The gangs and criminal networks that have historically occupied Rio de Janeiro’s favelas are classified by some as criminal insurgencies. The gangs operate in small and organized units, patrolling and defending their favela territories. The patrolling and defending is done in an effort to maintain autonomy from the Brazilian government and security forces in order to maximize profits from the drug trade. This is their main objective. Limited, yes; but becoming more and more difficult to achieve. The gangs have the capabilities to employ guerrilla tactics and warfare techniques to achieve their goals and control territories. These territories, which have a highly complex structure, are the operating grounds for Brazil’s drug commerce.
“At the local level, each favela is controlled by a senior leader or dono. Under the dono is the general manager who manages the gang operations including drug sales and military activities. Under the general manger, there are sub-managers for cocaine sales, marijuana sales, and security. Each drug distribution point, called a boca de fumo, has a manager and security force. Finally, guards are employed to protect the perimeter of the favela from police or rival gang incursions.”
The members of these gangs generally have access to assault rifles, grenades, and heavy machine guns. While many speculate that the control and power of the drug gangs has been overestimated, one security analyst explained, “To survive, they have to be intelligent, clever, and ruthless.” The attacks in December of 2006 demonstrate the gangs’ capabilities. On December, 28 2006, drug gangs launched a synchronized attack against buses and police stations. It has been speculated that this was coordinated to intimidate Rio’s new government. In October of 2009, a police helicopter was shot down just one mile away from the Marcana Stadium in Rio, where the opening and closing ceremonies for the 2016 Olympics are to take place. The helicopter was attempting to descend upon the Morro dos Macacos favela when criminal gangs began to fire. Two officers were killed during a forced emergency landing. A similar attack happened in November of 2010, when buses and cars were set on fire and improvised explosives were detonated. The attacks, which left over 35 people dead, were understood to be a reaction to the pacification program.
While there are clear similarities between insurgents and the criminal gangs of the favelas, the central demands of the gangs are not political. The underlying tensions are a result of conflicting social interests and a lack of opportunities for residents. The youth within the favelas are raised in this culture of violence where the gang leaders run the communities.
A nongovernmental organization in Rio determined that around 20% of the guns seized in the country are foreign produced. Others, which are produced in Brazil but cannot be legally sold there, are exported and then smuggled back in to Brazil. Within the last year, Brazil has started working together with neighboring countries Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru to monitor terrain and track drug traffickers and arms smugglers. Brazil initiated the operation, and has the rights to enter the other countries’ air space. Recent reports, however, show an increased use of maritime routes to smuggle in arms. Even if Brazil is able to reduce maritime smuggling, the country still borders ten other nations, much of which are densely forested and remote areas. Brazil needs to focus its efforts on border security, specifically in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul. One report determined that Mato Grosso do Sul, which borders Paraguay and Bolivia, was the location of 30% of the export and re-importation of illegal weapons. Youth and impoverished residents of the favela would be much less likely to enter the drug world if they did not have access to the tools necessary to survive.
SOURCES
Boyle, Christina. “Brazilian Drug Gangs Shoot down Police Chopper Near Rio De Janiero; 2 Officers Dead.” NYDailyNews, October 17, 2009. http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-10-17/news/17937622_1_drug-gangs-rio-drug-traffickers.
“Brazil Unmanned Aircraft Hunt Drug Gangs.” UPI, n.d. http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/07/13/Brazil-unmanned-aircraft-hunt-drug-gangs/UPI-44691310596620/.
Burgoyne, Michael. “The Right Tool for the Job: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Counterinsurgency Principles Against Criminal Insurgency | Small Wars Journal”, n.d. http://smallwarsjournal.com/resource/the-right-tool-for-the-job-an-evaluation-of-the-effectiveness-of-counterinsurgency-principl.
Killebrew, Robert. “PRISM 2, No. 3: Criminal Insurgency in the Americas and Beyond”, n.d. http://www.ndu.edu/press/criminal-insurgency.html.
