Meet the New Boss...Same as the Old Boss?

One of numerous posters comparing President Morsi to Former President Mubarak. The Arabic reads "Mohammed Morsi Mubarak" (Source: Mohammed Abd El Ghany-Reuters)

The current power struggle playing itself out in Egypt demonstrates the visceral and emotional power of framing in politics. On November 22^nd, in a move that shocked the international community and left many Egyptians with a sickening sensation of déjà vu, the first freely democratically elected leader of Egypt, President Mohammed Morsi bestowed upon himself sweeping and unrestricted executive powers by rendering impotent the Egyptian judiciary branch and circumventing the system of checks and balances (See Hume, Tim). While President Morsi presented 7 edicts, the two that drew the most criticism were Article 2- the pronouncement that all presidential decrees were exempt from judicial review and Article 5- the judiciary branch would have no ability to dissolve the upper house of parliament (the Shura Council) or the Constituent Assembly. Egyptian courts had previously dissolved the first Constituent Assembly along with the Parliament and rumors suggested that the Supreme Constitutional Court was “poised to dissolve the existing [largely Islamist] assembly in a ruling next Sunday” (See Kirkpatrick, David). With these decrees, a dead letter Egyptian constitution, a defanged judiciary and non-existent legislature, President Morsi’s executive power is now supreme and exceeds even that of his predecessor, ousted former President Hosni Mubarak.

The president maintains that this state of affairs is only temporary and necessary to preserve democratic gains made during the Egyptian Revolution of 25 January and to ensure the creation of a constitution which will be unhindered by anti-democratic and former regime elements still present in the judiciary and government. Regardless of his rationale, the President’s decision was immediately barraged with criticism from the judiciary and brought thousands of protestors as well as counter-protestor supporters of the President to the streets of every major city in Egypt. In the days since, violent clashes have erupted between Muslim Brotherhood (MB)/Morsi supporters and protestors, leaving a number of Egyptians dead and wounded. Elements of the judiciary, including the Supreme Court, have gone on strike paralyzing the court system across the country. Outside of Egypt, the perceived “power grab” by President Morsi has drawn condemnation from the United Nations Human Rights commissioner Navi Pillay as undermining the precepts of liberty, social justice and freedom that were the bedrock ideas of the Egyptian Revolution (See “Egypt: UN Human Rights…”). It is interesting that Western powers including the United States remain reticent to publicly condemn President Morsi’s actions (See Knox, Olivier).

The MB has had a loud and physical stage presence in the tumult of daily protests and growing political instability, framing President Morsi’s decrees as the only viable solution to combat the “enemy within” the political system- i.e., Mubark era judiciary appointees who were “part and parcel” of his autocratic policies (See Hendawi,Hamza) and whom President Morsi claims are the real obstacles to the creation of a legitimate constitution. Nobel Laureate and Egyptian liberal opposition leader Mohammed ElBaradei tweeted "(They) are currently staging a coup against democracy...regime legitimacy fast eroding," (See Spencer, Richard). ElBaradei later called for more protests, and in response a MB senior member commented, “He’s Western” (See Rohde, David).

The importance of framing ideas as a powerful tool to establish or delegitimize ideas, movements and political actors, is on full display in this clarifying moment of the Egyptian Revolution. It is well established that logical argument based on facts is usually a miserably ineffective political strategy. Human beings adopt and evolve political views in ways which have very little to do with factual analysis or reasoned comparisons of issues. There are several overlapping models which attempt to describe political socialization, such as research showing that people acquire political views from elites (See Zaller, 1992), that people self-identify with a group (See “Social Identity…”) and afterwards internalize the normative views of that group, media and communication such as television ads which use framing and narrative, and linguistic models which emphasize filtering (See Herman & Chomsky, 2002) and metaphor (See Lakoff, 1980). Identity and moral sense are fundamental ideas underlying several models of political socialization. Lakoff, for example, believes that human beings at a young age develop a library of moral metaphors which serve as the framework in later years for political, religious and moral belief (See Lakoff, 1980).

