise finally instigated action.[2] The government has made efforts to enact effective legislation and increase law enforcement capabilities. Additional funding has been invested into training courses to aid law enforcement in identifying, investigating and prosecuting human traffickers, and efforts have been made to improve international coordination with neighboring law enforcement agencies. However, the investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases decreased from 2011 through 2012. While the legislation, funding, and training appear to illustrate a genuine intent to combat the problem, a lack of results speaks to serious issues. Trafficking-focused NGO’s have continued to complain of antiquated tactics used by law enforcement and a general lack of concern for trafficking victims.
A lack of enforcement will continually hamper any attempt to enact effective rules and regulations. Given the likely levels of profit officials involved in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking reap from the trade, it will be difficult to comprehensively address the problem. At its core, any attempt to build an efficient response to trafficking must overcome high levels of corruption across the Kazakh state.


Sources

Curtis, Glenn E. 2002. “Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, And Chechnya.” Narcotics Trafficking in Former Soviet Union - Federal Research Division, Library of Congress Report.

 Roberts, Ken and Jochen Tholen, Takir Balykbaev and Daulet Duisenbekov. 2003. “Post-Soviet Management: Evidence from Kazakhstan.” Journal for East European Management Studies 8(3), 319-331

Schatz, Edward. 2000. “The Politics of Multiple Identities: Lineage and Ethnicity in Kazakhstan.” Europe-Asia Studies 52(3): 489-506

Schatz, Edward. 2005. “Reconceptualizing Clans: Kinship Networks and Statehood in Kazakhstan.” Nationalities Papers 33(2)

Shelley, Louise. 2012. The Relationship of Drug and Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

Townsend, Jacob. 2006. “The Logistics of Opiate Trafficking in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4(1), 69-91

Van Dijk, Jan. 2007. “Mafia Markers: Assessing Organized Crime and its Impact Upon Societies.” Trends in Organized Crime 10, 39-56 

Saturday, April 26, 2014

Yasiel Puig and Human Trafficking


Yasiel Puig and Human Trafficking

                The story that recently broke regarding the journey of Los Angeles Dodgers’ star Yasiel Puig from Cuba to the United States provides a rare insight into the reality of human smuggling.[1] While Puig had much bigger dreams in mind than most who seek out the help of smugglers, analyzing the process is useful. It is likely that very similar methods to those used to get past Cuban authorities are currently used to smuggle migrants within and out of Central Asia. Many victims of human trafficking at some point engage with smugglers to get them to their final destinations. This can range from unsuspecting targets attempting to get to Moscow to work for a trafficking ring posing as a modeling agency they found online to unwilling victims already in the grips of traffickers who are being moved or sold to another location.
                It is crucial to remember that for the smugglers, it is a business. Ultimately, expected returns must justify costs and potential risks. Certainly in Puig’s case, expected returns were justifiably very high. Over the past 5 years at least 20 defectors have been smuggled from Cuba who signed Major League Baseball contracts worth more than $300 million. Puig’s salary soared from $17 monthly in Cuba to over $150,000 per month for the Dodgers in 2013. The five men who drove the boat were in the employ of the infamous Mexican drug cartel, Los Zetas, who also controlled the landing spot on the Yucatan peninsula, Isla Mujeres. Similar to our understanding of likely behavior for human traffickers in Central Asia, this group moved any product that could produce a profit, from people to cocaine. Puig had already made several unsuccessful attempts to get out, and for this job the smugglers demanded $250,000 in return for smuggling Puig. He had a sponsor in the US, who initially offered to pay the fee in return for a contract with Puig that gave him 20 percent of all future earnings. When they arrived in Mexico, his smugglers demanded more from his sponsor, who refused to pay the full price. After a month of waiting for a deal, the sponsor sent in a “team of fixers” to deal with the smugglers and set Puig up with an agent. The leader of the smuggling group was later apparently executed after making repeated demands for payment.
                Smuggling people is much different from smuggling drugs. People cannot be squirreled away, and must be provided with food, water and reprieve. Unlike drugs, the easiest way to sneak people past authorities is in plain sight. While Puig was spirited out undercover from Cuba on a high-speed boat, after landing in Mexico and being released from his smugglers he was able to move about essentially as a legal immigrant. This required proper paperwork and typically the cooperation of corrupt officials. Smugglers must possess extensive knowledge of often highly intricate immigration regimes. In Puig’s case, given his eventual desire to play in the MLB, he was required by both league rules and US Treasury Department restrictions to establish residency in a third country. A mere formality, it forced his smugglers to take an alternate route (from the typical straight shot to Miami) to Isla Mujeres in the Yucatan, where their official contacts provided all the necessary documents and they were ensured no trouble by the local police.
Due to the nature of the black market, it is difficult to ascertain how comparable the costs of smuggling Puig out was to standard costs. An interesting website managed by ‘Havocscope’ attempts to give current prices on a variety of black market goods based on open-source information. While its reliability is dubious, it lists $10,000 as the going rate to smuggle someone from Cuba to the US.[2] Puig was certainly a unique case, given his need to transit via Mexico to meet MLB rules, and common knowledge of his future earnings potential.
                Puig’s account exemplifies the uncertainty and danger that are unavoidable throughout the smuggling process. Such situations are faced by smuggled migrants across the globe. At several points before finally succeeding, Puig was offered to be taken to the US by likely secret police trying to entrap him. When the money didn’t come through upon his arrival to Mexico, his smugglers threatened to maim and kill him. There is no guarantee for those arranging to be moved that they will not be exploited and harmed. One of the men who brought Puig across was being sought by US Homeland security for holding a migrant family captive until $40,000 was paid. To get to the escape point in Cuba, Puig hiked for 30 hours by night, hiding during the day, through backcountry and swampland to an unknown destination battling dehydration. At several points they were nearly intercepted by police, once having to wade out into the sea to escape. Upon finally arriving in the US, Cuban migrants face an uncertain situation, and turn to lawyers of Cuban descent for protection and guidance, often being extorted in the process. Even Puig has not fully escaped his past, as recent news reports say he faces continuing demands for payment by his smugglers, who even threatened his family still living in Cuba.  

