The Afterglow is Gone

Protestors clash with police in front of the Presidential Palace (Source: AP)

“I voted for Morsi. I thought the Brotherhood, more than any group, would have understood the concept of injustice and tried to fix it, but they failed.”
-- Egyptian protestor Ahmed Metwalli speaking from Tahrir Square on February 2, 2013 (Source: Dawn.com)

          Small events can spark major revolutions. Just as the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand initiated a chain of incidents that would result in the First World War, an act of self-immolation in 2010 in protest against a corrupt Tunisian government would change the geo-political landscape of the Middle East and North Africa. The Arab Spring was a tsunami of revolutionary fervor crested by a decentralized youthful protest movement that spread quickly from Tunisia to Egypt, Libya and other countries. The toppling of long standing dictators and their corrupt regimes generated social and political euphoria throughout the Middle East. Many countries held their first free democratic elections, bringing long suppressed political groups to center stage. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood seized the reigns of power winning a number of referendums and elections that ultimately culminated in 2012 with the election of President Mohammed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood backed candidate. Across much of the Arab World, widespread feelings of jubilation and hope for a brighter, more free and more prosperous future reigned.

           Over two years on from the onset of the Arab Spring, the optimistic views held by many are now wearing thin, and the shadow of winter and reality seems to have eclipsed the euphoria once felt by many. Tunisia’s Islamist government has “acknowledged the prospect of civil war…” breaking out between Islamists and modernists (See “Tunisia’s Islamist government…”). Chaos reigns in Libya. Infighting within the Libyan General National Congress and continued clashes between rival militias and Islamist groups threaten “another revolution” (See Gumuchian,Marie-Louise) and a growing potential breeding ground for Islamic Jihadi militants (See Michael, Maggie). An Islamist backlash from the current conflict in Mali threatens the already fragile Libyan government due to weapons and fighters funneled through Libya to Mali, Syria and other countries. Yemen is embroiled in a struggle against armed militant groups, is on the verge of a food crisis and the government exerts little control outside the capital of Sanaa and a few other major cities (See Al Zuhayyan, Abdulrahman). The Syrian "revolution" has become more civil war than revolution, and is widely seen as a proxy war between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran (See “Foreign Policy: Proxy…”).

           Ironically, the most stable countries within the region seem to have been ruthless dictatorships that acted decisively in the face of the Arab Spring to crush dissent (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Algeria), to bribe citizens with money, free food, loan interest forgiveness and other freebies to stop pro-democracy activism (Kuwait, United Arab Emirates), to implement immediate “reforms” (the permanence of which remains in question) and make accommodations with other existing political parties in an effort to cling to power (Morocco, Jordan).

           In Egypt, the people are marking the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution with widespread protests. There is an increasing sentiment of discontent with the government, led by President Morsi and a parliament dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Political opposition to the Muslim Brother's persistent efforts to “Islamacize” Egypt has revealed an unmistakable authoritarian streak in the new Islamist regime. Mubarak-like dictates cementing Morsi’s word as the final authority in government, a perceived Brotherhoodization of the state and mass media, a worsening economy, along with little real positive change in day-to- day life has left many previously hopeful Egyptians jaded and disillusioned (See previous blog post “Meet the New Boss…”). Amid the planting of 10,000 trees for the Muslim Brotherhood social welfare campaign “Together We Build Egypt”-- Egyptian internal strife reached a head last week as more than 60 people were killed in protests in the coastal city of Port Said and hundreds injured in other anti state/anniversary marches in 12 other governorates. Martial law and a curfew was declared in 3 governorates by President Morsi; these dictates were openly defied by protestors.

          The Muslim Brotherhood now faces what may prove to be insurmountable challenges. There is an essential contradiction that is inherent in the fundamental nature and goals of the Muslim Brotherhood itself. Although its rise to power was made possible by democratic elections, , Muslim Brotherhood ideology clearly tends toward an authoritarian religious state. Islamist authoritarianism coupled with the failure to restore a healthy economy, continuing social justice issues, and rampant corruption is eroding the Muslim Brotherhood's popularity, and is calling its very legitimacy into question. The narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood during the revolution was the promise of unity, honesty, transparency and reform, a people’s revolution rather than an Islamic one (See “Ikhwanweb: Egypt’s Revolution"). Immediately after President Morsi’s election, he sought to allay the fears of an impending Islamic State in the vein of Saudi Arabia. He espoused a narrative of moderation, an environment of inclusiveness, religious tolerance and democratic plurality. These promises have not translated into action and once again Egyptians are taking matters in their own hands.

