IRNA Logo from Google Images

 An Introduction on Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA)

Among many important news agencies inside Iran with different goals and political or social orientations such as Fars News Agency (Iran’s leading independent /semi-official), Mehr News Agency, MNA (owned by the Islamic Ideology Organization and is the most multilingual news agency with seven languages), Iranian Student News Agency, ISNA (created and operated by Iranian university students), etc. the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) is the official news agency in Iran and it is said that the organization functions as the primary source of information dissemination within the country to publish various types of news, bulletins, research works, opinion polls and stories of general interests. IRNA is a pro-government news agency which is funded by the current government and controlled based on the regulations and policies of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic guidance. Therefore, it may be obvious that its political orientation is toward the ongoing government and it may be changed in every cycle of four or eight years by changing the government. Its professional activities must set in the frame of securing Iranian national interests and it should focus on the main objectives of the Islamic Republic and Islamic culture.

IRNA: The Official Source of Access to Information

Excluding Iran territory as a region for covering the news, the source of information in IRNA dissemination comes from three other news regions including Middle East and Africa Region, the head office is in Beirut, Lebanon; Europe and America Region, the head office is located in London, England; and, Asia-Pacific Region, the head office is in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Furthermore, IRNA cooperates exclusively with some international news agencies like Reuters, Associated Press and so on. Within this contract, the only way of access to their news items and photos within Iran territories is only possible through IRNA. IRNA also has the bilateral cooperation with some of regional agencies such as the news agencies of Russia (Itar-Tass and Rianovesti), Saudi Arabia (SANA), China (Xinhaua), etc. in exchanging news items and photographs.

Beside the news regions with a number of branches in each region, IRNA is also operated by eight main news desks for the purpose of editorial board namely:

-          Europe and America Desk

-          Africa and Middle East Desk

-          Asia-Pacific Desk

-          Indian Peninsula and Central Asia Desk

-          English News Desk: This desk is in charge of sending the most important news gathered from IRNA's various lines, as well as those items acquired through various IRNA cooperation contracts with various news agencies.

-          Arabic News Desk: The similar activities as the English News Desk.

-          Persian Language International News Desk: The Staff are in charge of surveying news items dispatched from various IRNA news lines in the country and selecting those most likely to interest foreign readers. These are then rewritten as new items with information that are not included as being of no general importance to Iranian readers inside the country added and those that need revision altered.

-          Foreign News Desk: This desk is in charge of surveying the various foreign radio, television, satellite, Internet and printed media items and selecting the news items that IRNA is interested in.

The Final Outcome

Providing all the information through news regions and preparing them by news editorials, IRNA publishes eight daily newspapers and periodicals in three main languages of Persian, English and Arabic which are all:
IRAN, a daily newspaper in Persian language which is widely popular among  Iranians;
Iran Daily, an English daily newspaper;
Al-Vafaq, an Arabic daily newspaper;
Iran Varzeshi, a Persian daily newspaper which covers local and foreign sport events;
Iran Javan, a Persian weekly magazine which concentrates on issues related to the youth;
Iran-e Saal, an annual issue which reports the outstanding events occurred in the country;
Iran Sepid, the only kind in the region and the Middle East in Braille language;
Iran Azin, a monthly journal on interior design.

Considering the brief provided introduction about IRNA, this study aims to draw attention only to two IRAN newspaper in Persian and Iran Daily newspaper in English. It is going to compare the news items on the topic of recent 2013 election in Iran in two languages of Persian and English in a specific period of time from before the election to after that. Through this comparison, it’s supposed to understand how different the news with the same concept within the same news agency are published in two languages of English and Persian.

 

If you are still interested, follow this blog for future updates.

Iranian Social Domestic News in English Media:

Recent Election in Iran and the Foreign Interpretation

                          Photo from Aljazeera

          News is the communication of some selected information on current events which is presented by any kind of media including print, television, radio and internet to a mass audience. The nature of news can be defined variously depending on the audience interest and how it is brought the attention to the community in which the news is presented. As the result, the way the news is presented can influence the audience mind and consequently the way it is interpreted. Any single sentence of any news and the style of its writing or even its reading may have a specific role in the different interpretation of the same news in different communities and among different people.Therefore, minor differences in translation can profound consequences.
 