Saturday, April 12, 2014

Anti-Trafficking Efforts in Kazakhstan

                The US State Department in the 2013 Trafficking in Persons Report rated Kazakhstan as a Tier 2 country. Astana has made efforts to meet the minimum established standards, but current policy still does not fully comply.[1] This is partially to the complexity of the problem in Kazakhstan. The country serves as not only a country of origin for trafficking victims destined for Russia or Europe, but also functions as a transit country for victims en route from other Central Asian states, and a destination country for victims from the poorer states of Central Asia such as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.[2] However, equally important contributing factors has been the complicity of government officials in the trade, and an inadequate law enforcement response to the problem.
                The Kazakh government was initially slow to address the development of human trafficking during the 1990s, but growth of problems such as the spread of HIV/AIDS that accompanied the rise finally spurred action.[3] The government has made efforts to enact effective legislation. Trafficking in persons for both sexual exploitation and labor is banned by Articles 128, 133, 125(3b), 126(3b), 270, and 132-1 of the Kazakh penal code. The US State Department has rated the established penalties of up to 15 years’ imprisonment adequately severe. In 2012, the Kazakh Supreme Court further clarified how the judiciary should interpret human trafficking, and ruled that trafficking victims could not be prosecuted for crimes committed as result of being trafficked. Also in 2012, an Interagency Trafficking in Persons Working Group, chaired by the Minister of Justice, was established to coordinate national anti-trafficking efforts. Moreover, the order issued by the Ministry of Education and Science, which allowed the children of migrant workers to attend school alongside regular Kazakh citizens, has likely helped these children avoid being exploited through forced labor.[4] At the international level, Kazakhstan has focused on addressing the problem regionally through the Commonwealth of Independent States, and as member of the Budapest Process, a forum designed to develop comprehensive migration reform and counter-trafficking policies across Eurasia.[5]
                Astana has funneled funding into training courses to aid law enforcement in identifying, investigating and prosecuting human traffickers, and made efforts to improve international coordination with neighboring law enforcement agencies.  However, while the legislation, funding, and training illustrate an intent to combat the problem, a lack of results speaks to deeper issues. The investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases decreased from 2011 through 2012. Trafficking-focused NGO’s have continued to complain of antiquated tactics used by law enforcement that do not take a victim-centered approach.
Victim-centered approaches focus equally on the investigation and prosecution of the traffickers, as on finding and providing support to victims. Adequate social services should be provided to assisting in the recovery and stabilization of trafficking victims, not only for the health of the victim, but also to ensure the victim is ready and able to aid the prosecutors in the identification and successful prosecution of perpetrators. This requires a fundamental change in how law enforcement perceives the crime, which is too often addressed as petty, insignificant, and not worth their time.[6] This ingrained perception leads to trafficking victims often being ignored and discounted, investigations are carried out nonchalantly and yield few results, or victims being treated as criminals themselves and prosecuted for immigration violations and/or deported.
Inadequate law enforcement response has been further compounded by the role many government officials and members of law enforcement play in carrying out the trade. Official complicity often results in shielding traffickers from prosecution, further abusing trafficking victims, and physically engaging in the transport of victims. Police officers are in a unique position to establish connections between traffickers and employers seeking forced labor that is often misused.[7]
A lack of enforcement will continually hamper any attempt to enact effective rules and regulations. Given the likely levels of profit officials involved in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking reap from the trade, it will be difficult to comprehensively address the problem. At its core, this issue stems from the high levels of corruption across the Kazakh state. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Kazakhstan 140th out of 177.[8] While much of the corruption is centered on profit skimmed from more legitimate industries, particularly energy and construction, the lack of rule of law and a bureaucracy that does not effectively punish and prevent offenders will encourage officials interested in making a quick profit to engage in more illicit industries such as human trafficking.



