Mr Lukyanov is a noted Russian political commentator. Writing in "Russia Beyond the Headlines/Gazeta.ru", he speculates on Egypt's post Arab Spring role in the Middle East. I've contributed my own thoughts in an essay following his article.
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Russia Beyond the Headlines/Gazeta.ru
www.rbth.ru
August 12, 2012
The world ignores Egypt at its own peril
While the major global players are focused on Damascus, a power play is going on in Cairo that could have a more significant effect.
By Fyodor Lukyanov, Gazeta.ru
While the world's eyes are riveted on the Syrian cities of Damascus and Aleppo, Egypt is witnessing developments whose significance for the regional and global future is much greater than even the civil war in Syria.
President Muhammed Mursi, who has just been sworn in, has set about redrawing Egypt's political map with incredible speed. The sacking of the heads of the Egyptian junta Defense Minister Hussein Tantawi and chief of the general staff Sami Annan coupled with the canceling of constitutional amendments granting broad powers to the army, indicate that the Muslim Brothers are in no mood to seek a compromise with the former authorities.
With 80 million residents, Egypt is the Arab world's most populous country and Cairo has historically been one of the region's leading capitals. What happened there, as a rule, while not exactly setting a model for the political development of the entire community, made a strong imprint on it. It was the toppling of Hosni Mubarak a year and a half ago and not the earlier events in Tunisia that really triggered the Arab Spring.
That is why everybody wondered from the very beginning what model would take root in Egypt. Three variants were proposed: the Turkish model (power of the military plus a modernization agenda or moderate and relatively progressive Islamists), the Iranian model (a radical Islamic state) and the Algerian model (brutal suppression of democratically elected Islamists by the military).
The Kemal Ataturk model of the 20th century was quickly cast aside because the conditions for it are not present in Egypt. In Turkey, the military acted as a force for renewal after the collapse of an empire, while in Egypt they embody the former regime, even though they have tried to dissociate themselves from Mubarak.
The Iranian scenario was also dismissed as irrelevant early on, because Iran's system is intimately linked with Shiite Islam. Even if Egypt opts for an Islamic state, it will be a different one.
An Islamic but essentially democratic model still has a chance, according to the Muslim Brothers, but in reality, an Algerian scenario is more likely. Everyone is waiting with bated breath to see how the military top brass react to Mursi's attack. In 1991, the Algerian army annulled the results of elections that were set to deliver victory to the Islamic Salvation Front and thus plunged the country into a 10-year-long civil war that claimed more than 100,000 lives, but prevented the Islamists from gaining power.
Even if the Egyptian military decide to do this, success is not guaranteed. The world has changed greatly in the last 20 years. In 1991, the Algerian generals could count on a quiet solution they knew no one would care about their actions or interfere in their methods. Today, however, should Egypt take this path, both the Islamic world and the West would react extremely negatively. Besides, Egyptian society, as the parliamentary and presidential elections have shown, wants democratic procedures and change, so a military regime would have little support.
If the Muslim Brothers and Muhammed Mursi consolidate their power, there could be the start of a profound realignment of forces and influence in the Middle East. To give one example, the current situation with Israel will not endure, although Cairo is likely revise its policies over time rather than sever the agreements abruptly.
It is unlikely that any of the current Middle Eastern leaders would risk provoking a war with the Jewish state, even if it is a popular idea on the Arab streets. However, the overall erosion of rules of conduct might trigger a series of incidents on Israel's perimeter, engendering a response that might potentially drag it into a confrontation with everyone.
Washington, of course, has leverage in the shape of the $2 billion it has channeled to Cairo since its accords with Israel were reached. Because the Egyptian economy is in free fall, the Muslim Brothers' government would be loath to forego that money.
Yet the process of general geopolitical change might lead to a change of sponsors. The key players in the Arab Spring are the Gulf monarchies, whose influence has soared in the last year and a half. The oil kingdoms' financial clout enables them to support Egypt as strongly as the United States does.
The most acute collision in the near term is connected with Iran, because eliminating the menace of a nuclear Tehran and reducing Iran's influence is, for all the regional players, the main goal and one element of achieving it is confrontation in Syria.