A classic example of the political power of framing is the "It's Morning Again in America" frame, communicated iconically in a Ronald Regan presidential re-election campaign television commercial with soft, warm images of an idealized America, such as picket fences, beautiful children, strong brave men leading happy families, weddings and the like. This framing consolidated the success of the Southern strategy popularized by President Richard Nixon's campaign in the late 1960s. How can one rebut an argument which is not an argument, but rather is a highly emotional feeling? This requires counter-framing.

                By framing ElBaradei as "Western", the MB is attempting to associate its opponents, without ever having to prove any factual charges or even make any specific accusations, with aspects of Western culture and foreign policy which are hugely unpopular in Egypt and the Arab world. The not-so-subtle implication is that the largely young, educated often English speaking Egyptians who took the streets against Mubarak and actually initiated the Revolution are useful idiots-- tools of America and Europe acting as a naïve, or even traitorous Fifth Column, manipulated by The West. There are a number of connotations to this descriptor: exploitive, colonial, conspiracy, rapacious, war, consumerism, anti-Islam and support of Israel among them. This is one of the fundamental frames that the MB invokes against the liberal opposition. Ironically, the MB senior leadership were wary to support the revolution in its early stages allowing only their youth wing to be involved- true to their chameleon political history. Another irony is that the MB itself has a long history of accommodating and working with the Mubarak, Sadat and Nasser regimes.

A pawn of the West? (Source: Reuters- Mohammed Salem)

              Contrastingly, the liberal opposition frames this current struggle as Mubarak part deux or the rise of a “new Pharaoh” (See Hendawi, Hamza), referring to Mubarak’s failed attempts to cast himself as a modern day Pharaoh of Egypt (See Fein, Judie). This is powerful framing because the memory of the Mubarak dictatorship is still fresh in everyone's minds, mindful of the Egyptian historical cycle of revolution and liberation, followed by the imposition of authoritarianism in the name of a temporary emergency, which remains in place indefinitely.

President Mohammed Morsi depicted as the "new Pharaoh" of Egypt (Source: AP)

                President Morsi’s ascension to the presidential seat was filled with hope for a brighter future and in the intervening time he has made great strides in a number of areas relating to foreign policy. He has secured vital loans from a number of countries, ensured continuing tithes from the U.S., acted as a mediator for the Israeli-Hamas cease fire and cemented Egypt’s role as an important and necessary actor within the region. However, little has actually changed in the daily lives of Egyptians. Unemployment is still rampant, fundamental government services like water and electricity spotty, increasing prices on staple goods, a stalled constitution and an overall unease among many urban Egyptians as to the ultimate goal of the MB affiliated President Morsi. While he did win the presidency, he was considered by many moderate Egyptians to be the lesser evil, the best candidate among two bad choices. Even then he won by a narrow margin of 3%, 51.7% to 48.3% (See “Muslim Brotherhood backed…”). This most current unrest only heightens the fears of an Islamization/Brotherhoodization of the state and a return to an authoritarian regime.

  It seems at this point President Morsi has perhaps been overly ambitious in attempting to consolidate political power to advance his vision of an Islamic democratic nation. This has triggered massive protests by the Arab Street that was responsible for the Egyptian Arab Spring in the first place and the ouster of Mubarak. It is too early to predict what will happen in the coming days for Egypt, but since the fundamental issue is political legitimacy, whoever wins the framing battle is likely to prevail.

Works Cited:

“Muslim Brotherhood-backed Candidate Wins Egyptian Presidential Election.” (June 24, 2012). Fox News. Retrieved December 1, 2012, from: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/06/24/egypt-braces-for-announcement-president/

Cartalucci, Tony. (November 23, 2012). “Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood Challenged in Egypt.” Retrieved December 1, 2012, from: http://beforeitsnews.com/middle-east/2012/11/morsi-the-muslim-brotherhood-challenged-in-egypt-2446140.html

Clemons, Steve. (November 25, 2012). “Mohammed Morsi: Abe Lincoln in Disguise or Another Mubarak?” The Atlantic. Retrieved December 1, 2012 from: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/mohammed-morsi-abe-lincoln-in-disguise-or-another-mubarak/265557/

Herman, Edward and Noam Chomsky. (2002). “Updated Edition: Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media.” New York: Pantheon Books.