[1] http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2013/210548.htm
[2] http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66247
[3] http://www.protectionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/kazakhstan.pdf
[5] http://www.icmpd.org/Budapest-Process.1528.0.html
[6] https://www.dhs.gov/blue-campaign/victim-centered-approach
Goodey
[7] http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2013/210548.htm
[8] http://www.transparency.org/country#KAZ

Saturday, March 29, 2014

Organized Crime in Kazakhstan

                It has been well established that organized crime is one of the prime movers in the drug trade within Central Asia, and as I have discussed previously, it has been speculated that similar groups are responsible for the rise in human trafficking within the country. However, given their secretive nature, little is known about the character of these groups. I have pulled together what is readily available from academic and media sources, which gives a basic understanding of these groups in Kazakhstan.
                Van Dijk (2007) constructed the Composite Organize Crime Index, which combines the assessed perception of organized crime prevalence, state corruption, money-laundering, and the size of the black market, from data drawn from annual World Economic Forum surveys, the Merchant International Group’s investment risk assessments, World Bank Institute studies, and official crime statistics.[1] Within this index, as of 2007, Kazakhstan was rated at 100 on a 1-113 scale. Among former Soviet and communist states, Kazakhstan placed below Albania at 110, was on par with Russia and Ukraine, but was significantly higher than the Kyrgyz Republic at 80, and Uzbekistan and Belarus at 75. The index is now seven years old and the prevalence of organized crime in Kazakhstan may be contemporarily different. However, the lack of a significant national crackdown on organized crime and the continuing flow of narcotics from Afghanistan to Russia indicate that these criminal groups are likely still quite active.
                Recent analysis of organized crime in Kazakhstan is difficult to obtain; however, Curtis (2002) provides useful results from his field research into the ethnic composition of such criminal groups in the early 2000s. He conducted interviews with locals across the region who had either knowledge or personal experience with the drug trade. Interestingly, Chechens were reported to be the most common ethnic group involved in narcotics trafficking in Central Asia (and Russia and the Caucasus in general). While Russian criminal groups previously dominated these regions, in 1993 Chechen smugglers emerged and utilized the large Chechen diaspora (a result of Stalin’s deportations in the 1940s) to provide a cover for their trade. Strong relationships with locals were built over time, and the Russian mafia was pushed out of much of the drug trade in Central Asia. Curtis reports that the Russians moved more into the smuggling of “seafood, automobiles, and timber”, leaving narcotics to the Chechens. While some have proposed that the rise of the Chechen groups was an attempt to fund the ongoing conflict in Chechnya, Curtis claims individual profit has always been the primary motive. More recently, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek criminal groups have moved into the rapidly expanding narcotics trade, and are likely more prominent now. The drop in the price of heroin in the early 2000s boosted the number of users, and the increase in Afghan production following the ousting of the Taliban has both increased supply and demand across the region over the past decade.[2]
                The decline of the original Russia-based criminal groups in drug trafficking was instigated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent decline of the “symbiotic relationship” between the criminal groups and the government, which had provided tacit official acceptance and protection of the organizations in exchange for a degree of governmental control over certain activities. The privatization of the Soviet economy in the 1990s also opened the door to competition. A lack of regulation and rule of law allowed various criminal gangs to proliferate and profit from the black market, official corruption, and the establishment of protection payments on legitimate businesses, commonly referred to as the ‘roof’ or крыша, across the former Soviet Union. The considerable presence of Chechen businessmen across the FSU allowed them to organize and successfully push back against the extortion. However, their collective strength also allowed many to move into the protection racket themselves and further into organized crime. The prominent Chechen guerilla Ruslan Gelayev was reported to have emerged and progressed within Chechen protection rackets before establishing himself within the separatist movement.[3]
                The established Chechen criminal groups have faced additional competition in the drug trade from members of governmental agencies. Members of the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of the Interior’s security forces, and private security forces have used their authority and capabilities to establish their own protection rackets in both legitimate enterprises and on the criminal gangs themselves. The continued presence of Russian security forces across the FSU has allowed them to maintain a strong presence within the drug trade by providing protection in return for a share of the profits. Security officials may even be running several of the criminal organizations themselves.[4]
                Additional research indicates that these official rackets are more likely in Kazakhstan than traditional extortion by independent criminal groups. Roberts et al. (2003) conducted surveys of business owners and managers in Kazakhstan from 2000 - 2001. They found that when the “mafia” was mentioned, it generally referred to the “shadows of official state structures.” Official corruption ranged from tacitly ignoring narcotics trafficking to direct participation in the trade, and likely was prevalent into the highest offices. Moreover, businesses looking for a reliable ‘roof’ from harassment were more likely to make protection payments to government officials as opposed to gangsters. However, their research did find that this ‘bureaucratic extortion’ was less common in Kazakhstan than it was in Russia.[5]