As long as the Iranian problem exists, the interests of the conservative monarchies, the revolutionary regimes, the United States and Israel coincide. But if that problem is resolved one way or another, the common agenda will fall apart and the tacit temporary accord between Saudi Arabia and Israel will come to an end. And then much, if not everything, would depend on Egypt, its inner state and orientation in the world.
www.rbth.ru
August 12, 2012
The world ignores Egypt at its own peril
While the major global players are focused on Damascus, a power play is going on in Cairo that could have a more significant effect.
By Fyodor Lukyanov, Gazeta.ru
While the world's eyes are riveted on the Syrian cities of Damascus and Aleppo, Egypt is witnessing developments whose significance for the regional and global future is much greater than even the civil war in Syria.
President Muhammed Mursi, who has just been sworn in, has set about redrawing Egypt's political map with incredible speed. The sacking of the heads of the Egyptian junta Defense Minister Hussein Tantawi and chief of the general staff Sami Annan coupled with the canceling of constitutional amendments granting broad powers to the army, indicate that the Muslim Brothers are in no mood to seek a compromise with the former authorities.
With 80 million residents, Egypt is the Arab world's most populous country and Cairo has historically been one of the region's leading capitals. What happened there, as a rule, while not exactly setting a model for the political development of the entire community, made a strong imprint on it. It was the toppling of Hosni Mubarak a year and a half ago and not the earlier events in Tunisia that really triggered the Arab Spring.
That is why everybody wondered from the very beginning what model would take root in Egypt. Three variants were proposed: the Turkish model (power of the military plus a modernization agenda or moderate and relatively progressive Islamists), the Iranian model (a radical Islamic state) and the Algerian model (brutal suppression of democratically elected Islamists by the military).
The Kemal Ataturk model of the 20th century was quickly cast aside because the conditions for it are not present in Egypt. In Turkey, the military acted as a force for renewal after the collapse of an empire, while in Egypt they embody the former regime, even though they have tried to dissociate themselves from Mubarak.
The Iranian scenario was also dismissed as irrelevant early on, because Iran's system is intimately linked with Shiite Islam. Even if Egypt opts for an Islamic state, it will be a different one.
An Islamic but essentially democratic model still has a chance, according to the Muslim Brothers, but in reality, an Algerian scenario is more likely. Everyone is waiting with bated breath to see how the military top brass react to Mursi's attack. In 1991, the Algerian army annulled the results of elections that were set to deliver victory to the Islamic Salvation Front and thus plunged the country into a 10-year-long civil war that claimed more than 100,000 lives, but prevented the Islamists from gaining power.
Even if the Egyptian military decide to do this, success is not guaranteed. The world has changed greatly in the last 20 years. In 1991, the Algerian generals could count on a quiet solution they knew no one would care about their actions or interfere in their methods. Today, however, should Egypt take this path, both the Islamic world and the West would react extremely negatively. Besides, Egyptian society, as the parliamentary and presidential elections have shown, wants democratic procedures and change, so a military regime would have little support.
If the Muslim Brothers and Muhammed Mursi consolidate their power, there could be the start of a profound realignment of forces and influence in the Middle East. To give one example, the current situation with Israel will not endure, although Cairo is likely revise its policies over time rather than sever the agreements abruptly.
It is unlikely that any of the current Middle Eastern leaders would risk provoking a war with the Jewish state, even if it is a popular idea on the Arab streets. However, the overall erosion of rules of conduct might trigger a series of incidents on Israel's perimeter, engendering a response that might potentially drag it into a confrontation with everyone.
Washington, of course, has leverage in the shape of the $2 billion it has channeled to Cairo since its accords with Israel were reached. Because the Egyptian economy is in free fall, the Muslim Brothers' government would be loath to forego that money.
Yet the process of general geopolitical change might lead to a change of sponsors. The key players in the Arab Spring are the Gulf monarchies, whose influence has soared in the last year and a half. The oil kingdoms' financial clout enables them to support Egypt as strongly as the United States does.
The most acute collision in the near term is connected with Iran, because eliminating the menace of a nuclear Tehran and reducing Iran's influence is, for all the regional players, the main goal and one element of achieving it is confrontation in Syria.