Stone, Hannah. “Brazil Police Say Sea Is New Arms Trafficking Frontier”, n.d. http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1242-brazil-police-say-sea-is-new-arms-trafficking-frontier.
Showing posts with label favela. Show all posts
Showing posts with label favela. Show all posts
Thursday, April 19, 2012
Tuesday, March 20, 2012
War Within Brazil
There is a common perception that there is an undeclared war in Brazil that is taking place between the favelas, military police, paramilitary groups and drug traffickers. The situation has been described in comparison to US troops in Afghanistan and to the Brazilian presence in Haiti.
Rio’s diverse terrain and portions of extreme concentrated poverty have contributed to and reinforced these war-like perceptions. The terrain ranges from mountains to jungles which provide a dangerous patrolling environment much like that in Kabul.
Rio is home to around 1,000 favelas, which are generally built on the mountain sides and home to poor migrant workers. Brazil’s conservative middle class has been characterized as criminalizing the poor, and supporting any and all military operations to invade the favelas. The physical wall that has been built around 13 favelas has further segregated them, and was referred to by one professor as “a fascist fence around the poor.”
The favelas are being increasingly inhabited by military bases. General Enzo Martins Peri, a commander of the Brazilian Army, compared the operational base being set up in the Alemao favela Complex in 2010 to the operations taking place in Haiti. The army, which had already previously been involved in police actions, had the support of the State Civil Police in forming a military command center within the Alemao Complex. Army installations were set up and conducted under the same regulations as those in Haiti, with power that not even the police was given.
Like in Haiti, the troops had the right to use force in order to impose peace, often by entering properties without warrants and shooting to kill. The director of the UN Information Center in Brazil explained, “In Haiti, the military can fight back with gunfire, not only as a form of self defense.” In Haiti, the Brazilian military (as part of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti--MINUSTAH) had to clear Haiti’s streets and perform combat engineering, strategies which were originally used in Brazilian favelas.
In November of 2011, special police force and navy commandos invaded Rocinha and Vidigal, two of Rio’s largest favelas. After these security forces invaded the favelas at the crack of dawn, they hoisted the Brazilian flag in them to show that government authority had been restored. One journalist posed the question, “Where have we gone wrong if it is necessary to hoist the Brazilian flag in Brazilian territory, as if this signified the conquest of foreign land?” Military occupations of favelas are treating them as if they are foreign territory.
The media has further reinforced the war with favelas by using war-like language. For example, a hurt man is referred to as “a wounded bandit,” and the people arrested are referred to by their favela nicknames instead of formal names. This language paints a more gang-like picture of all of the favela residents, the majority of whom are not directly involved in the drug trafficking. For example, statistics of the Alemao Complex show that only .05% of the 200,000 inhabitants are actually involved in the trafficking.
SOURCES
Auler, Marcelo, and Tania Monteiro. “Brazil: Army to Be Peacekeepers and Police at Rio De Janeiro.” O Estado De Sao Paulo Digital. Sao Paolo, December 4, 2010.
“Police Wrest Control of Rio’s Largest Favela to Expel Drug Traffickers.” The Daily Star. Beirut, November 14, 2011.
Slater, Russell. “Brazil: Why Raiding Rio’s Favelas Is Not as Good as It Looks.” Brazzil (August 21, 2009).
Toledo, Renato Godoy de, and Claudia Santiago. “Brazil Police Use Press Coverage as Green Light to Kill and Invade Houses in Rio.” Brazzil (November 10, 2009).
Zibechi, Raul. “In Stretch to the Olympics Rio Becomes Lab for Genocide and Social Control.” Brazzil (January 20, 2010).
Rio’s diverse terrain and portions of extreme concentrated poverty have contributed to and reinforced these war-like perceptions. The terrain ranges from mountains to jungles which provide a dangerous patrolling environment much like that in Kabul.
Rio is home to around 1,000 favelas, which are generally built on the mountain sides and home to poor migrant workers. Brazil’s conservative middle class has been characterized as criminalizing the poor, and supporting any and all military operations to invade the favelas. The physical wall that has been built around 13 favelas has further segregated them, and was referred to by one professor as “a fascist fence around the poor.”