Therefore it can be said that the way the news is interpreted may be signified with the linguistic features of a language including lexicons, grammatical aspects, intonation in spoken news or even the style of writing in print (using punctuations, bold and large fonts and so on). Generally speaking, the style of presenting news may be directly related to the linguistic features of each language among the native speakers of that language. Consequently, the translation of news into any language and the way the translation influences the interpretation and correct understanding of the same news may vary from one language to another and from one community to another based on how the translator translates it and what kind of tools she/he exploits to provide the same influence and interpretation in the target language as it was in the source language/society. 

Paying attention to the effect of strategies in translating news, this research is going to consider a number of important Iranian social and economic domestic news in English media, and if these reports are written, reported or translated in a way to influence the audience interpretation. It aims to take into account various English versions of single social or economic Iranian news pieces in different English media (including CNN, BBC and Aljazeera) in order to examine any difference in broadcasting the same news in different countries such as the United States, Britain and Middle East countries; and, how they differ with the English media inside Iran.

The Upcoming research aims to consider the recent election in Iran, the victory of Hassan Rouhani as a reformist candidate among the candidates of other parties such as hard liners and the related issues affected by his victory. Some topics within a specific time period will be chosen then they are taken into account from the perspective of CNN, BBC and Aljazeera.

As the study of the above mentioned topic goes on, the progress and the temporary results will be posted on this blog.

The Challenge of Armed Humanitarian Intervention: National Objectives or Philanthropic Military Action?

On September 10^th, President Obama addressed the nation regarding potential military intervention in Syria. While the debate of diplomatically resolving the Syrian Civil War has entered political discourse several time over the over two years, President Obama communicated an urgent to need to apply military power amid allegations of chemical weapons use by the Assad Regime.

Allegedly, the Assad regime employed chemical weapons on August 21^st in the ongoing struggle with rebel opposition. The employment of these weapons violates an international norm codified by the Chemical Weapons Convention 1992, which has been ratified by ninety-eight percent of recognized nations.  Interestingly enough, Syria is one of the minority nations that has not endorsed the stipulations of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The United States has maintained a long concern with the stability of Syria and regional implications - and has actively sought diplomatic means to achieve peace within the Levant.

The challenge presented within the spectrum of international relations is muddied by the appeal used by President Obama.  As he articulated the legal framework that outlined a necessity to intervene, he also used a humanitarian appeal due to the indiscriminate nature of chemical weapons and their affect to non-combatants. By appealing to emotions, the United States could possibly be implying to the international community that a military intervention is warranted as outlined by the United Nations initiative of “Responsibility to Protect”.

This initiative was adopted by the United Nations in 2005 with the intent of establishing an emerging international norm that outlines the requirements of a sovereign nation and the collective responsibility of the international community.  The three principles that the United Nations outlines are:

• A state has a responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.

• The international community has a responsibility to assist the state to fulfill its primary responsibility.

• If the state manifestly fails to protect its citizens from the four above mass atrocities and peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures such as economic sanctions. Military intervention is considered the last resort.

      The discussion of Armed Humanitarian Intervention is not new.  Several examples of military intervention along humanitarian lines has been applied by several states and has had mixed success. A NATO led coalition intervened in Kosovo in 1999 to arrest the atrocities committed against civilians by the Serbian Government; The United Nations authorized intervention in East Timor in the same year.  However, there have been other examples of atrocities, such as Darfur, that did not merit intervention from the international community.  The mixed application of humanitarian intervention presents the possibility of problematic criteria that prevents universal agreement on how to address crisis.

     This blog series seeks to explore how nations may use "Armed Humanitarian Intervention" as a mechanism to advance their national security objectives.  By using case studies and independent Non-Government Organizations' observation data, this study seeks to address why the Responsibility to Protect initiative appears challenging in eliciting action from the international community.  As a result, a comparison of interventions, the motivations of nations, and undertaking of intervention actions may expose a pattern that add clarity to this evolving concept.

References:

Obama, Barack H. White House Press Office. 10 September 2013. Address to the Nation. 13 September 2013. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/10/remarks-president-address-nation-syria>.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. "Chemical Weapons Convention." 03 September 1992. Article II. Definitions and Criteria. 13 September 1992. <http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-ii-definitions-and-criteria/>.

United Nations General Assembly. "Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide." 12 January 2009. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. 13 September 2013. <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/677>.

United Nations Security Council. "Security Council Resolutions - 1999." 10 June 1999. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. 13 September 2013. <http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1272(1999).pdf>.