As long as the Iranian problem exists, the interests of the conservative monarchies, the revolutionary regimes, the United States and Israel coincide. But if that problem is resolved one way or another, the common agenda will fall apart and the tacit temporary accord between Saudi Arabia and Israel will come to an end. And then much, if not everything, would depend on Egypt, its inner state and orientation in the world.
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I
was fortunate enough (or unfortunate, depending on one's point of view)
to be at American University in Cairo during the Arab Spring.
Egyptian's refer to these events as "The Revolution of 25 January".
Lukyanov's article provided a starting point for an essay on my own thoughts on
the subject.
Springtime for Egypt
William Tombaugh
24 August 2012
The eyes of the world are fixed on Syria. Western incursion into Syria may be just around the corner. Escalating violence in Syria is capturing the headlines. However, Fyodor Lukyanov believes the more peaceful seismic power shift reverberating in Egypt will also produce fault lines which re-shape the Middle East.
Lukyanov suggests that Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (MB) led by President Morsi may be able to wrest control from the military junta and consolidate power within Egypt, resulting in a “profound realignment of forces and influences in the Middle East”. With the recent firing of defense minister Tantawi along with six other high ranking military officials by Morsi, the reversal of a constitutional declaration limiting presidential powers and the end of the veto power of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and with celebratory chants from the Egyptian Arab Spring of “Go Away Field Marshall” still echoing in Tahrir Square, the military’s role as interim government caretakers may soon be over. Lukyanov predicts a likely last gasp attempt by the military (the "Algerian" model) to assert control, but agrees that conditions in today's Egypt make it unlikely that the military will succeed in such an attempt, considering the deep momentum for democratic reform in Egypt, not to mention the international condemnation that such an action would immediately provoke.
The lack of concrete reforms during the 18-month military led transition period, recent instability in the Sinai Peninsula and Egyptian-Israeli border, and the advanced age of the falool General Tantawi ("falool" is colloquial Egyptian Arabic referring to the ancien régime) have offered President Morsi the political excuse he needed to more fully grasp the reins of power. The continued acquiescence of the military to this transition suggests coordinated effort between the military and the MB. The Egyptian military has dominated Egyptian politics since the Nasser era and is widely perceived by Egyptians as a protector of the people. It is too early to predict the withdrawal of military involvement in Egyptian politics, but it is clear that a sea change on the political scene is occurring.
Lukyanov suggests that Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (MB) led by President Morsi may be able to wrest control from the military junta and consolidate power within Egypt, resulting in a “profound realignment of forces and influences in the Middle East”. With the recent firing of defense minister Tantawi along with six other high ranking military officials by Morsi, the reversal of a constitutional declaration limiting presidential powers and the end of the veto power of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and with celebratory chants from the Egyptian Arab Spring of “Go Away Field Marshall” still echoing in Tahrir Square, the military’s role as interim government caretakers may soon be over. Lukyanov predicts a likely last gasp attempt by the military (the "Algerian" model) to assert control, but agrees that conditions in today's Egypt make it unlikely that the military will succeed in such an attempt, considering the deep momentum for democratic reform in Egypt, not to mention the international condemnation that such an action would immediately provoke.
The lack of concrete reforms during the 18-month military led transition period, recent instability in the Sinai Peninsula and Egyptian-Israeli border, and the advanced age of the falool General Tantawi ("falool" is colloquial Egyptian Arabic referring to the ancien régime) have offered President Morsi the political excuse he needed to more fully grasp the reins of power. The continued acquiescence of the military to this transition suggests coordinated effort between the military and the MB. The Egyptian military has dominated Egyptian politics since the Nasser era and is widely perceived by Egyptians as a protector of the people. It is too early to predict the withdrawal of military involvement in Egyptian politics, but it is clear that a sea change on the political scene is occurring.
Additionally,
the factor of economics keeps the military quiescent. The United States
provides $2 billion per year in aid to Egypt, which goes towards the purchase
of American grain and to the military. After re-structuring its economy to meet IMF conditions,
Egypt is no longer self-sufficient in food. It is
speculated that the military establishment holds upwards of a 20% stake in the
Egyptian economy (see “Inside Story...”). This financial interest is represented in
the numerous military owned clubs, hotels, restaurants, factories, and other
commercial ventures that are present throughout Egypt. A coup attempt would have
devastating effects on Egypt's already-teetering economy, endangering military
economic interests as well as the already enfeebled tourism industry.