[1] Van Dijk, Jan. 2007. “Mafia Markers: Assessing Organized Crime and its Impact Upon Societies.” Trends in Organized Crime 10, 39-56  
[2] Curtis, Glenn E. 2002. “Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, And Chechnya.” Narcotics Trafficking in Former Soviet Union -  Federal Research Division, Library of Congress Report.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Roberts, Ken and Jochen Tholen, Takir Balykbaev and Daulet Duisenbekov. 2003. “Post-Soviet Management: Evidence from Kazakhstan.” Journal for East European Management Studies 8(3), 319-331

Friday, March 14, 2014

The Zhuz in Kazakh Politics

                Previously, I have focused on analyzing Kazakh data strictly along provincial lines (fourteen oblasts and the two cities of Astana and Almaty). However, crossing provincial boundaries are regional ethnic ties that permeate Kazakh politics and are generally classified at their broadest levels as Hordes or zhuz (жүз). Often referred to as tribes, these confederations are divided into the Great (Ұлы жүз), Middle (Орта жүз), and Junior (Кiшi жүз). Each zhuz is sub-divided further into groups usually denoted as “clans”, with further sub-divisions down to individual lineages. The significance of these associations within the heavily clientelist politics of Kazakhstan could be influential in my analysis of human trafficking risk within the provinces. As I discussed in previous posts, individuals become more susceptible to human traffickers if they face a severe lack of opportunity in their home region. Particularly young people, with little social or employment prospects at home, are more likely to take risky jobs abroad that can ensnare them in foreign trafficking rings, or engage in other risky behavior domestically such as drug trafficking or prostitution. Patron-client networks in Kazakhstan may favor members of one zhuz over another based on access to officials in power, and if so this could have a considerable impact on available opportunities and resources to members of a zhuz without powerful patrons.
                Schatz (2000, 2005) provides an informative account of the resurgence of clan politics following independence in Kazakhstan, and the role the zhuz play today. Despite the professed push for erasing class distinctions in the Soviet Union, individual Kazakh identification with their historical zhuz was not eliminated. Instead, these identities became crucial in an era of scarcity under the Communist system. Individuals relied on familial networks to not only secure good positions, but also to obtain basic goods and services. Into modern times, the near universal possession of extensive individual genealogical knowledge created easily accessible, and manipulatable, identifiers for members to connect with one another. The average Kazakh is expected to accurately know and be able to orally trace their genealogical lineage going back to at least the seventh generation. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, early elite efforts at nation-building utilized these ethnic identities to increase a societal sense of “Kazakhness” independent of their Soviet past, and to build their own individual power bases for political gain. Elites used their lineage connections to establish a link with as many supporters as possible, over time this became “a virtual bidding war” that pushed these ethnic markers to the forefront of Kazakh politics (Schatz, 2005). Despite early elite intentions to build a unifying Kazakh identity by encouraging Kazakhs to embrace their zhuz, the exploitation of these associations by elites heavily politicized these identifications and polarized society along zhuz and clan lines. As political elites ascended into power and maintained their positions based on these associations, they grew increasingly more salient as the spoils and rewards of office were increasingly limited to members of the zhuz in power.

