Party Institutionalization

The literature that attempts to explain conflict espouses numerous theories including “differences in civilization,” exclusion, poverty, and weak institutions.  Each of these theories exhibit well-developed conceptual frameworks and attempt to offer empirical conclusions; nevertheless, the field is inundated with contradictory findings and to date has yet to offer clear explanations in specific regional contexts.   In fact, an alternative explanation of conflict within the African landscape may more appropriately explain conflict:  lack of political party institutionalization. 

One of the most well-known and controversial theories concerns “differences in civilization.”    Differences in civilization include such things as language, region, ethnicity, and nationality. Well-known authors Samuel Huntington and Donald Horowitz assert that nations that have diverse populations are more likely to be subsumed in frequent and extreme violence while other scholars find that nations characterized by large dissimilar populations are uncorrelated with increased violence.  Fearon and Laitin quantitatively find that high ethnic and religious diversity bear no direct relationship to conflict and instead emphasize that any relationship that is found is spurious.  In contrast, others theorize poverty is a predictor of conflict.

Ted Gurr’s Theory of Relative Deprivation essentially declares that conflict will ensue when some segment of the population has less than another segment and they are aware of this imbalance in resources.  In essence, Gurr believes that the difference between what a person believes that they are entitled to and what they can actually attain may be the impetus that spurs people to engage in violent conflict.  Gurr’s theory has been largely discounted as a causal mechanism of conflict because it fails to account for weak governmental and political institutions, ethnic concerns, or other important variables that influence violence. In fact, even studies that empirically determine poverty to be correlated to conflict conclude that this correlation is actually caused by weak governmental institutions rather than the existence of weak economic conditions.

The poverty theory as well as the cultural differences theory fail to examine the political institutions operating within any given nation state.  Recognizing this gap, two additional theories have developed that attempt to take a more comprehensive approach to explaining conflict:  exclusionary theory and weak institutional theory.

The exclusionary theory rests upon the claim that patronage systems encourage leaders to engage in the full exclusion from political participation and representation of whole ethnic populations.  This sort of exclusion eventually results in extreme discontent that is transformed into an aggrieved rebel force.  In many instances the development of rebel forces in Africa is linked to their exclusion from political representation. 

Finally, the weak institutional theory asserts that governments characterized by weak institutions are often characterized by extreme instability.   This theory is more comprehensive than others because proponents recognize the interaction between weak institutions and poverty, religious diversity, exclusion, etc.  One of the more interesting yet largely unexplored concepts of weak institutions is the weak political party systems; specifically, the role of political parties in encouraging or discouraging conflict. 

The institutionalization of political parties and political party systems has been deemed essential to a fully functioning representative democracy.  This is because party institutionalization ensures stability within the governmental system such that elites and electorate believe in the legitimacy of the governmental process.  Additionally, institutionalized party systems are generally free from patronage which translates into party autonomy.  This independence allows the party to act in the best interest of the electorate rather encouraging individual power seekers to be dependent upon certain “Big Men” in order to gain increased money and power.  In fact, it is argued that institutionalized party systems ensure governmental accountability and overall democratic stability.  In many ways the institutionalization of political parties incorporates many of the components of traditional conflict theories and thus offers a more comprehensive measure to examine the causes of conflict in developing regions.  In order to fully understand and attempt to mitigate the conflict it is first essential to isolate the causes of the conflict.  To be sure, evaluating party institutionalization within Africa is no easy task as the selection of key indicators and the accumulation of data is arduous, yet essential.

Sources:

Fearon, James D, and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." American Political Science Review, 2003: 75-90.

Horowitz, Donald. Ethhnic Groups in Conflict. Berkley: University of California Press, 1985.

Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Policy, 1993: 22-49.

Lindemann, Stefan. Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter? A Research Framework for Understanding the Causes of Civil War in Sub-Saharan AFrica. Discussion Paper, Crisis States Research Centre, 2008.

Mainwaring, Scott and Mariano Tocal (2005).  “Party System Institutionalizatino and Party System Theory after the Third Wave of Democratization.” (Working Paper #319).  Retrieved from Kellogg Instituute http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/319.pdf.

Randall, Vicky and Lars Svasand.  “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies.”  Party Politics, 2002:5-29.

Roessler, Philip. "The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War." World Politics 63, no. 2 (April 2011): 300-346.

Sambanis, Nicholas. "Poverty and the Organization of Political Violence: A Review and some conjectures." Brookings Trade Forum, 2004: 165-211.

van Wyk, Jo-Ansie. "Political Leaders in Africa: Presidents, Patrons, or Profiteers." Accord Group Occassional Paper, 2007.