—. "Undemocracy.com." 25 October 1999. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1272. 13 September 2013. <http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1272(1999).pdf>.

United States Government. National Security Strategy. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2010. 17 June 2013. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf>.

Destination Unknown

           

Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 (Picture: public domain)

“Allah is our objective;
the Quran is our constitution,
the Prophet is our leader;
Jihad is our way;
and death for the sake of Allah  
is the highest of our aspirations.”
(Hassan al-Bana)

          Observing the current political clime within Egypt today, it is clear that the Muslim Brotherhood has “won” the battle of narratives that began with the 25 January Egyptian Revolution. The two other major actors in the Revolution, the ancien regime and liberal democratic youth, have failed to offer a credible voice, and are barely relevant in Egypt today. The liberal democratic youth movement that sparked the revolution were unable to coalesce into a unified political group until recently in the form of the National Salvation Front, and have been relegated to the role of bit player on the political stage. The Egyptian military severed the umbilical tie to Mubarak and has returned to its barracks. The military professes no interest in taking part in the political life of Egypt unless absolutely necessary (See “The Future Role of…). The Muslim Brotherhood, in stark contrast, has ascended to power, after three long decades as outcasts. The Muslim Brotherhood originally began in Egypt, founded by Hassan al-Bana. They now join there brothers in Gaza (Hamas) as a ruling party. An Islamist Party headed by PM Erdogan has ruled Turkey for over a decade. Branches of the Muslim Brotherhood exist in Syria, Sudan, Jordan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen, Kuwait, Oman and Morocco. As the ruling party of the most populous nation in the Middle East, the Muslim Brotherhood has become an important regional arbiter in Middle Eastern affairs.

           Ironically, the Muslim Brotherhood initially opposed the protests which began the Revolution and were hesitant participants in its opening days. Nevertheless, they have become the greatest political beneficiaries of the revolution to which they were unenthusiastic latecomers. Conventional wisdom at the outset of the revolution focused mostly on social media and the liberal democratic youth, ignoring the long history and pervasive organizational presence of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout Egypt. Research sheds light on the factors that enabled the Muslim Brotherhood to prevail. In fact, looking at the revolution in hindsight, it is clear that the electoral victories of the Muslim Brotherhood were predictable. The Muslim Brotherhood had the strongest narrative, organization, and leadership.

           Founded in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood had long been one of the parties in Egypt which represented opposition to the authoritarian regimes of Farouk, Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak, though they opportunistically allied with them as well. The Muslim Brotherhood have demonstrated organizational savvy that would rival the experts at McKinsey & Company. They have a long history of providing stipends, food, health care and other social welfare services to Egypt’s needy for many decades. Muslim Brothers are (or were, at least) widely perceived to be devout, honest men dedicated to serving the public good. In contrast, the attempted narrative of justice and freedom offered by the liberal democratic youth who were the first protestors was incoherent to ordinary Egyptians who did not have college educations. The Muslim Brotherhood and the ancien regime were successfully able to portray them as un-Egyptian and potential puppets of the West. The ancien regime's narrative boiled down to the devil that you know is better than the devil that you don't know-- i.e., that the patriarchal Mubarak may have a few flaws here and there, but he's still better than chaos and uncertainty.

           Narrative is an ever-present element in politics, because there is no politics without narrative, and no political narrative without emotion. Human beings relate to stories. All politics is at the root comprised of interactions between individuals. Every construct of society and politics is at the root a creation by single individuals (See “There is no…”). The effectiveness of narrative boils down to three primary characteristics:

1. A Leader or group trusted by the audience
2. A narrative rooted in a cultural context and world-view accepted by the audience 

3. A sustained organizational capacity to push forth the narrative

           A revolution is a complex thing. Once critical mass is reached, a revolution takes on a life of its own. They are chaotic and inherently unpredictable. Napoleon said, "A revolution can be neither made nor stopped. The only thing that can be done is for one of several of its children to give it a direction by dint of victories." Narrative is the spark of a revolution. Injustice is the tinder. Revolutionaries fan the flames. Without a reason to revolt, there is no revolt. However, a successful revolution cannot live by narrative alone. There must be committed cadre with organizational skills and an organization. Resources such as bullets and money are required. A narrative cannot exist without communication. In the days of yore that meant printing presses. In today's world that means mass media.