The favelas are being increasingly inhabited by military bases. General Enzo Martins Peri, a commander of the Brazilian Army, compared the operational base being set up in the Alemao favela Complex in 2010 to the operations taking place in Haiti. The army, which had already previously been involved in police actions, had the support of the State Civil Police in forming a military command center within the Alemao Complex. Army installations were set up and conducted under the same regulations as those in Haiti, with power that not even the police was given.
Like in Haiti, the troops had the right to use force in order to impose peace, often by entering properties without warrants and shooting to kill. The director of the UN Information Center in Brazil explained, “In Haiti, the military can fight back with gunfire, not only as a form of self defense.” In Haiti, the Brazilian military (as part of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti--MINUSTAH) had to clear Haiti’s streets and perform combat engineering, strategies which were originally used in Brazilian favelas.
In November of 2011, special police force and navy commandos invaded Rocinha and Vidigal, two of Rio’s largest favelas. After these security forces invaded the favelas at the crack of dawn, they hoisted the Brazilian flag in them to show that government authority had been restored. One journalist posed the question, “Where have we gone wrong if it is necessary to hoist the Brazilian flag in Brazilian territory, as if this signified the conquest of foreign land?” Military occupations of favelas are treating them as if they are foreign territory.
The media has further reinforced the war with favelas by using war-like language. For example, a hurt man is referred to as “a wounded bandit,” and the people arrested are referred to by their favela nicknames instead of formal names. This language paints a more gang-like picture of all of the favela residents, the majority of whom are not directly involved in the drug trafficking. For example, statistics of the Alemao Complex show that only .05% of the 200,000 inhabitants are actually involved in the trafficking.
SOURCES
Auler, Marcelo, and Tania Monteiro. “Brazil: Army to Be Peacekeepers and Police at Rio De Janeiro.” O Estado De Sao Paulo Digital. Sao Paolo, December 4, 2010.
“Police Wrest Control of Rio’s Largest Favela to Expel Drug Traffickers.” The Daily Star. Beirut, November 14, 2011.
Slater, Russell. “Brazil: Why Raiding Rio’s Favelas Is Not as Good as It Looks.” Brazzil (August 21, 2009).
Toledo, Renato Godoy de, and Claudia Santiago. “Brazil Police Use Press Coverage as Green Light to Kill and Invade Houses in Rio.” Brazzil (November 10, 2009).
Zibechi, Raul. “In Stretch to the Olympics Rio Becomes Lab for Genocide and Social Control.” Brazzil (January 20, 2010).
Friday, February 24, 2012
Security Forces: What's happening now?
On February 9, 2012 the military police, civil police and firefighters in Rio de Janeiro declared a strike demanding a basic rate salary increase to R$3,500, or just over $2,000 USD. The civil police union ended up postponing the strike in order to stand by their primary commitment; to maintain security. The military police and firefighters continued to strike, however, despite the city-wide Carnaval celebrations that would certainly present security issues. The Secretary for the Civil Defense Department and fire brigade commander, Colonel Sérgio Simões, stated that 14,000 army troops and an additional 300 troops from the National Seucirity Force would be deployed to patrol the state and provide fire services. Recent news reports argue that the Brazilian public’s confidence in the police is greater now more than it ever has been, and that community members are increasingly feeling valued throughout society. This strike and lack of police surveillance make the newfound confidence sound like it might have just been the media’s spin on it (Croix).
Security policy analysts often suggest that Rio’s several police forces reform and unify into one large force. According to one public safety specialist, this is not a feasible option since each force has a specific function. Brazil’s Public Safety Secretary explains: “We inherited [the division between civil, investigative police and military, enforcement police] from the times of the [Portuguese] empire. You can’t decree things. Today, as Secretary, I think we’re still very far from having a police force with the whole cycle, from investigation to patrolling.”
