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| Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 (Picture: public domain) |
“Allah is our objective;
the Quran is our constitution,
the Prophet is our leader;
Jihad is our way;
and death for the sake of Allah
is the highest of our aspirations.”
(Hassan al-Bana)
the Quran is our constitution,
the Prophet is our leader;
Jihad is our way;
and death for the sake of Allah
is the highest of our aspirations.”
(Hassan al-Bana)
Observing the current political clime within Egypt today, it is clear that the Muslim Brotherhood has “won” the battle of narratives that began with the 25 January Egyptian Revolution. The two other major actors in the Revolution, the ancien regime and liberal democratic youth, have failed to offer a credible voice, and are barely relevant in Egypt today. The liberal democratic youth movement that sparked the revolution were unable to coalesce into a unified political group until recently in the form of the National Salvation Front, and have been relegated to the role of bit player on the political stage. The Egyptian military severed the umbilical tie to Mubarak and has returned to its barracks. The military professes no interest in taking part in the political life of Egypt unless absolutely necessary (See “The Future Role of…). The Muslim Brotherhood, in stark contrast, has ascended to power, after three long decades as outcasts. The Muslim Brotherhood originally began in Egypt, founded by Hassan al-Bana. They now join there brothers in Gaza (Hamas) as a ruling party. An Islamist Party headed by PM Erdogan has ruled Turkey for over a decade. Branches of the Muslim Brotherhood exist in Syria, Sudan, Jordan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen, Kuwait, Oman and Morocco. As the ruling party of the most populous nation in the Middle East, the Muslim Brotherhood has become an important regional arbiter in Middle Eastern affairs.
Ironically, the Muslim Brotherhood initially opposed the protests which began the Revolution and were hesitant participants in its opening days. Nevertheless, they have become the greatest political beneficiaries of the revolution to which they were unenthusiastic latecomers. Conventional wisdom at the outset of the revolution focused mostly on social media and the liberal democratic youth, ignoring the long history and pervasive organizational presence of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout Egypt. Research sheds light on the factors that enabled the Muslim Brotherhood to prevail. In fact, looking at the revolution in hindsight, it is clear that the electoral victories of the Muslim Brotherhood were predictable. The Muslim Brotherhood had the strongest narrative, organization, and leadership.
Founded in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood had long been one of the parties in Egypt which represented opposition to the authoritarian regimes of Farouk, Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak, though they opportunistically allied with them as well. The Muslim Brotherhood have demonstrated organizational savvy that would rival the experts at McKinsey & Company. They have a long history of providing stipends, food, health care and other social welfare services to Egypt’s needy for many decades. Muslim Brothers are (or were, at least) widely perceived to be devout, honest men dedicated to serving the public good. In contrast, the attempted narrative of justice and freedom offered by the liberal democratic youth who were the first protestors was incoherent to ordinary Egyptians who did not have college educations. The Muslim Brotherhood and the ancien regime were successfully able to portray them as un-Egyptian and potential puppets of the West. The ancien regime's narrative boiled down to the devil that you know is better than the devil that you don't know-- i.e., that the patriarchal Mubarak may have a few flaws here and there, but he's still better than chaos and uncertainty.
Narrative is an ever-present element in politics, because there is no politics without narrative, and no political narrative without emotion. Human beings relate to stories. All politics is at the root comprised of interactions between individuals. Every construct of society and politics is at the root a creation by single individuals (See “There is no…”). The effectiveness of narrative boils down to three primary characteristics:
1. A Leader or group trusted by the audience
2. A narrative rooted in a cultural context and world-view accepted by the audience
A revolution is a complex thing. Once critical mass is reached, a revolution takes on a life of its own. They are chaotic and inherently unpredictable. Napoleon said, "A revolution can be neither made nor stopped. The only thing that can be done is for one of several of its children to give it a direction by dint of victories." Narrative is the spark of a revolution. Injustice is the tinder. Revolutionaries fan the flames. Without a reason to revolt, there is no revolt. However, a successful revolution cannot live by narrative alone. There must be committed cadre with organizational skills and an organization. Resources such as bullets and money are required. A narrative cannot exist without communication. In the days of yore that meant printing presses. In today's world that means mass media.
One of the primary hurdles when evaluating narratives is the chicken or the egg problem. How do we evaluate the role that narrative played in legitimizing the Muslim Brotherhood and mobilizing public opinion on their side? The answer seems to be that narrative will always play a role, and is intertwined with other elements. For example, the long history of opposition and social welfare services is a very important legitimizing factor for the Muslim Brotherhood. However, that history is communicated through language in the form of narrative. In short, narrative is essential but it is never the only factor. Successful manipulation of narrative does not guarantee a particular outcome, but increases the chances of a successful outcome. The power of narrative is especially observable during times of crisis. In contrast, historical narrative may become somewhat of an albatross around the neck of a revolutionary opposition party which suddenly finds itself thrust into power. The Muslim Brotherhood now finds it necessary to try to explain two simultaneous and inconsistent narratives. This is something of a challenge for rulers who in the past have never been forced to explain or cope with contradictory statements. For example, after assuming office President Morsi made a number of speeches to the Egyptian people promising that the Muslim Brotherhood would be inclusive and would respect all ethnic groups and all religions. He was promptly confronted with a slew of YouTube videos from his earlier career as Muslim Brotherhood apparatchik giving passionate speeches damning Jews as the descendants of apes and pigs (See "Morsi in 2010...").