           One of the primary hurdles when evaluating narratives is the chicken or the egg problem. How do we evaluate the role that narrative played in legitimizing the Muslim Brotherhood and mobilizing public opinion on their side? The answer seems to be that narrative will always play a role, and is intertwined with other elements. For example, the long history of opposition and social welfare services is a very important legitimizing factor for the Muslim Brotherhood. However, that history is communicated through language in the form of narrative. In short, narrative is essential but it is never the only factor. Successful manipulation of narrative does not guarantee a particular outcome, but increases the chances of a successful outcome. The power of narrative is especially observable during times of crisis. In contrast, historical narrative may become somewhat of an albatross around the neck of a revolutionary opposition party which suddenly finds itself thrust into power. The Muslim Brotherhood now finds it necessary to try to explain two simultaneous and inconsistent narratives. This is something of a challenge for rulers who in the past have never been forced to explain or cope with contradictory statements. For example, after assuming office President Morsi made a number of speeches to the Egyptian people promising that the Muslim Brotherhood would be inclusive and would respect all ethnic groups and all religions. He was promptly confronted with a slew of YouTube videos from his earlier career as Muslim Brotherhood apparatchik giving passionate speeches damning Jews as the descendants of apes and pigs (See "Morsi in 2010...").

           Narrative is most important when people are most emotional. As normality begins to return, other factors overshadow narrative, such as employment, trash collection and keeping criminals off the streets. In other words, the evaluation of narrative must consider timing and context. In some contexts, such as the first ten days of the Egyptian Revolution, narrative was perhaps the most important element of all-- the spark. However, at other stages other factors such as organizational presence and the ability to turn out millions of members to vote were the most important. The evolution of my research has been to incorporate other theoretical approaches to integrate the lens of narrative in a more holistic view of the dynamics of social change.

           One of these approaches is that of the “Great Man Theory”, that is the idea that singular individuals of great charisma, intelligence, skill and/or will could make decisive impacts on the course of history (See “There is no…”). This approach is particularly relevant with respect to Egypt. Since the coup d’état of King Farouk in 1952, every subsequent leader of Egypt has been a military man. Muhammad Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and finally Hosni Mubarak were all seen to one degree or another as a “strong” man and hero figure by their association with the military. Nasser in particular cultivated his role as protector of Egyptian society by emphasizing exterior threats and continually reaffirming Egypt’s role as the de facto leaders of the Arab world. Up until this day Nasser still retains a cult of personality as demonstrated by the continued appearance of his visage in Egyptian streets, homes, and shops. The idea of the military man as protector and leader continues to pervade the social consciousness of Egyptians. The military was seen as the one governmental institution that insured the rights of Egyptian to protest during the revolution. Military officers are seen as incorruptible and honorable as opposed to their police counterparts. In 2011, 21 of the 29 Egyptian governates were run by ex military generals (See “The Army and…).

           Since the revolution, the Egyptian government has slowly been shifting to a more civilian form of representation in its cabinet positions (See “The Future Role of…). For the first time in five decades, the president is not a military man. It is apparent, however, that the narrative of the patriarchal cult continues to be alive and well. Since Morsi has taken office, there are ongoing attempts to manage the narrative to cast him as the “Great Man” and leader of Egypt. His shocking dismissal of Supreme Council of the Armed Forces Generals Tantawi and Anan in his early days of office (See "Morsi's coup..."), his sweeping foreign policy activities regarding Iran and Hamas, and the attempted strong man seizure of constitutional powers have all been activities to portray strength of character and resolve to the Egyptian people. In April, a Morsi “fan” thought by some to be a representative of the Muslim Brotherhood published “The Achievements of Doctor Morsi”, an eerie echoing of the previous presidents forays into publishing and cults of personality with “Mubarak in the Heart of Egypt”.

 

"The Achievements of Dr Morsi" by Reda al-Masry held aloft by a Muslim Brotherhood supporter. Copies will be distributed to members of the Muslim Brotherhood  (Picture: behind the revolution)  

"Mubarak in the Heart of Egypt" (Picture: Alexandria Digital Library Repository)

          In the aftermath of the 25 January Egyptian Revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood is the dominant force in Egyptian politics. However, there is no narrative that can compensate for a deteriorating economy, the absence of police on the streets and a general air of hopelessness. Simply repeating the phrase “Islam is the Solution” is not the panacea Egyptians are likely to accept. The Muslim Brotherhood has launched Egypt into rough seas. The destination remains unknown. 