           In response to the President’s dictatorial constitutional edicts of 22 November 2012 (See previous blog post “Meet the New Boss…”) the National Salvation Front was formed. Led by Nobel laureate Mohammed El Baradei, and former presidential candidates Amr Moussa and Hamdeen Sabahi, the National Salvation Front has framed themselves as the de-facto opposition umbrella group to President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. Espousing a position of non-violent opposition, they have created a coalition that was expected to run for seats in the parliamentary elections set for April. In the wake of violent protests seen in the last few weeks, the National Salvation Front has moved towards a more assertive stance calling for President Morsi to step down from power (See “Egypt’s Opposition Backs Morsi Exit Call”). Though the National Salvation Front has presented an increasingly hardliner approach, to some protestors these demands are not enough.

From L to R: Hamdeen Sabahi, Mohammed El Baradei and Amr Moussa the leaders of the National Salvation Front (Source: Ahram Online)

          Revolutions are often bloody and chaotic. They also often produce unintended side effects. One side effect of the Arab Spring has been a "great awakening" of the ordinary people of the Middle East, the so-called "Arab Street". Throughout the Middle East there is now a heightened political consciousness where people are aware of the possibility of change and are more ready to confront government authoritarianism in both peaceful and violent protest. In other words, the threat of an angered Arab Street rising up against Morsi in a “althowra athaneeya” (The Second Revolution) in Egypt is a real threat to the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi’s regime. The popular social networking site Facebook hosts the “althowra athaneeya almisreah” (See "The Second Egyptian Revolution") page that comments daily on the developments ongoing in Egypt and seeks to bring together Egyptians, much as Facebook and Twitter allowed the Arab Street to coalesce and act during the first Egyptian Revolution against Hosni Mubarak’s regime.

"The Second Egyptian Revolution" page keeps daily tabs on events and seeks to bring Egyptians together (Source: Facebook)

Facebook comment from "The Second Egyptian Revolution" page capturing the frustration with the current government, making comparisons between President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood with the former regime (Source: Facebook)

          The unforeseen appearance of an “Egyptian Black Bloc” among protestors after incidents of police brutality against demonstrators in December of 2012 further complicates the tenuous political situation within the country and adds another unpredictable element to an already potentially explosive mix. The “Black Bloc” is the general name for anonymous individuals gathering to protest against corruption and tyranny. Originally used as a tactic in 1977 demonstrations against the Brokdorf Nuclear Power Plant in Germany, the tactic of anonymous black-dressed individuals protesting has since spread throughout the world (See “Black Bloc") and similar activism took place during the first Egyptian Revolution with protestors appropriating the Guy Fawkes mask previously used by the activist group “Anonymous”. The Egyptian Black Bloc has been framed by President Morsi as a militia manipulated by malign outside forces, by the Muslim Brotherhood as “thugs” inciting violence and turmoil within the country (See Michael, Maggie, “Masked…”) and being tacitly supported by the opposition. The Egyptian Black Bloc appears to cast themselves as “defenders of the protestors” and an anti-Morsi/Muslim Brotherhood element that is willing to act when other opposition groups do not. Presumably, the Egyptian Black Bloc sees the actions of groups like the National Salvation Front and other opposition as ineffectual given the state of failed reforms while liberal opposition groups view the Egyptian Black Bloc as unneeded incitement towards more violence and instability. Saad Zhagloul, a renowned Egyptian revolutionary and statesman in the 1920s is quoted as saying, “The Egyptian voices will be heard, and if not heard, it will be only because the blood already shed has not been enough…” It seems that Egyptians are willing to return to the fight and reclaim what is now seen by many as a stolen revolution (See Zaheer, Salma).

Black Bloc in Tahrir during recent protests against the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi (Source: Reuters)

          Plato observed that "extreme liberty" (e.g, protest and revolution) naturally leads to tyranny. The reflexive response of a regime facing the challenge of street demonstrations and violent opposition to its authority is to impose ever-harsher measures in the name of order and stability. Seemingly on cue, Egypt’s Shura Council (the upper house of the Parliament) is set to discuss a draft anti-protest/anti thuggery law that would “grant police a free hand to disrupt and disperse street protests” and grant the interior ministry the right to forbid demonstrations, public gatherings, and meetings at their discretion (See Essam El-Din, Gamal). Given the already brutal tendencies demonstrated by the Egyptian Police when “fettered” by law in the past weeks, including the suspected torturing to death of one protestor (See Kingsley, Patrick), one can only imagine the police methods of quelling civil unrest when given free reign to do as they may by a harried regime and the unintended consequences of such actions; small events can spark major revolutions.

 

According to the Egyptian Interior Ministry "police forces have not been able to fight violent street protests in recent days" (Source: Text Al-Ahram/Video Al-Haya News via Youtube)

          This may be the pivotal moment where the fate of the Egyptian Revolution is decided. President Morsi and Egypt are at a crossroads. One path leads to neoliberal democracy. The other descends to chaos, strife and a potential bloody second Egyptian Revolution. It seems that in the short term President Morsi is likely to attempt the tactics used by other authoritarian regimes to crush dissent but in the long term will have to compromise with the opposition if he and the Muslim Brotherhood intends to stay in power--- and are allowed to remain in power.

In a revolution, as in a novel, the most difficult part to invent is the end.