“Egypt: UN Human Rights Chief Calls on Egypt’s President to Roll Back Powers of Recent Decree.” (November 30, 2012). All Africa. Retrieved December 1, 2012, from: http://allafrica.com/stories/201212010476.html

Fein, Judie. “Mubarak: Modern-Day Pharaoh of Egypt.” (February 3, 2011). Huffington Post. Retrieved November 26, 2012 from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/judie-fein/mubarak-modernday-pharoah_b_816944.html

Hendawi, Hamza. (December 2, 2012). “Egypt’s Anti-Morsi Rebellion of Judges is Complete.” Bloomberg Business Week. Retrieved December 2, 2012 from: http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-12-02/egypt-islamists-protest-ahead-of-court-ruling#p2

Hume, Tim. (November 30, 2012). “Q & A: What’s Driving Egypt’s Unrest?” CNN. Retrieved December 1, 2012, from: http://beforeitsnews.com/middle-east/2012/11/morsi-the-muslim-brotherhood-challenged-in-egypt-2446140.html

Kirkpatrick, David. (November 24, 2012). “Egyptian Judges Challenge Morsi Over New Power.” The New York Times. Retrieved November 29, 2012, from: http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/news/world/egyptian-judges-challenge-morsi-over-new-power-663501/

Knox, Olivier. (November 26, 2012). “White House Cites ‘Concerns’ Over Egypt, Won’t Criticize Morsi.” Yahoo! News. Retrieved November 29, 2012, from: http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/ticket/white-house-cites-concerns-over-egypt-won-t-211632449--politics.html

Lakoff, George & Mark Johnson. (1980). “Metaphors We Live By.” Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rohde, David. (November 24, 2012). “Morsi’s Power Grab: ‘There Was a Disease But This Is Not The Remedy.” The Atlantic. Retrieved November 29, 2012, from: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/morsis-power-grab-there-was-a-disease-but-this-is-not-the-remedy/265555/

“Social Identity Theory.” (n.d.) Wikipedia. Retrieved October 2, 2012 at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Identity_Theory

Spencer, Richard. (November 30, 2012). “Egypt: Mohammed Morsi Criticised by UN.” The Telegraph. Retrieved December 1, 2012, from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/9715314/Egypt-Mohammed-Morsi-criticised-by-UN.html
Zaller, John. (1992). “The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Book Review

Warfare in Independent Africa.  William Reno.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.  262 pp.

     Northwestern University Professor William Reno’s Warfare in Independent Africa is an extensive review of conflict in Africa.  In seven chapters Reno navigates conflict and warfare in Africa by providing in-depth descriptions of post-colonial rebel movements to current Islamist threat potentials.  This book is touted as an essential read for not only students, but also “the policy community, the military, and humanitarian agencies.”  In reality, this book should be on the shelves of anyone doing work or research in Africa.  It provides essential information about African culture, politics, conflicts, and the relationships between these three components.  

     Conflict in Africa is a well-studied subject with numerous books and articles that abound on the subject.  Despite the wealth of information already written Reno’s book is unique and makes important contributions to the subject matter.  First, Reno does not limit his analysis to a case study of a single nation or a single period of time.  Second, Reno rejects the standard causal explanation of conflict in Africa:  ethnic diversity and poverty.  Finally, the author uses his historical study as blueprint to analyze and make guarded forecasts about the potential for the future of African conflict.  In short, this book offers comprehensive and in-depth information about conflict but goes beyond pure descriptive narratives by providing important analysis that is relevant for the future.       