Sources:

Abul-Magd, Zeinab. (December 24, 2011). "The Army and The Economy In Egypt." Egypt Independent. Retrieved April 20, 2013, from: http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/army-and-economy-egypt

"The Future Role of the Military in Post-Revolutionary Democratic Egypt." (May 2, 2013). Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved May 4, 2013, from: http://csis.org/multimedia/audio-public-panel-future-role-military-post-revolutionary-democratic-egypt-pt-1 

“Great Man Theory.” (N.D.) Wikipedia. Retrieved April 21, 2013, from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/great_man_theory 

"Morsi in 2010: No to Negotiations with the Blood-Sucking, Warmongering "Descendants of Apes and Pigs"; Calls to Boycott U.S. Products." (March 20 & Septermber 23, 2010). MEMRI TV. Retrieved May 6, 2013, from: http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/3702.htm 

Rashwan, Nada. (August 14, 2012). "Morsi's Coup Against SCAF: The Hows and the Whys." Ahram Online. Retrieved February 20, 2013, from: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/140/50324/Egypt/First--days/Morsis-coup-against-SCAF-The-hows-and-the-whys.aspx  

Tombaugh, William. (April 22, 2013). CGIS-FMSO Blog. Retrieved April 22, 2013, from: http://cgis-fmso.blogspot.com/2013/04/there-is-no-such-thing-as-society.html  





 

BAGA KILLINGS- THE CONSEQUENCE OF EXCESSIVE USE OF MILTARY FORCE IN COMBATING EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA.

Soldiers and arms and ammunition recovered from suspected Boko Haram members in Baga, Borno State... on Thursday

Source AFP

The Nigeria Army conducted the single deadliest military intervention which caused wanton destruction of lives and properties of civilians in Baga, Borno State in north eastern Nigeria. On Sunday, April 21, 2013, the soldiers from special operations searched and invaded the Baga community in search of suspects believed to be members of the deadly Islamic extremist group, Boko Haram. According to a recent United Nations report, “about 200 people were killed, and more than 2000 houses were destroyed during the raids conducted by the Nigerian Army,” (Guardian Newspaper, May 4, 2013).

There have been conflicting reports over what triggered the incident as the civilian population in Baga, Borno state were alleged to have harbored members of Boko Haram among them. Other reports claimed that a unit of the joint task force, made up of soldiers from Nigeria, Niger and Chad, was on a reconnaissance mission to the border town when members of the Boko Haram group ambushed and killed a senior military officer. The aggressors were said to have quickly merged with the crowd using the locals as human shields. The soldiers were alleged to have carried out a reprisal attack that left over 200 people dead and over 2,000 homes destroyed in Baga (Punch Newspaper, May 5, 2013).

Earlier in the year, General Carter Ham, Commander of the United States African Command (AFRICOM), cautioned African governments not to rely solely on the use of excessive military force to fight the war against terror in Africa (Onuorah, 2013). He lamented that, “though there is perhaps some necessity for some military action, the solution in combating terror, lies in the non-military solution and activities that would address the underline causes of the dissatisfactions which include good governance,” (Guardian Newspaper, February 01, 2013). 

Unfortunately, the indiscriminate use of excessive military force have claimed the lives of civilians that are supposed to be protected by Article 51 of the 1977 Additional Protocol of the Geneva Convention which states that, “the civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations” (deoxy.org, n.d.). The Nigerian government needs to ensure that efforts to achieve security comply with basic human right principles and perpetrators of this arson are brought to justice. The continuous use of military force in the fight against extremism should be down played to accommodate distinction between the civilian population and military targets.

Works Cited

Article 51 of 1977 Geneva Convention retrieved from http://deoxy.org/wc/wc-proto.htm.

Obayuwana, O., & Akande, L. (n.d.). UN Warns Jonathan On Amnesty To Boko Haram. Guardian.

Retrieved from

http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=120850:un-warns-jonathan-on-amnesty-to-boko-haram&catid=1:national&Itemid=559.

Onuorah, M. (2013, February 1). US General Cautions African Government Against Over

Reliance on Military For War Against Terror. Guardian. Retrieved from http://ngrguardiannews.com.

The Punch: Nigeria's Most Widely Read Newspaper. (n.d.). The mindless Baga killings.

Retrieved from http://www.punchng.com/editorial/the-mindless-baga-killings/.