Friday, April 20, 2012

Book Reviews


Zhao, Suisheng.    Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism.   Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004.   xii + 355 pp. ISBN 0-8047-5001-7.

This book provides a comprehensive account for the development of Chinese nationalism throughout modern Chinese history (from the late nineteenth century to the beginning of the twenty-first century). In this work, Zhao takes a primarily historical approach to the study of Chinese nationalism as a multi-faceted and multi-layered phenomenon. This book is composed of seven chapters, covering topics from the historical context for understanding Chinese nationalism to the different forms of Chinese nationalism, and from a case study of the patriotic education campaign of the 1990s to the foreign policy ramifications of Chinese nationalism.
Zhao seeks to present his readers with a comprehensive picture of Chinese nationalism as well as the studies on this topic. The great amount of information provided and the way this information is presented constitute both the major strength and weakness of the work. On the one hand, the book is extremely informative. In terms of content, Zhao not only provides historical context for understanding the origins and rise of Chinese nationalism, but also illustrates the characteristics of various forms of Chinese nationalism, including Chinese liberal nationalism, state nationalism, and ethnic nationalism. In terms of theoretical paradigms of nationalism, Zhao employs “primordialism with a careful measure of instrumentalism” (7). On the other hand, to accommodate all of this information into a 300-page book, the author does not have enough space to delve into each subtopic in depth, and thus, this text lacks a strong focus. Moreover, as Zhao tends to present the arguments of different sides in the theoretical debates on the issues of Chinese nationalism, the analysis in this book does not provide support for any coherent theory, and Zhao’s own position on certain controversial issues in the study of Chinese nationalism, such as its origins, content and ramifications, is unclear (12).
Another gap in this study is that no systematic quantitative fieldwork has been carried out to specifically examine contemporary Chinese nationalist views. Zhao’s book is largely based on extensive reading of primary sources and scholarly literature, and derives its ideas and arguments mainly from descriptive content analysis of these sources. However, no convincing quantitative evidence on Chinese public opinion in regard to Chinese nationalism is provided. For example, in Zhao’s chapter on the patriotic education campaign in China of the 1990s, although the author does an excellent job in analyzing the content of the instrumentalist campaign, his evaluation of the effects of the patriotic campaign is supported only by several examples that are representative to a limited extent (238), based on which a comprehensive understanding of Chinese public opinion toward nationalism during the campaign cannot be accurately determined.
There is no doubt that Zhao’s work is a historically comprehensive essential reading for all students of Chinese nationalism. Nevertheless, it does not contribute much to the theoretical debates on this topic. Ideally, it ought to be further completed and strengthened by possible quantitative evidence.



Gries, Peter Hays.    China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy.   Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2004.   215 pp.   ISBN 0-520-24482-6.

This book is an in-depth case study on what Peter Gries defines as the “fourth generation” of Chinese nationalists, who “seek to make sense of their experiences in the ‘Liberal 80s,’ ” and the rise of Chinese mass nationalism in the events of China’s confrontations with external powers, particularly the United States and Japan, in the 1990s and early 2000s (4).
In order to avoid the controversies in the academic definition of nationalism and national identity, Gries resorts to social psychology theory, making this book a very innovative study of contemporary Chinese nationalism. It is insightful and inspiring for both western and Chinese readers because Gries provides a refreshing analysis of the perceptions and misperceptions of people from China and from other countries toward each other from a psychological perspective, “relying on a deep immersion in the historical and cultural context of Chinese politics today” (9). In particular, Gries emphasizes the concept of “face” in Chinese culture and its role in Chinese nationalism (21). According to the author, in Chinese culture, the “face game” is “a battle over the zero-sum resource of social status”, and is thus “fundamentally political” and closely related to Chinese national pride and foreign policy (26).
Another valuable contribution of this book is that Gries challenges the conventional western view that Chinese nationalism is a state-centric construction based on top-down Party propaganda. Instead, he argues that nationalist politics in China today should be seen as an interaction between the Chinese people and the China Communist Party (121). In support of his argument, he used the Diaoyu Islands protests in 1996 and the Belgrade bombing protests in 1999, as examples of bottom-up nationalist movements in China that involve “both Chinese people and their passion” (Gries, 19, 121, 133).
However, as a possible weakness, this book’s heavy reliance on social psychology might have resulted in an overestimation of the psychological explanations for the rise of Chinese nationalism while overlooking other independent variables. For example, Gries sees the psychological void of the “fourth generation” of Chinese nationalists and the historical grievances between China and other states as the main explanatory factors in the rise of Chinese nationalism in the 1990s and 2000s. But, in the absence of a systematic quantitative study, he presents no control over other variables affecting people’s attitude toward Chinese nationalism and national identity, such as education, sources of information, and occupation, and thus cannot account for the exact role and position of psychological factors, in relation to other factors, in the process of the formation of Chinese national identity.
This book is an important reading for those who are interested in understanding the recent rise of Chinese nationalism within the cultural and historical contexts in China from a psychological perspective. Particularly, this work contributes to more comprehensive interpretations of Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations.  