There are around five hundred new police officers entering the force each month. The new officers are being trained under a new mentality, one which aims at de-emphasizing the importance of killing; one where police offers don’t feel naked without a rifle. As the curriculum changes and Rio’s favelas undergo their makeovers, one wonders if now would be the best time to transform the police forces into one, and if so, what this would look like? One thing is clear; in order to be effective, officials will need to maintain a constant community presence that is focused on prevention and respects human rights. The use of highly visible, forceful and ‘military style’ executions are becoming less and less popular (Michaels).
The UPPs (Pacifying Police Divisions) are squadrons of Brazilian officers occupying favelas using community-policing methods. The drug gangs and traffickers, who often have been in control of the favelas for over three decades, certainly feel the pressure on themselves and on their profits. Reflecting on the seriousness of the invasions, Beltrame stated (in somewhat war-like language), "We have taken from these people what was never taken from them before — their territory. They commit their barbarous acts, and they run for their hideouts, protected by weapons of war. It's important to arrest them, but it is more important to occupy their territory. Without seizing territory, there is no advance."
There have been 17 UPPs set up in 68 favelas, and crimes (such as murder and assault) in those communities are down significantly. To understand the implications of the UPPs will take a much deeper analysis, which will be addressed later on with the help of community (favela) level testimonies. However, it is clear that the policies for favela integration and restructuring must be long-term, and that they will require more than just community policing, and will need the support of international organizations and local NGOs.
Downie, Andrew. “Rio Finally Makes Headway Against its Drug Gangs.” Time Magazine. 11/26/2010.
Croiz, Sarah de Sainte. “Police Strike in Rio Begins Today: Daily” Rio Times. 2/10/2012.
Michaels, Julia. “Rio's top cop talks public safety policy, favela pacification program.” Latin America Monitor. 10/20/2011.
Security policy analysts often suggest that Rio’s several police forces reform and unify into one large force. According to one public safety specialist, this is not a feasible option since each force has a specific function. Brazil’s Public Safety Secretary explains: “We inherited [the division between civil, investigative police and military, enforcement police] from the times of the [Portuguese] empire. You can’t decree things. Today, as Secretary, I think we’re still very far from having a police force with the whole cycle, from investigation to patrolling.”
There are around five hundred new police officers entering the force each month. The new officers are being trained under a new mentality, one which aims at de-emphasizing the importance of killing; one where police offers don’t feel naked without a rifle. As the curriculum changes and Rio’s favelas undergo their makeovers, one wonders if now would be the best time to transform the police forces into one, and if so, what this would look like? One thing is clear; in order to be effective, officials will need to maintain a constant community presence that is focused on prevention and respects human rights. The use of highly visible, forceful and ‘military style’ executions are becoming less and less popular (Michaels).
The UPPs (Pacifying Police Divisions) are squadrons of Brazilian officers occupying favelas using community-policing methods. The drug gangs and traffickers, who often have been in control of the favelas for over three decades, certainly feel the pressure on themselves and on their profits. Reflecting on the seriousness of the invasions, Beltrame stated (in somewhat war-like language), "We have taken from these people what was never taken from them before — their territory. They commit their barbarous acts, and they run for their hideouts, protected by weapons of war. It's important to arrest them, but it is more important to occupy their territory. Without seizing territory, there is no advance."
There have been 17 UPPs set up in 68 favelas, and crimes (such as murder and assault) in those communities are down significantly. To understand the implications of the UPPs will take a much deeper analysis, which will be addressed later on with the help of community (favela) level testimonies. However, it is clear that the policies for favela integration and restructuring must be long-term, and that they will require more than just community policing, and will need the support of international organizations and local NGOs.
Downie, Andrew. “Rio Finally Makes Headway Against its Drug Gangs.” Time Magazine. 11/26/2010.
Croiz, Sarah de Sainte. “Police Strike in Rio Begins Today: Daily” Rio Times. 2/10/2012.
Michaels, Julia. “Rio's top cop talks public safety policy, favela pacification program.” Latin America Monitor. 10/20/2011.