With
the ouster of military rule, the lack of an Egyptian constitution, and the
non-existence of a parliament, it appears that both legislative and executive
powers are being drawn into the hands of Morsi. The military seems to be cooperating
with Morsi, but there is growing opposition among Egyptians who were the original
participants of Egypt's Arab Spring, liberal democratic Egyptians who favor
democratic reform. Morsi is obviously aware of these concerns and responded to Egyptian Copts, emphasizing tolerance and inclusiveness, and assuring Copts they would remain part of the fabric of the Egyptian nation (see Malah, Nadia).
It
is interesting to observe that the leaderless spontaneous protests which began the
Egyptian revolution and which were fronted largely by young Egyptians interested in liberal democracy, have been
co-opted by the well entrenched MB. Perhaps a lesson is that
protest movements without leaders and organizational support are likely
to be ephemeral. Lenin famously insisted that the masses need a vanguard (the Party) to lead the revolution to eliminate the old social order and build anew. The gradually
increasing assertion of power by the MB has led to fears of an oppressive Islamist state. An example of this concern is the recent call for mass protest against the "Brotherhoodization"
of the state (see Shukrallah, Salamah).
The
MB’s short-term intentions in Egypt remain opaque. A decade earlier, the MB was
rumored to have made a deal with the Mubarak regime to withdraw from politics
and not to publicly protest against the dictatorship (see “Egypt: Islamism…”), although
individual MB members would often go off the reservation by organizing
public protests or running for parliament. Ironically, the MB was
absent at the outset of the Egyptian revolution, and advised their followers
not to participate. However, when it became clear that the demonstrations had
widespread support, the MB dived headlong into the fray. Clearly, the MB made
an opportunistic calculation that the demonstrations were about to achieve escape velocity. The MB initially stated they would not field a presidential
candidate (see “Egypt’s Brotherhood may…” and Lynch, Marc). However, they later changed
their mind and submitted two candidates. The MB has shown itself to be
pragmatic, opportunistic, cautious, and ambitious. A political
chameleon.
The
MB has historically been consistent in its long-term goal: the establishment of
an Islamic Sharia state (see “Profile: Egypt’s…”). In the short
term they are unlikely to embark on a hasty program of radical change that
would fracture Egyptian society-- religious, sectarian or
otherwise. This would also hold true for its current relationships with foreign
countries, including Israel. Lukyanov is correct that over time, a
change in the relationship with Israel seems inevitable. There are issues that have the potential to spin out of control, such as the border in Sinai and Gaza. As
Egypt and other Arab states develop their technology and economies, there will
be ongoing tensions with Israel, unless a comprehensive peace is achieved. Over
the longer term there is no certainty that the alliance between Egypt and the
U.S. that has existed since the Camp David Accords will continue to exist. At
present there is no stable status quo. Nothing is certain in the ME-- except
change.
Iran
is perceived as a threat by Israel, Saudi Arabia/the Gulf States, Europe, and the United States. Egypt
as well as other countries are less concerned with Iran (see “Egypt’s Morsi to
make…”). The Syrian conflict is a part of a larger effort against Iran and does
of course influence alliances and policies that affect Egypt. For example,
political developments in Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank may
strongly affect Egypt’s relationship with the United States and Israel. Instability has repercussions that are hard
to predict.
Egypt accounts for almost 40% of the total population of Arab countries, and has historically viewed itself as the natural leader of the Arab nation. It is easy to agree with Lukyanov that Egypt will play a major role in Middle Eastern affairs, with or without the largesse of the United States. He also raises the possibility that there could be "a change of sponsors" in the ME. Saudi Arabia may be able to offer some support to Egypt in the short term for opportunistic issues such as Palestinian aid or security measures, but there is historical animosity between Egypt and Saudi Arabia that is likely to influence ongoing relations between the countries, even with the advent of a MB regime in Egypt. In the early post-war years, during the Cold War, Russia supplied Egypt with military and economic aid. The Aswan Dam is a memorial of Russian aid to Egypt. Russia is now re-asserting itself in the ME, and may be an alternative to the United States. China has very aggressively expanded her presence on the African continent and is another potential sponsor.