Thursday, April 19, 2012

Favela Gangs: Threats to Brazilian Security

The gangs and criminal networks that have historically occupied Rio de Janeiro’s favelas are classified by some as criminal insurgencies. The gangs operate in small and organized units, patrolling and defending their favela territories. The patrolling and defending is done in an effort to maintain autonomy from the Brazilian government and security forces in order to maximize profits from the drug trade. This is their main objective. Limited, yes; but becoming more and more difficult to achieve. The gangs have the capabilities to employ guerrilla tactics and warfare techniques to achieve their goals and control territories. These territories, which have a highly complex structure, are the operating grounds for Brazil’s drug commerce.

“At the local level, each favela is controlled by a senior leader or dono. Under the dono is the general manager who manages the gang operations including drug sales and military activities. Under the general manger, there are sub-managers for cocaine sales, marijuana sales, and security. Each drug distribution point, called a boca de fumo, has a manager and security force. Finally, guards are employed to protect the perimeter of the favela from police or rival gang incursions.”

The members of these gangs generally have access to assault rifles, grenades, and heavy machine guns. While many speculate that the control and power of the drug gangs has been overestimated, one security analyst explained, “To survive, they have to be intelligent, clever, and ruthless.” The attacks in December of 2006 demonstrate the gangs’ capabilities. On December, 28 2006, drug gangs launched a synchronized attack against buses and police stations. It has been speculated that this was coordinated to intimidate Rio’s new government. In October of 2009, a police helicopter was shot down just one mile away from the Marcana Stadium in Rio, where the opening and closing ceremonies for the 2016 Olympics are to take place. The helicopter was attempting to descend upon the Morro dos Macacos favela when criminal gangs began to fire. Two officers were killed during a forced emergency landing. A similar attack happened in November of 2010, when buses and cars were set on fire and improvised explosives were detonated. The attacks, which left over 35 people dead, were understood to be a reaction to the pacification program.

While there are clear similarities between insurgents and the criminal gangs of the favelas, the central demands of the gangs are not political. The underlying tensions are a result of conflicting social interests and a lack of opportunities for residents. The youth within the favelas are raised in this culture of violence where the gang leaders run the communities.

A nongovernmental organization in Rio determined that around 20% of the guns seized in the country are foreign produced. Others, which are produced in Brazil but cannot be legally sold there, are exported and then smuggled back in to Brazil. Within the last year, Brazil has started working together with neighboring countries Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru to monitor terrain and track drug traffickers and arms smugglers. Brazil initiated the operation, and has the rights to enter the other countries’ air space. Recent reports, however, show an increased use of maritime routes to smuggle in arms. Even if Brazil is able to reduce maritime smuggling, the country still borders ten other nations, much of which are densely forested and remote areas. Brazil needs to focus its efforts on border security, specifically in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul. One report determined that Mato Grosso do Sul, which borders Paraguay and Bolivia, was the location of 30% of the export and re-importation of illegal weapons. Youth and impoverished residents of the favela would be much less likely to enter the drug world if they did not have access to the tools necessary to survive.