Friday, January 20, 2012
Brazil's Unique Situation
Brazil is looking forward to the 'kick-start' that the upcoming mega-events are expected to give to its economy and development. This will not come without a cost though, and large investments are being made into Brazil's infrastructure and stadia.The map on the left shows the 12 different locations of the host cities for the 2014 FIFA World Cup. Each stadium is supposed to host between 40,000-60,000 guests.
Rio de Janeiro will also serve as the site of the 2016 Summer Olympics.
The most recent mega-events hosted in Brazil include the 1950 World Cup, the 1963 Pan-American Games and the 2007 Pan-American Games. The 2007 games were hosted in Rio, and sold 1.3 million tickets. These games were intended to be used as propaganda to secure Brazil as the host of the upcoming World Cup and Olympics. The propaganda worked.
The two principle economic reasons for hosting mega-events are economic development and a positive image in the media. As a result of hosting a mega-event, Brazil will automatically be the center of international media attention. Through positive media coverage, Brazil has the potential to dramatically increase tourism revenues.
The public budget and tax dollars used for the 2007 games were justified to Brazilians by the potential long-term economic benefits. Audience Characteristics of the 2007 games were somewhat surprising. 55% of the attending audience was between the ages of 10 and 29. Of the overwhelmingly young audience, 50% of all attendees bought their tickets online. Only 20% of the audience was from Rio, and only 3.9% was foreign tourists. Considering the high numbers of tickets purchased electronically, it would be beneficial to provide as much information as possible online before the events.
The unique situation in Rio presents many security challenges. The rich and poor live literally side by side. In order to feel comfortable, the rich often exclude the poor or block them from interfering with their lives. The social exclusion has lead to prevalent discrimination against people living in a favela (slum). Favelas are inter-mixed geographically with prosperous neighborhoods and are historically controlled by drug dealers.
Favelas are a huge component of Brazil's pop culture and they are participating more and more in local commerce activities. Store owners and transportation workers in the favelas are taxed by unofficial 'leaders.' Tourism is starting to bring in new opportunities for the 'favelados' (residents of the favelas). Many tourists make it a priority to visit the infamous favelas, despite safety concerns.
Security Measures to Consider
1. Crowd Management-This force pays special attention to organization, offers service and assistance to audience members, constitutes a low-level of policing. In the past, crowd management officers were not dressed as typical police force members. They intentionally appeared less aggressive.
For the 2007 Gemes, a large portion of these positions were filled by volunteers. The volunteers handed out guides (stadium maps, public transport, etc.) and spoke over megaphones.
A security concern of this would be the credibility of volunteers as a security force, even
for low-level policing.
2. Hotel and Restaurant Security
3. Transportation Security
Social Issues brought on by hosting mega-events
1. Interference with Public Space
The proposed destruction of the Parque de Flamengo in Marina de Gloria for the 2007 Games is one of the most well-known interferences. A famous panarama of the city was to be destroyed. The project was susbended due to threats from society.
2.Property Issues
Many of the homes surrounding the stadium are to be expropriated to allow for stadium development. For those properties that aren't taken over, prices are expected to rise making them unaffordable for many. Residents will be going through a 'redistribution' of location.
3.Promises not kept
Two new subway lines were promised for the 2007 Games and they were never built. The public was also promised access to use the stadiums after the events, however they were rarely used after the event. Sports are considered a 'luxury good' and the demand for stadium use was very low.
The mega-events and new policies are often seen as being used for city marketing, not for actually solving daily social problems of urban life. Previous investments tended to go toward already socially privileged areas, and avoided the areas that need help the most. The social issues have the potential to cause an unsupportive Brazilian public and a negative reaction to the authoritarianism.
Sources:
"FIFA World Cup Brazil." Destination. http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/destination/cities/index.html
"Metamorphosis of Marginality in Rio." Perlman, Janice
“Pan-American Games in Rio in 2007.” Curi, Knijnik,
Mascarenhas. International Review for the Sociology of Sport.
"Predicting the Costs and Benefits of Major Sporting Events." Barday, Jonathon
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