Meet the New Boss...Same as the Old Boss?

One of numerous posters comparing President Morsi to Former President Mubarak. The Arabic reads "Mohammed Morsi Mubarak" (Source: Mohammed Abd El Ghany-Reuters)

The current power struggle playing itself out in Egypt demonstrates the visceral and emotional power of framing in politics. On November 22^nd, in a move that shocked the international community and left many Egyptians with a sickening sensation of déjà vu, the first freely democratically elected leader of Egypt, President Mohammed Morsi bestowed upon himself sweeping and unrestricted executive powers by rendering impotent the Egyptian judiciary branch and circumventing the system of checks and balances (See Hume, Tim). While President Morsi presented 7 edicts, the two that drew the most criticism were Article 2- the pronouncement that all presidential decrees were exempt from judicial review and Article 5- the judiciary branch would have no ability to dissolve the upper house of parliament (the Shura Council) or the Constituent Assembly. Egyptian courts had previously dissolved the first Constituent Assembly along with the Parliament and rumors suggested that the Supreme Constitutional Court was “poised to dissolve the existing [largely Islamist] assembly in a ruling next Sunday” (See Kirkpatrick, David). With these decrees, a dead letter Egyptian constitution, a defanged judiciary and non-existent legislature, President Morsi’s executive power is now supreme and exceeds even that of his predecessor, ousted former President Hosni Mubarak.

The president maintains that this state of affairs is only temporary and necessary to preserve democratic gains made during the Egyptian Revolution of 25 January and to ensure the creation of a constitution which will be unhindered by anti-democratic and former regime elements still present in the judiciary and government. Regardless of his rationale, the President’s decision was immediately barraged with criticism from the judiciary and brought thousands of protestors as well as counter-protestor supporters of the President to the streets of every major city in Egypt. In the days since, violent clashes have erupted between Muslim Brotherhood (MB)/Morsi supporters and protestors, leaving a number of Egyptians dead and wounded. Elements of the judiciary, including the Supreme Court, have gone on strike paralyzing the court system across the country. Outside of Egypt, the perceived “power grab” by President Morsi has drawn condemnation from the United Nations Human Rights commissioner Navi Pillay as undermining the precepts of liberty, social justice and freedom that were the bedrock ideas of the Egyptian Revolution (See “Egypt: UN Human Rights…”). It is interesting that Western powers including the United States remain reticent to publicly condemn President Morsi’s actions (See Knox, Olivier).

The MB has had a loud and physical stage presence in the tumult of daily protests and growing political instability, framing President Morsi’s decrees as the only viable solution to combat the “enemy within” the political system- i.e., Mubark era judiciary appointees who were “part and parcel” of his autocratic policies (See Hendawi,Hamza) and whom President Morsi claims are the real obstacles to the creation of a legitimate constitution. Nobel Laureate and Egyptian liberal opposition leader Mohammed ElBaradei tweeted "(They) are currently staging a coup against democracy...regime legitimacy fast eroding," (See Spencer, Richard). ElBaradei later called for more protests, and in response a MB senior member commented, “He’s Western” (See Rohde, David).

The importance of framing ideas as a powerful tool to establish or delegitimize ideas, movements and political actors, is on full display in this clarifying moment of the Egyptian Revolution. It is well established that logical argument based on facts is usually a miserably ineffective political strategy. Human beings adopt and evolve political views in ways which have very little to do with factual analysis or reasoned comparisons of issues. There are several overlapping models which attempt to describe political socialization, such as research showing that people acquire political views from elites (See Zaller, 1992), that people self-identify with a group (See “Social Identity…”) and afterwards internalize the normative views of that group, media and communication such as television ads which use framing and narrative, and linguistic models which emphasize filtering (See Herman & Chomsky, 2002) and metaphor (See Lakoff, 1980). Identity and moral sense are fundamental ideas underlying several models of political socialization. Lakoff, for example, believes that human beings at a young age develop a library of moral metaphors which serve as the framework in later years for political, religious and moral belief (See Lakoff, 1980).

A classic example of the political power of framing is the "It's Morning Again in America" frame, communicated iconically in a Ronald Regan presidential re-election campaign television commercial with soft, warm images of an idealized America, such as picket fences, beautiful children, strong brave men leading happy families, weddings and the like. This framing consolidated the success of the Southern strategy popularized by President Richard Nixon's campaign in the late 1960s. How can one rebut an argument which is not an argument, but rather is a highly emotional feeling? This requires counter-framing.