-- Alexis de Tocqueville

  
Sources:

Al Zuhayyan, Abdulrahman (January 5, 2013). “World Has A Lot At Stake In Yemen.” Arab News. Retrieved February 3, 2013, from: http://www.arabnews.com/world-has-lot-stake-yemen

“Black Bloc.” (N.D.) Wikipedia. Retrieved February 3, 2013, from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_bloc

El Tablawy, Tarek and Mariam Fam (January 24, 2013). “Cairo Slum-Dwellers Despair of Mursi On Uprising Anniversary.” Bloomberg News. Retrieved February 2, 2013, from: http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-01-23/cairo-slum-dwellers-despair-of-mursi-on-uprising-s-anniversary

“Egypt’s Opposition Backs Morsi Exit Call.” Al-Jazeera. Retrieved February 3, 2013, from: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/02/201322163950716415.html

“Egypt Protest Targets Morsi Palace As Violence Flares.” Dawn.com. Retrieved February 3, 2013, from: http://dawn.com/2013/02/01/egypt-protest-targets-morsi-palace-as-violence-flares/

Essam El-Din, Gamal. (February 3, 2013). “Shura Council Discusses Laws ‘To Control Protests And Confront Thuggery’.” Al-Ahram. Retrieved February 3, 2013, from: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/63966/Egypt/Politics-/Shura-Council-discusses-laws-to-control-protests-a.aspx

“Foreign Policy: Proxy War Between Saudi Arabia and Iran.” (N.D.) Al-Quds (Arabic). Retrieved February 1, 2013, from: http://www.alquds.com/news/article/view/id/346348

“Ikhwanweb: Egypt’s Revolution Is A People’s Revolution With No Islamic Agenda.” Ikhwanweb. Retrieved December 30, 2012, from: http://www.ikhwanweb.com/print.php?id=27963

Kingsley, Patrick. (February 4, 2013). “Egyptian Protester Dies After Suspected Police Torture.” The Guardian. Retrieved February 4, 2013, from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/04/egyptian-protester-dies-suspected-torture

Michael, Maggie (January 26, 2013). “Fears Grow That Libya Is An Incubator For Turmoil.” Yahoo News. Retrieved January 31, 2013, from: http://news.yahoo.com/fears-grow-libya-incubator-turmoil-195835295.html

Michael, Maggie (January 28, 2013). “Masked ‘Black Bloc’ A Mystery In Egypt Unrest.” Associated Press. Retrieved February 3, 2012, from: http://world.time.com/2013/01/28/masked-black-bloc-a-mystery-in-egypt-unrest/

Morrow, Adam and Khaled Al-Omrani (January 31, 2013). “Egypt faces ‘Mubarak-like’ Morsi.” Asia Times. Retrieved January 31, 2013, from: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/OA31Ak01.html

“Tunisia’s Islamist Government Warns of Civil War with Modernists.” World Tribune. (January 14, 2013). Retrieved February 2, 2013, from: http://www.worldtribune.com/2013/01/14/tunisias-islamist-government-warns-of-civil-war-with-modernists/

Gumuchian, Marie-Louise (January 31, 2013). “Two Years On, Benghazi Threatens ‘Another Revolution’ In Libya.” Reuters. Retrieved January 31, 2013, from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/01/us-libya-benghazi-idUSBRE91002N20130201

Ottaway, Marina (July 31, 2012). “Morrocco: Can The Third Way Succeed?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved February 3, 2012, from: http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/07/31/morocco-can-third-way-succeed/d3op

Sen, Ashish Kumar (January 24, 2013). “Egyptian Youths Are Ready For Another Revolution.” The Washington Times. Retrieved February 3, 2012, from: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/24/egyptian-youths-are-ready-for-another-revolution/?page=1

Zaheer, Salma (January 22, 2013). “Abu Hamid: The Brotherhood Is The Biggest Devil And They Stole The Revolution.” Al-Destour (Arabic). Retrived February 2, 2013, from: http://dostor.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1/132636-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%88%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9

Combating Violent Extremism and Insurgency in Mali and Nigeria

Combating Violent Extremism and Insurgency in Mali and Nigeria

(Map of West Africa showing Mali and Nigeria). Retrieved February 3, 2013 from http://www.rescue.org/blog/africa-conflict-mali-meets-worsening-food-crisis?ms=gg_nonb_zzz_zzzz_an_zzzzzz&gclid=CL-pp9uQmLUCFfSlPAodJR8ATw

With the recent escalating military actions by the French forces against the Tuareg rebel group (the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) in Mali and the deadly radical Islamist sect, Boko Haram, in Nigeria, violent extremism and insurgency show no lasting sign of abating. Most African leaders ignore the internal domestic factors that promote violence in their countries; rather, they perpetually seek international intervention to the crisis at hand. They restrict the analysis of the issues solely to the dangers and threats extremist groups pose to the rest of the continent, particularly, the linking up of these terrorist groups with Al-Qaeda in other to merit and command the attention of the international community. For example, the Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, told a panel at the recent 2013 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland that “if violent extremism is not contained in Nigeria, definitely it will spill into other countries in West Africa…..It is one of the reasons we have to move fast” (Reuters, 2013).

