Favela Gangs: Threats to Brazilian Security

The gangs and criminal networks that have historically occupied Rio de Janeiro’s favelas are classified by some as criminal insurgencies. The gangs operate in small and organized units, patrolling and defending their favela territories. The patrolling and defending is done in an effort to maintain autonomy from the Brazilian government and security forces in order to maximize profits from the drug trade. This is their main objective. Limited, yes; but becoming more and more difficult to achieve. The gangs have the capabilities to employ guerrilla tactics and warfare techniques to achieve their goals and control territories. These territories, which have a highly complex structure, are the operating grounds for Brazil’s drug commerce.

“At the local level, each favela is controlled by a senior leader or dono. Under the dono is the general manager who manages the gang operations including drug sales and military activities. Under the general manger, there are sub-managers for cocaine sales, marijuana sales, and security. Each drug distribution point, called a boca de fumo, has a manager and security force. Finally, guards are employed to protect the perimeter of the favela from police or rival gang incursions.”

The members of these gangs generally have access to assault rifles, grenades, and heavy machine guns. While many speculate that the control and power of the drug gangs has been overestimated, one security analyst explained, “To survive, they have to be intelligent, clever, and ruthless.” The attacks in December of 2006 demonstrate the gangs’ capabilities. On December, 28 2006, drug gangs launched a synchronized attack against buses and police stations. It has been speculated that this was coordinated to intimidate Rio’s new government. In October of 2009, a police helicopter was shot down just one mile away from the Marcana Stadium in Rio, where the opening and closing ceremonies for the 2016 Olympics are to take place. The helicopter was attempting to descend upon the Morro dos Macacos favela when criminal gangs began to fire. Two officers were killed during a forced emergency landing. A similar attack happened in November of 2010, when buses and cars were set on fire and improvised explosives were detonated. The attacks, which left over 35 people dead, were understood to be a reaction to the pacification program.

While there are clear similarities between insurgents and the criminal gangs of the favelas, the central demands of the gangs are not political. The underlying tensions are a result of conflicting social interests and a lack of opportunities for residents. The youth within the favelas are raised in this culture of violence where the gang leaders run the communities.

A nongovernmental organization in Rio determined that around 20% of the guns seized in the country are foreign produced. Others, which are produced in Brazil but cannot be legally sold there, are exported and then smuggled back in to Brazil. Within the last year, Brazil has started working together with neighboring countries Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru to monitor terrain and track drug traffickers and arms smugglers. Brazil initiated the operation, and has the rights to enter the other countries’ air space. Recent reports, however, show an increased use of maritime routes to smuggle in arms. Even if Brazil is able to reduce maritime smuggling, the country still borders ten other nations, much of which are densely forested and remote areas. Brazil needs to focus its efforts on border security, specifically in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul. One report determined that Mato Grosso do Sul, which borders Paraguay and Bolivia, was the location of 30% of the export and re-importation of illegal weapons. Youth and impoverished residents of the favela would be much less likely to enter the drug world if they did not have access to the tools necessary to survive.

SOURCES

Boyle, Christina. “Brazilian Drug Gangs Shoot down Police Chopper Near Rio De Janiero; 2 Officers Dead.” NYDailyNews, October 17, 2009. http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-10-17/news/17937622_1_drug-gangs-rio-drug-traffickers.

“Brazil Unmanned Aircraft Hunt Drug Gangs.” UPI, n.d. http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/07/13/Brazil-unmanned-aircraft-hunt-drug-gangs/UPI-44691310596620/.

Burgoyne, Michael. “The Right Tool for the Job: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Counterinsurgency Principles Against Criminal Insurgency | Small Wars Journal”, n.d. http://smallwarsjournal.com/resource/the-right-tool-for-the-job-an-evaluation-of-the-effectiveness-of-counterinsurgency-principl.

Killebrew, Robert. “PRISM 2, No. 3: Criminal Insurgency in the Americas and Beyond”, n.d. http://www.ndu.edu/press/criminal-insurgency.html.

Stone, Hannah. “Brazil Police Say Sea Is New Arms Trafficking Frontier”, n.d. http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1242-brazil-police-say-sea-is-new-arms-trafficking-frontier.