     Reno structures his book in three different but compatible ways:  by time period, type of rebel group, and region.  He examines conflict by categorizing conflicts as those perpetuated by anti-colonial rebels, majority rule rebels, reform rebels, warlord rebels, and parochial rebels.  Within these rebel confines Reno also structures his analysis within the borders of western Africa, southern Africa, and the Horn of Africa.   The benefit of this structure is that it allows the reader to distinguish key regional differences that differentiates African conflict while also allowing one to see the immense similarities between countries.  Similarly, the characterization of conflict into four distinct groups illustrates the progression of violence and conflict over time.   Reno’s structure is a unique and helpful manner to examine and understand the sources of conflict and how distinct the conflicts today are from those earlier ones.  Reno’s thesis is essentially that rebel groups and conflicts are the result of the contextual nature of the political sphere within which these groups operate.      

     Warfare in Independent Africa provides essential information to those interested in African politics and conflicts.  In fact, Reno’s sources are impeccable and wide-ranging which provides much validity to his arguments; nevertheless, he seems to neglect the conceptual and theoretical framework of conflict in his book.  For example, throughout the book Reno notes that ethnicity, corruption, and poverty are symptoms of the overall cause of conflict.  He seemingly finds that weak political institutions, including political parties, are really the culprits that continue to breed violence.  Reno’s conclusions are essentially an acceptance and rejection of specific conflict theories; yet, Reno never formally lays out theories.  Providing this theoretical background likely would provide increased clarity and strength to his arguments.  Despite this weakness, the book provides an abundance of information that is helpful to both researchers and those seeking a general overview of African conflict.
     
     Overall, Reno’s Warfare in Independent Africa is an important contribution to historical and modern analysis on African conflict.  He seamlessly transitions from country to country and from time period to time period before illustrating how these historical accounts are instrumental in understanding the future of conflict.  This book should not serve as a sole source of conflict literature but should serve as an essential accompaniment to other conflict research.   His critical analysis coupled with his historical account makes his book a must-read. 

Pro-Wrestling Takes The Middle East By Storm

                                                 Pro-Wrestling luminaries Zack Ryder and Kaitlyn pose with an Egyptian fan
                                                                                                    (courtesy of WWE)

            Amid demonstrations protesting the “Brotherhoodization” of the state and media in Tahrir Square, gatherings protesting President Morsi's 100^th day in office, and amid escalating tensions between Israeli and Egyptian military forces in the Sinai, another great spectacle was unfolding in Cairo. For the first time ever, World Wrestling Entertainment (WWE) held the first (October 18, 2012) of what was to be 3 capacity shows at the Cairo Stadium Complex.  Superstars of the professional/pro-wrestling world like the “Big Show”, “The Miz”, Irish dynamo “Sheamus”, “The Mexican Aristocrat” Alberto Del Rio, blond adonis “Dolph Ziggler”, Jamaican Sensation “Kofi Kingston” and WWE Divas “Kaitlyn” and “Natalya” transfixed sold-out crowds of Egyptians. The WWE obviously sees Egypt and the Middle East as regions ripe for tapping of fans and has already held sold out shows in Qatar and Abu Dhabi and will presumably return to Egypt based on the success of their inaugural show.

           At first blush the presence of the WWE in Egypt seems odd, particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring and the recent ascension of fundamentalist Islam to the pinnacle of power in Egypt. However, many Middle Easterners in general and Egyptians in particular have nonetheless become fanatic fans who follow the drama and action that takes place in the squared circle of pro-wrestling. It is not uncommon to venture into a downtown Cairo coffee shop and see crowds assembled in front of a single television watching larger than life WWE celebrity pro wrestlers pummel each other senseless while hastily reading transcripted Arabic of the English audio commentary.

          I recall sitting in a Cairo coffee shop on the day when Amr Moussa and Abdel Monem Fatouh, two leading candidates for the then-undecided presidential race squared off on television for the first and only televised election debate since the ouster of Mubarak. A truly historical television event that was interspersed by rapid flipping of channels back to“WWE RAW”(the WWE’s flagship television show) for several seconds to see if the “Undertaker” had made an appearance and then back to the presidential debates discussing fiscal policy in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Egyptians, particularly adolescent and young adult Egyptians love pro-wrestling. 60% of Egypt's population is under 30 years old.