                By framing ElBaradei as "Western", the MB is attempting to associate its opponents, without ever having to prove any factual charges or even make any specific accusations, with aspects of Western culture and foreign policy which are hugely unpopular in Egypt and the Arab world. The not-so-subtle implication is that the largely young, educated often English speaking Egyptians who took the streets against Mubarak and actually initiated the Revolution are useful idiots-- tools of America and Europe acting as a naïve, or even traitorous Fifth Column, manipulated by The West. There are a number of connotations to this descriptor: exploitive, colonial, conspiracy, rapacious, war, consumerism, anti-Islam and support of Israel among them. This is one of the fundamental frames that the MB invokes against the liberal opposition. Ironically, the MB senior leadership were wary to support the revolution in its early stages allowing only their youth wing to be involved- true to their chameleon political history. Another irony is that the MB itself has a long history of accommodating and working with the Mubarak, Sadat and Nasser regimes.

A pawn of the West? (Source: Reuters- Mohammed Salem)

              Contrastingly, the liberal opposition frames this current struggle as Mubarak part deux or the rise of a “new Pharaoh” (See Hendawi, Hamza), referring to Mubarak’s failed attempts to cast himself as a modern day Pharaoh of Egypt (See Fein, Judie). This is powerful framing because the memory of the Mubarak dictatorship is still fresh in everyone's minds, mindful of the Egyptian historical cycle of revolution and liberation, followed by the imposition of authoritarianism in the name of a temporary emergency, which remains in place indefinitely.

President Mohammed Morsi depicted as the "new Pharaoh" of Egypt (Source: AP)

                President Morsi’s ascension to the presidential seat was filled with hope for a brighter future and in the intervening time he has made great strides in a number of areas relating to foreign policy. He has secured vital loans from a number of countries, ensured continuing tithes from the U.S., acted as a mediator for the Israeli-Hamas cease fire and cemented Egypt’s role as an important and necessary actor within the region. However, little has actually changed in the daily lives of Egyptians. Unemployment is still rampant, fundamental government services like water and electricity spotty, increasing prices on staple goods, a stalled constitution and an overall unease among many urban Egyptians as to the ultimate goal of the MB affiliated President Morsi. While he did win the presidency, he was considered by many moderate Egyptians to be the lesser evil, the best candidate among two bad choices. Even then he won by a narrow margin of 3%, 51.7% to 48.3% (See “Muslim Brotherhood backed…”). This most current unrest only heightens the fears of an Islamization/Brotherhoodization of the state and a return to an authoritarian regime.

  It seems at this point President Morsi has perhaps been overly ambitious in attempting to consolidate political power to advance his vision of an Islamic democratic nation. This has triggered massive protests by the Arab Street that was responsible for the Egyptian Arab Spring in the first place and the ouster of Mubarak. It is too early to predict what will happen in the coming days for Egypt, but since the fundamental issue is political legitimacy, whoever wins the framing battle is likely to prevail.

Works Cited:

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Cartalucci, Tony. (November 23, 2012). “Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood Challenged in Egypt.” Retrieved December 1, 2012, from: http://beforeitsnews.com/middle-east/2012/11/morsi-the-muslim-brotherhood-challenged-in-egypt-2446140.html

Clemons, Steve. (November 25, 2012). “Mohammed Morsi: Abe Lincoln in Disguise or Another Mubarak?” The Atlantic. Retrieved December 1, 2012 from: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/mohammed-morsi-abe-lincoln-in-disguise-or-another-mubarak/265557/

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Hume, Tim. (November 30, 2012). “Q & A: What’s Driving Egypt’s Unrest?” CNN. Retrieved December 1, 2012, from: http://beforeitsnews.com/middle-east/2012/11/morsi-the-muslim-brotherhood-challenged-in-egypt-2446140.html

Kirkpatrick, David. (November 24, 2012). “Egyptian Judges Challenge Morsi Over New Power.” The New York Times. Retrieved November 29, 2012, from: http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/news/world/egyptian-judges-challenge-morsi-over-new-power-663501/

Knox, Olivier. (November 26, 2012). “White House Cites ‘Concerns’ Over Egypt, Won’t Criticize Morsi.” Yahoo! News. Retrieved November 29, 2012, from: http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/ticket/white-house-cites-concerns-over-egypt-won-t-211632449--politics.html

Lakoff, George & Mark Johnson. (1980). “Metaphors We Live By.” Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rohde, David. (November 24, 2012). “Morsi’s Power Grab: ‘There Was a Disease But This Is Not The Remedy.” The Atlantic. Retrieved November 29, 2012, from: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/morsis-power-grab-there-was-a-disease-but-this-is-not-the-remedy/265555/

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Spencer, Richard. (November 30, 2012). “Egypt: Mohammed Morsi Criticised by UN.” The Telegraph. Retrieved December 1, 2012, from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/9715314/Egypt-Mohammed-Morsi-criticised-by-UN.html
Zaller, John. (1992). “The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.