The missing link here is a clear focus on identifying the internal domestic factors that continually fan the flames of extremism in Africa, particularly in Mali and Nigeria. These factors include endemic elite corruption, pervasive use of extremist groups by politicians and political parties to win elections, bad governance, military brutality, continued economic challenges, weak state capacity, ethnic divisions, and incessant international influence. It seems appropriate to critically examine the causal efficacy of these triggering factors with a view to find lasting solutions to the impasse of violent extremism and insurgency in Mali and Nigeria.

The premise of insurgency, very broadly speaking, is that armed groups seeking to overthrow an existing government can do so over the long term, using a variety of violent and non-violent tactics that include terrorism (Zalman, 2009). Terrorism has been defined “to be any premeditated violent act perpetrated against civilian non-combatants by sub-national or international groups, clandestine agents or individuals sympathetic to larger terrorist groups and movements, with the intent to influence a target audience larger than the intended victims toward or against a particular policy action” (Cox et al., 2009). This further illustrate the actions of the rebel group called the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) in Mali that seeks to establish an independent state in their home region of Northern Mali, a region that is pre-supposedly rich in uranium and oil.  Likewise, the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria has introduced abysmal depths of insurgency characterized by orchestrated bomb attacks, large-scale suicide attacks on innocent churches, mosques, and coordinated hostage taking and shootings to make known their demands of establishing undiluted Sharia law in Nigeria.

Researchers have made several attempts to sue for lasting peace in both Nigeria and Mali, and these efforts have resulted in the emergence of different theories on the subject. Prominent among the theories are: frustration-aggression and relative deprivation (Dollard et al., 1939; Gurr, 1970 & 2000), state-failure (Rotberg, 2002 &2003; Zartman, 1995), and resource curse theories (Bannon and Collier, 2003). The state-failure thesis argues that nation-states exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political goods to persons living within designated parameters of the state. Nation- states are further responsible to answer to the legitimate concerns and demands of their citizens (Rotberg, 2003). It is rather unfortunate that most governments in Africa are negligent and irresponsible to their citizens. Rotberg contends that nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence, and as a result are unable to provide security and positive political goods to their citizens. These political goods include security, education, health care, infrastructures, employment opportunities, and a legal framework for law and order (Rotberg 2002 pg. 87). It thus becomes very clear that once the state is lacking in performing its civic responsibilities to the citizens, it loses credibility and legitimacy before the very eyes of their citizens. Thus, many of these citizens will then naturally transfer their loyalty and allegiance to more responsive authority other than the state (which include religious groups and civil right movements), while other disgruntled turn to terrorism.

General Carter Ham, Commander of the United States African Command (AFRICOM), cautions African governments not to rely solely on the use of excessive military force to fight the war against terror in Africa. He laments that “though there is perhaps some necessity for some military action, the solution lies in the non-military solution and activities that would address the underline causes of the dissatisfactions which include good governance” (Guardian Newspaper, February 01 2013). Ultimately, the continuous use of military force seems preferable in dousing the tension of extremism in Mali and Nigeria, but protracted military effort is not going to eradicate the long-term problem as this is capable of leaving another negative dimension to an endless warfare on the continent. Violent extremism and insurgents thrive in an environment charged with hopelessness and African governments must begin to be more responsive to the socio-economic well-being of the people, and further engage systematic means of mediating disputes without recourse to the protracted use of armed insurrection.

Works Cited

Bannon, I., & Collier, P. (2003). Normal Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions, DC:

World Bank.

Cox, D., Falconer, J., & Brain Stackhouse (2009). Terrorism, Instability, and Democracy in Asia and

                Africa. Northeastern University Press Boston.

Dollard, J., Doob, L., Miller, N., Mowrer, O.H., & Robert Sears (1939). Frustration and Aggression. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Onuorah, M. (2013, February 1). US General Cautions African Government Against Over Reliance on

Military For War Against Terror. Guardian. Retrieved from http://ngrguardiannews.com

Gurr, T.  (2000). People versus states: Minorities at Risk in the New Century. Washington DC: United

States Institute for Peace.

Gurr, T. (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Prince University Press.

Rotberg, R. (2003). State Failure and State Weakness in Time of Terror, DC: Brookings Institution Press

Rotberg, R. (2002). The New Nature of Nation-State Failure. The Washington Quarterly 25(3): 85-96.