          Wrestling has a historical precedent in the region and written records suggest that it is the oldest sport in the world (See “Grappling Hooks...”). Sumerian records (Sumer, now parts of modern day Iraq and Kuwait) recount the legend of “Gilgamesh”, a mythical king of Sumeria who won an epic wrestling match. The national sport of Turkey is oil/grease wrestling (See “Oil Wrestling...”) and according to Houchan Chehabi an Iranian historian; freestyle wrestling is often characterized as “the first sport” of the Islamic Republic of Iran (See “The Ancient Roots...”). Egypt has the distinction of fielding the first Arab-Muslim sumo wrestler from the “African continent and Arab world” (See “First Arab-Muslim...”), Abdelrahman Ahmed Shaalan or more commonly known by his ring name “Great Sandstorm”, and countries in the region routinely send wrestlers to compete in the Olympics.

          Given this precedent, the phenomena of pro-wrestling in Egypt is not as odd as it may initially seem. After all, one might just as well ask how The Undertaker and his fellow superheroes have won the hearts and minds of American fans. Egyptians embrace Islam and their own culture, but like most Middle Easterners, they tend to love things that are Western/American (as opposed to disliking Western/American foreign policy). From blockbuster Hollywood films to McDonald’s to Apple IPhones. The average Egyptian makes in the neighborhood of 300 to 500 Egyptian pounds (l.e.) if they are fortunate enough to be employed. An average Egyptian cannot afford to attend a WWE show (3000 l.e.), buy an IPhone (8000 l.e.) or even regularly eat at McDonalds (20-25 l.e.), yet they still love Western materialism, consumerism and culture. The theatrical morality play which unfolds in the ring captures the Egyptian imagination just as it has captured that of America on a mass scale since the first televised wrestling events started in the 1950s. Pro wrestling is of course essentially more entertainment than sport.

          Marketing research in wrestling (See “How Viewing...”) points out that the targeted audience for pro-wrestling are adolescents and adults 18-34 years old. Elements that appeal to this demographic are violence and sex (See “How Viewing...”). The sex and violence angle in pro-wrestling is obvious (though in recent years there have been attempts to lessen the sex angle within WWE shows). It is interesting that governments like the Islamic Republic of Egypt, and other Islamic nations (Qatar and Abu Dhabi) are embracing, or at least tolerating, edgy sports entertainment like pro-wrestling. The traditional Muslim reaction to the introduction of American pro-wrestling illustrates the power of framing. Had the Muslim Brotherhood chosen to object to pro-wrestling, they could easily have framed the WWE event as decadent and scandalous, as violating Muslim standards of modesty, as exploitation of poor Egyptians by unscrupulous Western businessmen, etc.  Clearly, the Muslim Brotherhood and other other powerful traditional institutions chose to ignore-- or at least to avert their gaze -- to the arrival of The Miz, The Big Show and the rest of pro-wrestling's gaudy entourage onto sacred Egyptian soil. It's hard to imagine that fundamentalist and traditional Muslims could warmly embrace the scantily-clad sexually-overt Divas and Superheroes of the WWE. However, the Muslim Brotherhood is clearly sensitive to charges of censorship and religious coercion, and may well be deferring its objections to a later day, choosing its battles carefully.                

                                                                  Natalya and Kaitlyn battle in a Diva match-up before the crowd                                                                                                                                          (courtesy of WWE)

          Obviously, the appeal of pro-wrestling is different than that of traditional wrestling. The enduring popularity of competitive spectator sports, including pro-wrestling, is that fans participate in ritualistic “In-group identity”(a concept derived from social identity theory; the idea that anything that makes a group look better enhances the esteem of not only the group but the members of the group as well; anything that denigrates an out group enhances the esteem of the in-group and its members  [See “Social Identity”]). Clearly, in any kind of competition where there is a winner and loser, the esteem of winners and supporters of the winner are enhanced. In the pro-wrestling system, where the characters (the heel and the hero) and outcomes are already pre-defined, the crowds know who to support and who to revile, and as a result are usually on the winning side of the faux-competition in the end. “This system is pleasurable because it requires little work on the part of the consumer to understand who is good and who is evil in the grand melodrama that is professional wrestling” (See “Speaking in Images...”).