Egypt accounts for almost 40% of the total population of Arab countries, and has historically viewed itself as the natural leader of the Arab nation. It is easy to agree with Lukyanov that Egypt will play a major role in Middle Eastern affairs, with or without the largesse of the United States. He also raises the possibility that there could be "a change of sponsors" in the ME. Saudi Arabia may be able to offer some support to Egypt in the short term for opportunistic issues such as Palestinian aid or security measures, but there is historical animosity between Egypt and Saudi Arabia that is likely to influence ongoing relations between the countries, even with the advent of a MB regime in Egypt. In the early post-war years, during the Cold War, Russia supplied Egypt with military and economic aid. The Aswan Dam is a memorial of Russian aid to Egypt. Russia is now re-asserting itself in the ME, and may be an alternative to the United States. China has very aggressively expanded her presence on the African continent and is another potential sponsor.
The only certainty is change. The Arab Spring is its harbinger.
English Sources:
“Egypt’s
Brotherhood may bid for President.” The Jerusalem Post, (March 21, 2012).
Retrieved August 22, 2012, from: http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=262807
“Egypt:
Islamism and the State.” The American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of
Islamism. (n.d.). Retrieved August 22, 2012, from: http://almanac.afpc.org/Egypt
“Egypt’s
Morsi to make historic trip to Tehran.” Al Jazeera English, (n.d.). Retrieved
August 22, 2012, from: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/08/2012818182526548301.html
“Inside
Story: Can Morsi break the military’s hold on Egypt?” Al Jazeera English,
(n.d.). Retrieved August 21, 2012, from: http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/08/2012813135019322491.html
Lukyanov,
Fyodor. (August 21, 2012). “The world ignores Egypt at its own peril.” Russia
Beyond the Headlines. Retrieved August 21, 2012, from: http://rbth.ru/articles/2012/08/21/the_world_ignores_egypt_at_its_own_peril_17539.html
Lynch,
Marc. (April 2, 2012). “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Presidential Gambit.” Foreign
Policy. Retrieved August 22, 2012, from: http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/04/01/the_muslim_brotherhoods_presidential_gambit
“Profile:
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood” BBC News, (n.d.). Retrieved August 22, 2012, from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12313405
Shukrallah,
Salamah. (August 23, 2012). “Egypt revolutionaries to steer clear of Friday’s
anti-Brotherhood rally.” Ahram Online English. Retrieved August 23, 2012, from:
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/51025/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-revolutionaries-to-steer-clear-of-Fridays-an.aspx
“Empire: Egypt: A second republic?” Al Jazeera
English, (n.d.). Retrieved August 21, 2012, from: http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/empire/2012/07/2012711163519717268.html
Arabic
Sources:
“Egypt:
Presidential coup overthrows the rule of the military.” The Ambassador, (n.d.).
Retrieved August 21, 2012, from: http://www.assafir.com/Article.aspx?ArticleId=1218&EditionId=2228&ChannelId=53429
Khalifa,
Abdel Raouf. (August 23, 2012). “Mahmoud Alsharef: Demonstrations tomorrow aim
to embarrass the president elect and prevent the implementation of his
programs.” Ahram Digital. Retrieved August 23, 2012, from: http://digital.ahram.org.eg/Policy.aspx?Serial=1002503
Malah,
Nadia. (June 27, 2012). “Doctor Louis Grace: Morsi’s letter reassuring the
Copts they are a part of the fabric of the nation.” Ahram Digital. Retrieved
August 22, 2012, from: http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=944240&eid=1218
“Morsi’s
decisions change the political landscape in Egypt: Absolute power for the
president not available to Mubarak!” The Ambassador, (August 14, 2012).
Retrieved August 21, 2012, from: http://www.assafir.com/MulhakArticle.aspx?EditionId=2235&MulhakArticleId=604966&MulhakId=4261