Zalman, A. (2009). Now that the “War is Out”. Retrieved from

                http://terrorism.about.com/od/usforeignpolicy/a/GlobalInsurgent.htm

Reuters. 2013. US, Africa say Mali Action counters growing Islamist Threat.

http://www.reuters.com/assets

Zartman, I. (1995). Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority. DC:

Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Drinking the Kool-Aid: "Influence: Science and Practice" by Robert B. Cialdini - A Review

"Influence: Science and Practice" by Robert B. Cialdini (Source: Amazon.com)

          Most people would be shocked to discover the extent to which their emotions, opinions and attitudes are manipulated in every facet of life. From their political affiliations to mundane decisions on which vacuum cleaner to purchase, people are barraged continually by tactics tailored to shape and drive human behavior and decision making. According to Robert Cialdini, a social psychologist and author of “Influence: Science and Practice”, these tactics are successful in large part because they prey upon fundamental psychological principles that are present in each of us. In the hands of a master manipulator aware of these vulnerabilities, these techniques can yield “purchases, donations, concessions, votes, or assent” in individuals and groups (See Cialdini, Robert p XI).

          Cialdini focuses on the psychology of compliance; how people influence others to act in a way in which they would not normally act. While much of Cialdini’s book is targeted to marketing and sales, his theories are readily applied to the arena of politics. The 2008 Obama presidential campaign applied these theories to create the successful “Get Out The Vote” campaign and later to influence his campaign for change in the healthcare system and the economy (See Grunwald, Michael). Initially written as a classroom text, Cialdini’s book has become a pop culture phenomenon in large part because it not only outlines methods of persuasion but also provides useful guidance on how to recognize and avoid these persuasion methods.

          Cialdini suggests that humans have fixed, involuntary and automatic patterns of behavior which have been acquired since childbirth. When triggered, these “fixed action patterns” also referred to as human automatic actions (See Cialdini, Robert p6) begin a sequence of predictable behavior from start to finish. These automatic actions are useful to humans because they provide “judgmental heuristics” (a term of art meaning mental shortcuts) that allow us to rapidly perform a shallow analysis of a complex environment. Examples of judgmental heuristics are stereotypes, analogies, metaphors, rules of thumb and other constructs that enable human beings to quickly classify something and then act according to that general classification. Interestingly, the use of metaphors as assessment tools is similar to cognitive linguist George Lakoff’s theories on framing and metaphor. In Lakoff’s model, metaphors are conceptual building blocks that people use as the basis of how to think and act (See Lakoff, George) whereas Cialdini sees metaphor as one tool among many to evaluate a situation. An instance of judgmental heuristics that Cialdini cites is the stereotype “expensive = quality” whereas "cheap = low quality". Lakoff suggests an interesting parallel where across all human cultures the direction of "up" is a metaphor for more and "down" for less.

          These automatic stereotyped behaviors are very efficient in allowing human beings to process information at a high level but they leave us vulnerable to “profiteers” (individuals that use compliance techniques to influence others [See Cialdini, Robert p9]). An unscrupulous compliance professional who understands these mental shortcuts can mimic “trigger features” that elicit an automatic complying response in the individual. Cialdini indicates that these techniques are not infallible, but they work in many, many cases and are often unnoticed by the targeted subjects. For example, there are instances where a manufacturer has increased price without changing the product and subsequently increased sales, because of a resulting perception among consumers of a higher quality product. Lakoff’s work on framing taps into this idea of being able to influence opinion by presenting narratives that appeal to the metaphors that underpin the thought processes existing in the psyche. The business of politics is the stuff of metaphor and stereotype. For example one side uses the frame of “tax burden”, suggesting the image of a crushing weight on the shoulders of hard working Americans depleting their hard-earned resources, will, and strength. The other side frames taxes as “what you pay to be an American, to live in a civilized society that is democratic and offers opportunity…” (Powell quoting Lakoff, See Powell, Bonnie). The facts relating to an issue do not change with framing, but voters' attitudes and perception of issues are heavily influenced by how that issue is framed.

          Cialdini has extensively studied consumer psychology, finding that marketeers and sales people draw heavily on six categories of "compliance tactics": reciprocation, consistency, social proof, liking, authority, and scarcity. Reciprocation is the feeling of a person who has been given something of an obligation to repay the debt that was created. Metaphors such as “tit for tat” or “one hand washes to the other” draw on deeply-rooted notions of fairness and equity. Consistency refers to the innate desire of most people to act and think in ways that are consistent with their own belief system. Consistency is a valuable an sought after trait. A person consistent in values, beliefs and previous decisions is thought to be “reliable” and “good” (See Cialdini, Robert p94). Once a person has been persuaded to commit to an idea or action, they are predisposed to behave consistently thereafter, often following through with additional demands associated with the previous commitment in an effort to remain consistent even if the initial commitment is found to be wrong. A classic example is doomsday cult followers who choose to remain within the cult even though doomsday has come and gone numerous times. Authority is the psychological principle that there is a tendency to obey or heed the teaching of those who represent authority. An example of this is former talk show diva Oprah Winfrey’s Book Club. Formerly obscure and struggling book titles would instantly be catapulted to bestseller status after being recommended by Oprah. Out of 70 recommended titles during a 15-year period, over 50 books made it on bestseller lists. Oprah not only influenced her listeners to buy books, but also influenced her followers on political and cultural issues so much so that the phrase the “Oprah Effect” was coined (See Jacobson, Murrey). Liking is simply the principle that we are more likely to help and say yes to someone that we like and know versus someone who is unknown. Social proof or imitation is the idea that people will act, do or believe in something based on what other people are doing or saying, particularly if those people are similar to them. Scarcity is the idea that when something such as an opportunity is presented as less available, it is perceived as more desirable and valuable. For example, ads on television proclaiming “Act Now”, “Limited Quantites” or “Limited Time Offer” are all tactics used to instill a sense of scarcity and therefore an urgency which incites people to buy.