          There is also a long history of mythology in wrestling on which pro-wrestling draws , particularly on framing and narratives based Judeo-Christian/Islamic culture and religion, such as the duality of good and evil. The old testament has a number of wrestling metaphors, of which the story of Jacob wrestling an angel/God in Genesis is an example [See "Jacob wrestling..."]). Wrestling is an archetypal metaphor for struggle, catharsis and illumination as well as a metaphor for striving to know God. The Bible and Qur’an personifies villains (for example, Satan, the ultimate villain) and heroes (e.g., Angels, the Prophets). According to noted philosopher and semiotician Roland Barthes (See “The World of...”), pro-wrestling embodies a ritualistic casting out of evil where the pure hero of the melodrama fights an evil villain. The hero faces trials and tribulations; a journey within and without the ring akin to Joseph Campbell’s “monomyth or hero’s journey”(“Campbell held that numerous myths from disparate times and regions share fundamental structures and stages” [See “Monomyth”]), ultimately triumphing against the evil in most cases. Crowds participate through the wrestlers, vicariously “stoning the witch” and triumphing over evil.  

          Pro-wrestling is a scripted drama, a modern day morality play that taps into universal, fundamental, deeply psychological themes which resonate strongly in American and Arab culture (witness the sell out crowds), and they probably resonate all over the world with people. Pehaps the most interesting lesson of a pro-wrestling morality play is that for all our varied cultures and differences, human nature remains essentially the same.

Works Cited:

Barthes, Roland. “The World of Wrestling.” Retrieved November 16, 2012, from: http://www.tcnj.edu/~miranda/classes/theory_practice/barthes_wrestling.html

Bering, Jesse. (March 11, 2010). “If Darwin were a Sports Psychologist: Evolution and Athletics.” Scientific American. Retrieved November 16, 2012, from: http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/bering-in-mind/2010/03/11/if-darwin-were-a-sports-psychologist-evolution-and-athletics/

Bernthal, Matthew. (nd). “How Viewing Professional Wrestling May Affect Children.” The Sport Journal. Retrieved November 16, 2012, from: http://thesportjournal.org/article/effect-professional-wrestling-viewership-children

Fisher, Max. (August 9, 2012). “The Ancient Roots of Iran’s Wrestling and Weightlifting Olympic Dominance.” Retrieved November 16, 2012, from: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/08/the-ancient-roots-of-irans-wrestling-and-weightlifting-olympic-dominance/260919/

“First Arab-Muslim Sumo Wrestler Faces Challenges in Japan.” (April 9, 2012). Al Arabiya. Retrieved November 16, 2012, from: http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/04/09/206441.html

“Grappling Hooks: The Biological Appeal of Wrestling.” Wrestlers Without Borders. (nd). Retrieved November 16, 2012, from: http://www.wrestlerswob.com/legacy/history_allure.htm

“Jacob Wrestling with the Angel.” Wikipedia. (nd). Retrieved November 16, 2012, from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacob_wrestling_with_the_Angel 

“Monomyth.” Wikipedia. (nd). Retrieved November 16, 2012, from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monomyth

“Oil Wrestling.” Wikipedia. (nd). Retrieved November 16, 2012, from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_wrestling

“Professional Wrestling as the Ideal Metaphor for Modern Life.” Dante and The Devil. (nd). Retrieved November 16, 2012, from: http://danteandthedevil.com/professional-wrestling-as-the-ideal-metaphor-for-modern-life/

“Social Identity.” Wikipedia. (nd). Retrieved November 16, 2012, from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Identity

Staunch, Michael. (nd). “Speaking in Images: The Increasing Sublety of Manipulation in Wrestlemania XX.” Retrieved November 16, 2012, from: http://infohost.nmt.edu/~xchanges/old_xchanges/xchanges/4.1/stauch.html