                Post-independence, zhuz and clan distinctions have become intrinsically tied to power and goods distribution. To gain access to lucrative posts in state bureaucracy that provide access to rents from the extractive industries, elites continue to rely on their clan connections, and distribute the spoils to their key supporters in this patron-client system. Local elites push their kin-based connections to potential supporters, and emphasize the likely benefits to be received in reward for support, and the need for clan-based loyalty to protect members from the aspirations of competing clans. President Nazarbaev and his family are a prime example. At the center of power for the entirety of Kazakhstan’s independence, he has been in a prime position to privilege both family members and his fellow members of the Great zhuz. A pattern of political appointments and key contracts by him have tended to favor extended family and core members of his zhuz. However, Nazarbaev’s core concern of preventing any regionalist movements built on excluded clan loyalties that might challenge national integrity and his hold on power, led to a policy of clan balancing within the provinces that to a degree has worked to push the clan out of regional politics. Given the strength of their position, provincial governors have been rotated regularly to prevent any from building a rival power base. Few served longer than two years in office before being moved to other state posts.
               
                Despite Nazarbaev’s intentions, clan association is still a crucial political factor at the regional level. Governors are usually from whatever clan is dominant in the region. Schatz (2005) provides an example:

“Most found it hard to imagine a situation in which, for example, the governor of Atyrau region could be a non-Zhetiru or the governor of South Kazakhstan region could be a non-Dulat.”

Upon assuming power, governors often quickly moved to reward their supporters and fill the bureaucracy with loyalists (Schatz, 2005):

“For example, upon assuming office in 1995 the governor of Zhambyl region removed 140 employees, replacing 80% of them with members of the Zhanys subdivision of the Dulat division (Great zhuz clan). In Torghai region the new governor promoted the members of his clan Zhoghary-Shekty of the Arghyn division (Middle zhuz), at the expense of traditionally predominant Uzyn and Qulan-Qypshaq subdivisions (also Middle zhuz). In the South Kazakhstan region, local subethnic patronage networks ensnared members of the lucrative extractive industries, who had a stake in the region’s oil refinery.”

It was difficult for governors from non-local clans to succeed, as sub-par performance was instantly ascribed to their clan association, and support would vanish quickly.

                Schatz (2005) provides an analysis of the respective positions of the three zhuz both within the elite population and within state bureaucracy, and how these positions have evolved since independence. He only looks at rural-born elite as zhuz identification is the easiest to identify for Kazakhs from rural portions of the country, where zhuz membership is still geographically associated. His analysis has shown that over time, the Great zhuz has consistently been disproportionately represented in state bureaucracy compared to their demographic position, with the Junior zhuz continually relegated to the weakest position. The Junior zhuz has been historically excluded from powerful positions, which could be partially attributable to the physical distance between Junior power centers in the west of the country and the Soviet-era capital of Almaty (a map illustrating the general location of the zhuz and their clans is included at the bottom). Great and Middle zhuz members have also been generally better educated and trained since the Soviet period. Although initially excluded to some degree from power, the Middle zhuz has been pulled into an alliance with the Great zhuz, as illustrated by the relocation of the capital city from Almaty in Great zhuz territory, to Astana in Middle zhuz territory, and significant incorporation of Middle zhuz members into state power structures. The following graphs provided by Shatz (2005) illustrate the disproportionate representation of the Great and Middle zhuz in the Kazakh elite (Table 2), and the shift in zhuz representation after the alliance between the Great (also referred to as Elder) and Middle zhuz (Tables 3 and 4).






Schatz, Edward. 2000. “The Politics of Multiple Identities: Lineage and Ethnicity in Kazakhstan.” Europe-Asia Studies 52(3): 489-506


Schatz, Edward. 2005. “Reconceptualizing Clans: Kinship Networks and Statehood in Kazakhstan.” Nationalities Papers 33(2)