Consumerism as an alturistic act for loved ones or manipulation? (Source: Pierre Bourgeault-noistar.com)

          Cialdini offers many real world examples to support his 6 categories of compliance. He cites “possibly (the) most spectacular act of compliance of our time,” (See Cialdini, Robert p127) the “Jonestown Massacre” to support the category of social proof (See “Jonestown”). Beginning in 1977, members of the religious cult “Peoples Temple” began migrating from the United States to Jonestown, Guyana to escape perceived religious persecution and to create a “socialist paradise” in the jungle (See “Peoples Temple”). In 1978, 907 members of the Peoples Temple, among them 276 children committed mass suicide. Forming in orderly queues, they drank cyanide and sedative laced Flavor Aid (often referred to incorrectly as kool-aid) at the behest of their leader, the reverend Jim Jones. According to Cialdini, under conditions of uncertainty and the unknown, in the wilderness of a foreign country far away from home and family, members willingly and calmly dosed themselves and their children with poison because, “they looked to the actions of others to guide their own actions” (See Cialdini, Robert p129), a herd mentality that demonstrates the influence of social proof.

          Uncertainty and looking to what other people were doing may have played a role in Jonestown. However, it seems to me to be quite a stretch to assume that social proof and uncertainty were a more significant driving force in the behavior of members than being dependent upon the organization of the Peoples Temple for sustenance and survival, the fear of an unbalanced and megalomanical Jim Jones, his gun toting acolytes and an overall feeling that there was no viable choice other than to “drink the kool-aid” (a commonly used metaphor derived from the Jonestown Massacre referring to beliefs held without any critical examination [See “Drinking the…”]).

Did they want to "drink the kool-aid" or were they coerced? (Source: AP)

          Human beings actions and ideas are shaped and manipulated everyday often unknowingly. Cialdini’s focus is on applications and behavioral patterns that can be manipulated. In contrast scientists like Lakoff (metaphor is the basic process of how people evaluate the world in moral terms), John Zaller (people obtain their political and social beliefs from elites) and John Turner (Social identity theory) are focused on the fundamental aspects and theories of human personality at a more granular, deeper level. Cialdini’s analysis is more superficial, but in a way also more useful because he describes many specific tools that are used in manipulating individual and group behavior. His book also serves to make people aware of such practices so they will be more able to read between the lines, form, and adopt informed opinions and judgments on issues that are important to them while avoiding manipulative influence.


Works Cited:

Cialdini, Robert. (1985). “Influence: Science and Practice.” Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company.

“Drinking the Kool-Aid.” (n.d.) Wikipedia. Retrieved December 17, 2012 at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drinking_the_Kool-Aid

Grunwald, Michael. (April 2, 2009). “How Obama Is Using The Science Of Change.” Time Magazine. Retrieved December 16, 2012, from: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1889153,00.html

Jacobson, Murrey. (May 25, 2011). "The Oprah Effect, By The Numbers." PBS News Hour. Retrieved December 16, 2012, from: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2011/05/the-oprah-phenomenon---by-the-numbers.html

“Jonestown.” (n.d.) Wikipedia. Retrieved December 17, 2012 at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonestown_massacre

Lakoff, George & Mark Johnson. (1980). “Metaphors We Live By.” Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

“Peoples Temple.” (n.d.) Wikipedia. Retrieved December 17, 2012 at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peoples_Temple#San_Francisco_Temple

Powell, Bonnie. (October 27, 2003). “Framing The Issues: UC Berkeley Professor George Lakoff Tells How Conservatives Use Language To Dominate Politics.” UC Berkeley News. Retrieved December 16, 2012, from: http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2003/10/27_lakoff.shtml

Meet the New Boss...Same as the Old Boss?