Warrick, Joby. (March 3, 2011). “Clinton: U.S. Losing Global Public Relations Battle to Baywatch and Wrestling.” The Washington Post. Retrieved November 16, 2012, from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/02/AR2011030206898.html

Party Institutionalization

The literature that attempts to explain conflict espouses numerous theories including “differences in civilization,” exclusion, poverty, and weak institutions.  Each of these theories exhibit well-developed conceptual frameworks and attempt to offer empirical conclusions; nevertheless, the field is inundated with contradictory findings and to date has yet to offer clear explanations in specific regional contexts.   In fact, an alternative explanation of conflict within the African landscape may more appropriately explain conflict:  lack of political party institutionalization. 

One of the most well-known and controversial theories concerns “differences in civilization.”    Differences in civilization include such things as language, region, ethnicity, and nationality. Well-known authors Samuel Huntington and Donald Horowitz assert that nations that have diverse populations are more likely to be subsumed in frequent and extreme violence while other scholars find that nations characterized by large dissimilar populations are uncorrelated with increased violence.  Fearon and Laitin quantitatively find that high ethnic and religious diversity bear no direct relationship to conflict and instead emphasize that any relationship that is found is spurious.  In contrast, others theorize poverty is a predictor of conflict.

Ted Gurr’s Theory of Relative Deprivation essentially declares that conflict will ensue when some segment of the population has less than another segment and they are aware of this imbalance in resources.  In essence, Gurr believes that the difference between what a person believes that they are entitled to and what they can actually attain may be the impetus that spurs people to engage in violent conflict.  Gurr’s theory has been largely discounted as a causal mechanism of conflict because it fails to account for weak governmental and political institutions, ethnic concerns, or other important variables that influence violence. In fact, even studies that empirically determine poverty to be correlated to conflict conclude that this correlation is actually caused by weak governmental institutions rather than the existence of weak economic conditions.

The poverty theory as well as the cultural differences theory fail to examine the political institutions operating within any given nation state.  Recognizing this gap, two additional theories have developed that attempt to take a more comprehensive approach to explaining conflict:  exclusionary theory and weak institutional theory.

The exclusionary theory rests upon the claim that patronage systems encourage leaders to engage in the full exclusion from political participation and representation of whole ethnic populations.  This sort of exclusion eventually results in extreme discontent that is transformed into an aggrieved rebel force.  In many instances the development of rebel forces in Africa is linked to their exclusion from political representation. 

Finally, the weak institutional theory asserts that governments characterized by weak institutions are often characterized by extreme instability.   This theory is more comprehensive than others because proponents recognize the interaction between weak institutions and poverty, religious diversity, exclusion, etc.  One of the more interesting yet largely unexplored concepts of weak institutions is the weak political party systems; specifically, the role of political parties in encouraging or discouraging conflict. 

The institutionalization of political parties and political party systems has been deemed essential to a fully functioning representative democracy.  This is because party institutionalization ensures stability within the governmental system such that elites and electorate believe in the legitimacy of the governmental process.  Additionally, institutionalized party systems are generally free from patronage which translates into party autonomy.  This independence allows the party to act in the best interest of the electorate rather encouraging individual power seekers to be dependent upon certain “Big Men” in order to gain increased money and power.  In fact, it is argued that institutionalized party systems ensure governmental accountability and overall democratic stability.  In many ways the institutionalization of political parties incorporates many of the components of traditional conflict theories and thus offers a more comprehensive measure to examine the causes of conflict in developing regions.  In order to fully understand and attempt to mitigate the conflict it is first essential to isolate the causes of the conflict.  To be sure, evaluating party institutionalization within Africa is no easy task as the selection of key indicators and the accumulation of data is arduous, yet essential.

Sources:

Fearon, James D, and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." American Political Science Review, 2003: 75-90.

Horowitz, Donald. Ethhnic Groups in Conflict. Berkley: University of California Press, 1985.

Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Policy, 1993: 22-49.