Friday, February 28, 2014

Using Drug Seizures as a Human Trafficking Indicator

I proposed in the previous blog to use drug seizure data from the UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) to assist in measuring the level of state stability within each Kazakh province.[i] Drug trafficking flourishes in regions with low enforcement of the rule of law, and it is reasonable that human trafficking should also. Additionally, the human trafficking literature has suggested that drug traffickers have moved into moving humans alongside or instead of drugs, therefore anywhere we see a high incidence of drug trafficking, there could be a higher risk of the same agents engaging in human trafficking. To pursue the validity of this argument, I have gone through several articles on the subject, and I come away with preserved belief in the usefulness of drug trafficking as an indicator.
Shelley argues that drug trafficking often becomes entwined with human trafficking.[ii] Trafficked victims are often used as drug couriers went sent to foreign destinations, providing recipients with both the drugs and a victim to exploit. Aside from profiting on the sale, traffickers also utilize drugs throughout the entire trafficking process as a way to subdue the victim, increase endurance for longer work hours, and to discourage running way by facilitating victim addiction. Drug traffickers have been encouraged to move into the human trafficking market by increasing competition and danger within drug market, and low startup costs and risks in the human market. Traffickers generally seek a diversified source of profits, and human trafficking is extremely profitable.
The more recent expansion of the human trade has brought established drug organizations into human trafficking, rather than vice versa. These organizations already have considerable financial resources built up from the lucrative drug trade, and they are able to bring in logistical resources previously used for running drugs. These resources can be put to work moving both drugs and humans, creating more profitable economies of scale. Transport of humans is both more and less difficult than moving drugs. Moving people requires safe houses, adequate sustenance, and people are more difficult to hide. However, traffickers are often able to hide their victims in plain sight, within existing migration flows. Moreover, as discussed previously, trafficking victims are often lured willingly on false pretenses to their destinations before being seized by traffickers.
As important as the means of transport are, equally necessary are the facilitators working in the legitimate world. In both drug and human trafficking, criminal organizations must enlist the support of collaborators in border guards, law enforcement, immigration officials, lawyers, accountants, bankers, and real estate agents who provide the false travel documents, safe houses, laundering the profits, and turn a blind eye to successfully move their product. Shelley provides a persuasive argument for the likelihood of criminal involvement in both the drug and human trades simultaneously. High profits and lower risk should make human trafficking irresistible for such organizations. While different products, both require similar transport networks and official corruption that would allow established organizations to engage in both. Given the possibility of drug traffickers moving people along established drug routes, I have pursued further information regarding the drug trade in the region.
Townsend provides a detailed description of the drug trade in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan that brings opiates from Afghanistan north.[iii] His examination of Kazakhstan reveals several relevant details. After conducting field research in the early years of the 2000s, he saw a growing professionalism within the drug organizations, with increasingly streamlined transportation networks and more sophisticated methods of concealment. These organizations have discovered the routes of least resistance, particularly along the porous Kyrgyz/Kazakh border. Traffickers can both walk across and bring large vehicles through, within the established networks of fuel smuggling from Kazakhstan.
The main crossings are to the north and west of Bishkek (see map at bottom), where they continue on to Almaty, taking advantage both of better roads and the large consumer market in the Almaty province. Opiates are stockpiled outside the city, and then broken down to supply low-level dealers. From Almaty, drugs are distributed further along the Almaty-Taldyqorghan-Georgievka and Almaty-Balkash-Astana roads. Almaty also provides access to rail networks, both northwest to Astana and north to Georgievka, each with links to Russia. Organizations both use established routes repeatedly and switch quickly between available options, as dictated by destination, geography, law enforcement, and the adaptability of their transport links. The geography of Kyrgyzstan requires that all traffic heading from Osh to Bishkek to use the same road for much of the route, whereas traffickers crossing the more open areas of Kazakhstan have more choices. Additionally, a trend that has likely increased since Townsend published in 2006 is the expansion of the drug trade to the Xinjiang province in western China, which has had a large and growing market. At the time of publication, heroin prices in Xinjiang were 4-5 times higher than in Central Asia, and the markets are much closer and more accessible than those in Western Russia or Europe. Townsend theorized that the crossings at Khorgos and Dostuk along the Kazakh/China border would be likely targets.
Townsend provides additional detail that is important to understanding the intricacies of the drug trade, and likely of the human trade, in Central Asia. However, he disagrees that drug organizations could easily move into human trafficking. “Human trafficking is quite a different business again and given the logistics of drug trafficking described here, it is difficult to believe that the same groups moving opiates would also be optimized for organizing illegal immigration.” Yet, he does agree that the same official facilitators are necessary to traffic both. Based on his conclusions, it is safe to say that while I cannot automatically assume that active drug traffickers in Kazakhstan are also likely engaged in human trafficking, I can conclude that the facilitating factors that enable the drug trade will also enable the human trade. Therefore, any province with a high incidence of drug trafficking will be at a higher risk of human trafficking due to the existence of these risk factors in the area.




[i] http://drugsmonitoring.unodc-roca.org
[ii] Shelley, Louise. 2012. The Relationship of Drug and Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
[iii] Townsend, Jacob. 2006. “The Logistics of Opiate Trafficking in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4(1), 69-91