Narrative is most important when people are most emotional. As normality begins to return, other factors overshadow narrative, such as employment, trash collection and keeping criminals off the streets. In other words, the evaluation of narrative must consider timing and context. In some contexts, such as the first ten days of the Egyptian Revolution, narrative was perhaps the most important element of all-- the spark. However, at other stages other factors such as organizational presence and the ability to turn out millions of members to vote were the most important. The evolution of my research has been to incorporate other theoretical approaches to integrate the lens of narrative in a more holistic view of the dynamics of social change.
One of these approaches is that of the “Great Man Theory”, that is the idea that singular individuals of great charisma, intelligence, skill and/or will could make decisive impacts on the course of history (See “There is no…”). This approach is particularly relevant with respect to Egypt. Since the coup d’état of King Farouk in 1952, every subsequent leader of Egypt has been a military man. Muhammad Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and finally Hosni Mubarak were all seen to one degree or another as a “strong” man and hero figure by their association with the military. Nasser in particular cultivated his role as protector of Egyptian society by emphasizing exterior threats and continually reaffirming Egypt’s role as the de facto leaders of the Arab world. Up until this day Nasser still retains a cult of personality as demonstrated by the continued appearance of his visage in Egyptian streets, homes, and shops. The idea of the military man as protector and leader continues to pervade the social consciousness of Egyptians. The military was seen as the one governmental institution that insured the rights of Egyptian to protest during the revolution. Military officers are seen as incorruptible and honorable as opposed to their police counterparts. In 2011, 21 of the 29 Egyptian governates were run by ex military generals (See “The Army and…).
Since the revolution, the Egyptian government has slowly been shifting to a more civilian form of representation in its cabinet positions (See “The Future Role of…). For the first time in five decades, the president is not a military man. It is apparent, however, that the narrative of the patriarchal cult continues to be alive and well. Since Morsi has taken office, there are ongoing attempts to manage the narrative to cast him as the “Great Man” and leader of Egypt. His shocking dismissal of Supreme Council of the Armed Forces Generals Tantawi and Anan in his early days of office (See "Morsi's coup..."), his sweeping foreign policy activities regarding Iran and Hamas, and the attempted strong man seizure of constitutional powers have all been activities to portray strength of character and resolve to the Egyptian people. In April, a Morsi “fan” thought by some to be a representative of the Muslim Brotherhood published “The Achievements of Doctor Morsi”, an eerie echoing of the previous presidents forays into publishing and cults of personality with “Mubarak in the Heart of Egypt”.
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| "The Achievements of Dr Morsi" by Reda al-Masry held aloft by a Muslim Brotherhood supporter. Copies will be distributed to members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Picture: behind the revolution) |
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| "Mubarak in the Heart of Egypt" (Picture: Alexandria Digital Library Repository) |
In the aftermath of the 25 January Egyptian Revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood is the dominant force in Egyptian politics. However, there is no narrative that can compensate for a deteriorating economy, the absence of police on the streets and a general air of hopelessness. Simply repeating the phrase “Islam is the Solution” is not the panacea Egyptians are likely to accept. The Muslim Brotherhood has launched Egypt into rough seas. The destination remains unknown.
Sources:
Abul-Magd, Zeinab. (December 24, 2011). "The Army and The Economy In Egypt." Egypt Independent. Retrieved April 20, 2013, from: http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/army-and-economy-egypt
"The Future Role of the Military in Post-Revolutionary Democratic Egypt." (May 2, 2013). Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved May 4, 2013, from: http://csis.org/multimedia/audio-public-panel-future-role-military-post-revolutionary-democratic-egypt-pt-1
“Great Man Theory.” (N.D.) Wikipedia. Retrieved April 21, 2013, from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/great_man_theory
"Morsi in 2010: No to Negotiations with the Blood-Sucking, Warmongering "Descendants of Apes and Pigs"; Calls to Boycott U.S. Products." (March 20 & Septermber 23, 2010). MEMRI TV. Retrieved May 6, 2013, from: http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/3702.htm
Rashwan, Nada. (August 14, 2012). "Morsi's Coup Against SCAF: The Hows and the Whys." Ahram Online. Retrieved February 20, 2013, from: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/140/50324/Egypt/First--days/Morsis-coup-against-SCAF-The-hows-and-the-whys.aspx
Tombaugh, William. (April 22, 2013). CGIS-FMSO Blog. Retrieved April 22, 2013, from: http://cgis-fmso.blogspot.com/2013/04/there-is-no-such-thing-as-society.html