One of numerous posters comparing President Morsi to Former President Mubarak. The Arabic reads "Mohammed Morsi Mubarak" (Source: Mohammed Abd El Ghany-Reuters)

The current power struggle playing itself out in Egypt demonstrates the visceral and emotional power of framing in politics. On November 22^nd, in a move that shocked the international community and left many Egyptians with a sickening sensation of déjà vu, the first freely democratically elected leader of Egypt, President Mohammed Morsi bestowed upon himself sweeping and unrestricted executive powers by rendering impotent the Egyptian judiciary branch and circumventing the system of checks and balances (See Hume, Tim). While President Morsi presented 7 edicts, the two that drew the most criticism were Article 2- the pronouncement that all presidential decrees were exempt from judicial review and Article 5- the judiciary branch would have no ability to dissolve the upper house of parliament (the Shura Council) or the Constituent Assembly. Egyptian courts had previously dissolved the first Constituent Assembly along with the Parliament and rumors suggested that the Supreme Constitutional Court was “poised to dissolve the existing [largely Islamist] assembly in a ruling next Sunday” (See Kirkpatrick, David). With these decrees, a dead letter Egyptian constitution, a defanged judiciary and non-existent legislature, President Morsi’s executive power is now supreme and exceeds even that of his predecessor, ousted former President Hosni Mubarak.

The president maintains that this state of affairs is only temporary and necessary to preserve democratic gains made during the Egyptian Revolution of 25 January and to ensure the creation of a constitution which will be unhindered by anti-democratic and former regime elements still present in the judiciary and government. Regardless of his rationale, the President’s decision was immediately barraged with criticism from the judiciary and brought thousands of protestors as well as counter-protestor supporters of the President to the streets of every major city in Egypt. In the days since, violent clashes have erupted between Muslim Brotherhood (MB)/Morsi supporters and protestors, leaving a number of Egyptians dead and wounded. Elements of the judiciary, including the Supreme Court, have gone on strike paralyzing the court system across the country. Outside of Egypt, the perceived “power grab” by President Morsi has drawn condemnation from the United Nations Human Rights commissioner Navi Pillay as undermining the precepts of liberty, social justice and freedom that were the bedrock ideas of the Egyptian Revolution (See “Egypt: UN Human Rights…”). It is interesting that Western powers including the United States remain reticent to publicly condemn President Morsi’s actions (See Knox, Olivier).

The MB has had a loud and physical stage presence in the tumult of daily protests and growing political instability, framing President Morsi’s decrees as the only viable solution to combat the “enemy within” the political system- i.e., Mubark era judiciary appointees who were “part and parcel” of his autocratic policies (See Hendawi,Hamza) and whom President Morsi claims are the real obstacles to the creation of a legitimate constitution. Nobel Laureate and Egyptian liberal opposition leader Mohammed ElBaradei tweeted "(They) are currently staging a coup against democracy...regime legitimacy fast eroding," (See Spencer, Richard). ElBaradei later called for more protests, and in response a MB senior member commented, “He’s Western” (See Rohde, David).

The importance of framing ideas as a powerful tool to establish or delegitimize ideas, movements and political actors, is on full display in this clarifying moment of the Egyptian Revolution. It is well established that logical argument based on facts is usually a miserably ineffective political strategy. Human beings adopt and evolve political views in ways which have very little to do with factual analysis or reasoned comparisons of issues. There are several overlapping models which attempt to describe political socialization, such as research showing that people acquire political views from elites (See Zaller, 1992), that people self-identify with a group (See “Social Identity…”) and afterwards internalize the normative views of that group, media and communication such as television ads which use framing and narrative, and linguistic models which emphasize filtering (See Herman & Chomsky, 2002) and metaphor (See Lakoff, 1980). Identity and moral sense are fundamental ideas underlying several models of political socialization. Lakoff, for example, believes that human beings at a young age develop a library of moral metaphors which serve as the framework in later years for political, religious and moral belief (See Lakoff, 1980).

A classic example of the political power of framing is the "It's Morning Again in America" frame, communicated iconically in a Ronald Regan presidential re-election campaign television commercial with soft, warm images of an idealized America, such as picket fences, beautiful children, strong brave men leading happy families, weddings and the like. This framing consolidated the success of the Southern strategy popularized by President Richard Nixon's campaign in the late 1960s. How can one rebut an argument which is not an argument, but rather is a highly emotional feeling? This requires counter-framing.

                By framing ElBaradei as "Western", the MB is attempting to associate its opponents, without ever having to prove any factual charges or even make any specific accusations, with aspects of Western culture and foreign policy which are hugely unpopular in Egypt and the Arab world. The not-so-subtle implication is that the largely young, educated often English speaking Egyptians who took the streets against Mubarak and actually initiated the Revolution are useful idiots-- tools of America and Europe acting as a naïve, or even traitorous Fifth Column, manipulated by The West. There are a number of connotations to this descriptor: exploitive, colonial, conspiracy, rapacious, war, consumerism, anti-Islam and support of Israel among them. This is one of the fundamental frames that the MB invokes against the liberal opposition. Ironically, the MB senior leadership were wary to support the revolution in its early stages allowing only their youth wing to be involved- true to their chameleon political history. Another irony is that the MB itself has a long history of accommodating and working with the Mubarak, Sadat and Nasser regimes.