Lindemann, Stefan. Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter? A Research Framework for Understanding the Causes of Civil War in Sub-Saharan AFrica. Discussion Paper, Crisis States Research Centre, 2008.

Mainwaring, Scott and Mariano Tocal (2005).  “Party System Institutionalizatino and Party System Theory after the Third Wave of Democratization.” (Working Paper #319).  Retrieved from Kellogg Instituute http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/319.pdf.

Randall, Vicky and Lars Svasand.  “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies.”  Party Politics, 2002:5-29.

Roessler, Philip. "The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War." World Politics 63, no. 2 (April 2011): 300-346.

Sambanis, Nicholas. "Poverty and the Organization of Political Violence: A Review and some conjectures." Brookings Trade Forum, 2004: 165-211.

van Wyk, Jo-Ansie. "Political Leaders in Africa: Presidents, Patrons, or Profiteers." Accord Group Occassional Paper, 2007.

Cults of Personality

          The interaction between state and citizen is a complex and nuanced relationship. The existence of the state is incumbent on the support and consent of the citizens that comprise it. By the same token, citizens benefit from the rules and stability provided by the state and are dependent on the institutions created by its presence. It can be said that without this social contract  between the two, civil society can neither be created nor exist. To further complicate the co-dependence between the two, the objectives of one may not in fact mirror the aims of the other.  For instance, a state must remain separate from its citizens and civil society to be able to effectively enforce a rule of law upon the governed, even if unpopular. Citizens, left to their own devices may be more apt to fulfill self-interests eroding the solvency of the state.  The struggle to find balance between the goals of the state and its citizens is a continual conflict. Given the states' presumptive role as a steward of its populace and the conviction that citizens will not always act in a manner that supports the continued being of the state; a significant question that arises is what systems of citizen manipulation by states is most conducive to the preservation of state power. In other words, how do states stay in control? One method is in the veneration of the individual.

          Throughout history, those individuals given the authority to lead have held a distinctive and elevated position over the led. From humankind's austere beginnings as ragged groupings of people to the Age of Kings, the respective tribal leaders, chieftains and subsequent monarchs have possessed enormous power over their citizens and been venerated by them. As states developed, so did an understanding of the usefulness that specific individuals could play in the preservation of state power. The development of organized religion and the subsequent reverence of leaders as god-kings by their subjects is an example. Through the construction of religious and political doctrines, monarchs could assert their right to rule by the presumptive will of a higher power. Ruling through doctrines such as the Divine Right of Kings and the Mandate of Heaven ascribed the leader with god-like powers and the creation of the first widely recognized cults of personality (COP).  These COPs which were seen as direct representations of the state played an instrumental role in holding sway over the ruled masses and legitimizing the state. While the onset of new forms of government in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries would weaken and eventually destroy the institution of the monarch, globalization of the world, expansion of technology, and greater use of mass media would serve to create some of the most influential COPs and by association states in the twentieth century.

          A COP is created when governments attempt to introduce revolutionary or radical new ideas into a society, usually after a regime change or new system of government has been established . To help inculcate these ideas into a society, a single individual is chosen to serve as the patriarchal/matriarchal agent to safely shepherd the masses and act as the crusader and spearhead for the countries transformation.  The individual chosen exemplifies the values and beliefs of the new regime and will often come to symbolize the state itself. A COP may be the creation of the state or may be created from the actions of the individual who will become that personality within the cult.

          Methods of manipulating citizenry and COPs are an important subject deserving of study because the actions of the modern day state can often infringe on the rights of citizens. It can be said that there are many examples of nation states using COPs in unethical and unscrupulous manners, manipulating citizenry for reasons completely contrary to the will of the people and the social contract. While the most gross examples of this are obvious in despotic, totalitarian and authoritarian regimes (i.e. North Korea, Nazi Germany), the manipulation of a country's citizens for the preservation of state power is a practice employed by all states.  By understanding COPs and the mechanisms states use to manage their citizens we gain a much greater comprehension as to how our governments work and the ways in which citizens can influence change in states.