A pawn of the West? (Source: Reuters- Mohammed Salem)

              Contrastingly, the liberal opposition frames this current struggle as Mubarak part deux or the rise of a “new Pharaoh” (See Hendawi, Hamza), referring to Mubarak’s failed attempts to cast himself as a modern day Pharaoh of Egypt (See Fein, Judie). This is powerful framing because the memory of the Mubarak dictatorship is still fresh in everyone's minds, mindful of the Egyptian historical cycle of revolution and liberation, followed by the imposition of authoritarianism in the name of a temporary emergency, which remains in place indefinitely.

President Mohammed Morsi depicted as the "new Pharaoh" of Egypt (Source: AP)

                President Morsi’s ascension to the presidential seat was filled with hope for a brighter future and in the intervening time he has made great strides in a number of areas relating to foreign policy. He has secured vital loans from a number of countries, ensured continuing tithes from the U.S., acted as a mediator for the Israeli-Hamas cease fire and cemented Egypt’s role as an important and necessary actor within the region. However, little has actually changed in the daily lives of Egyptians. Unemployment is still rampant, fundamental government services like water and electricity spotty, increasing prices on staple goods, a stalled constitution and an overall unease among many urban Egyptians as to the ultimate goal of the MB affiliated President Morsi. While he did win the presidency, he was considered by many moderate Egyptians to be the lesser evil, the best candidate among two bad choices. Even then he won by a narrow margin of 3%, 51.7% to 48.3% (See “Muslim Brotherhood backed…”). This most current unrest only heightens the fears of an Islamization/Brotherhoodization of the state and a return to an authoritarian regime.

  It seems at this point President Morsi has perhaps been overly ambitious in attempting to consolidate political power to advance his vision of an Islamic democratic nation. This has triggered massive protests by the Arab Street that was responsible for the Egyptian Arab Spring in the first place and the ouster of Mubarak. It is too early to predict what will happen in the coming days for Egypt, but since the fundamental issue is political legitimacy, whoever wins the framing battle is likely to prevail.

Works Cited:

“Muslim Brotherhood-backed Candidate Wins Egyptian Presidential Election.” (June 24, 2012). Fox News. Retrieved December 1, 2012, from: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/06/24/egypt-braces-for-announcement-president/

Cartalucci, Tony. (November 23, 2012). “Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood Challenged in Egypt.” Retrieved December 1, 2012, from: http://beforeitsnews.com/middle-east/2012/11/morsi-the-muslim-brotherhood-challenged-in-egypt-2446140.html

Clemons, Steve. (November 25, 2012). “Mohammed Morsi: Abe Lincoln in Disguise or Another Mubarak?” The Atlantic. Retrieved December 1, 2012 from: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/mohammed-morsi-abe-lincoln-in-disguise-or-another-mubarak/265557/

Herman, Edward and Noam Chomsky. (2002). “Updated Edition: Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media.” New York: Pantheon Books.

“Egypt: UN Human Rights Chief Calls on Egypt’s President to Roll Back Powers of Recent Decree.” (November 30, 2012). All Africa. Retrieved December 1, 2012, from: http://allafrica.com/stories/201212010476.html

Fein, Judie. “Mubarak: Modern-Day Pharaoh of Egypt.” (February 3, 2011). Huffington Post. Retrieved November 26, 2012 from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/judie-fein/mubarak-modernday-pharoah_b_816944.html

Hendawi, Hamza. (December 2, 2012). “Egypt’s Anti-Morsi Rebellion of Judges is Complete.” Bloomberg Business Week. Retrieved December 2, 2012 from: http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-12-02/egypt-islamists-protest-ahead-of-court-ruling#p2

Hume, Tim. (November 30, 2012). “Q & A: What’s Driving Egypt’s Unrest?” CNN. Retrieved December 1, 2012, from: http://beforeitsnews.com/middle-east/2012/11/morsi-the-muslim-brotherhood-challenged-in-egypt-2446140.html

Kirkpatrick, David. (November 24, 2012). “Egyptian Judges Challenge Morsi Over New Power.” The New York Times. Retrieved November 29, 2012, from: http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/news/world/egyptian-judges-challenge-morsi-over-new-power-663501/

Knox, Olivier. (November 26, 2012). “White House Cites ‘Concerns’ Over Egypt, Won’t Criticize Morsi.” Yahoo! News. Retrieved November 29, 2012, from: http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/ticket/white-house-cites-concerns-over-egypt-won-t-211632449--politics.html

Lakoff, George & Mark Johnson. (1980). “Metaphors We Live By.” Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rohde, David. (November 24, 2012). “Morsi’s Power Grab: ‘There Was a Disease But This Is Not The Remedy.” The Atlantic. Retrieved November 29, 2012, from: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/morsis-power-grab-there-was-a-disease-but-this-is-not-the-remedy/265555/

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Spencer, Richard. (November 30, 2012). “Egypt: Mohammed Morsi Criticised by UN.” The Telegraph. Retrieved December 1, 2012, from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/9715314/Egypt-Mohammed-Morsi-criticised-by-UN.html
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