SOURCES

Boyle, Christina. “Brazilian Drug Gangs Shoot down Police Chopper Near Rio De Janiero; 2 Officers Dead.” NYDailyNews, October 17, 2009. http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-10-17/news/17937622_1_drug-gangs-rio-drug-traffickers.

“Brazil Unmanned Aircraft Hunt Drug Gangs.” UPI, n.d. http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/07/13/Brazil-unmanned-aircraft-hunt-drug-gangs/UPI-44691310596620/.

Burgoyne, Michael. “The Right Tool for the Job: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Counterinsurgency Principles Against Criminal Insurgency | Small Wars Journal”, n.d. http://smallwarsjournal.com/resource/the-right-tool-for-the-job-an-evaluation-of-the-effectiveness-of-counterinsurgency-principl.

Killebrew, Robert. “PRISM 2, No. 3: Criminal Insurgency in the Americas and Beyond”, n.d. http://www.ndu.edu/press/criminal-insurgency.html.

Stone, Hannah. “Brazil Police Say Sea Is New Arms Trafficking Frontier”, n.d. http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1242-brazil-police-say-sea-is-new-arms-trafficking-frontier.

Wednesday, April 18, 2012

Chinese Commentaries on Foreign Affairs

Sino-US Relations

A Chinese Foreign Ministry official wrote a commentary on Sino-US relations, where he pointed out that the biggest mistrust in Sino-US relations are their suspicions of each other's intentions to change their own regime types. According to him, the mistrust between China and the US, to a certain extent, should be attributed to the conflict between a superpower and a rising power. To improve mutual trust, this Chinese official suggests that the US should provide answers for the following questions: Is the US's increase of military bases around China aimed at partially encircling China? Has the US considered what impacts its high-profile return to the Asia-Pacific has on the feelings of Chinese, the Sino-US mutual trust, and regional stability? When will the US reduce its arm sales to Taiwan? Will the US stick to protectionism in regard to Sino-US trade frictions, or the US hope to strengthen the cooperation with China? How will the US explain its particular concern over Chinese dissidents, if it is not the US's intention to change the regime type in China? What does the US mean by "being responsible" when commenting China's policy toward Iran and North Korea nuclear crisis?

North Korea Satellite

Regarding the North Korea nuclear crisis, China always holds that it is in the common interests of all parties to continue to push forward the Six Party Talks and the denuclearization of the Peninsula and to maintain peace and stability in the region. China believes that practice has proved that dialogue and consultation is the only correct choice to solve the problem. China hopes that different parties can work together to properly handle the issues through contact and dialogue. China is willing to work with the parties to actively promote the six Party Talks and make unremitting efforts for the realization of the long-term stability of the Peninsular and Northeast Asia.

Sino-Russian Military Exercises

From April 22 to April 29, Russia and China will conduct joint naval exercises in the Yellow Sea water codenamed "maritime collaboration 2012". This will be the largest joint military exercises at sea between China and Russia in recent years. During the exercise, the North China Sea Fleet will send a guided missile destroyer to the Russian Fleet to form a mixed fleet to enter Yellow Sea water across the Strait of Japan, and hold joint exercises near Qingdao. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the purpose of this joint exercise is targeted at anti-piracy and counter-terrorism operations. The Chinese side stressed that the exercise is to deepen the strategic partnership between China and Russia and to safeguard peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the world. The Russian side also stressed that this exercise is not against any third party.

China-Philippines Water Disputes

With regard to the China-Philippines disputes over Huangyan Island in the South China Sea, a commentary from Global Times claims that the Philippine military does not know its limits, and that it is very easy to destroy their naval forces. According to this commentary, the strongest of the Philippine Navy warships is only a quasi-warship of the U.S. Coast Guard, while their other warships are mostly from the United States and Britain eliminated ships. In addition, due to the limited remote capacity of the Philippine Navy, Marines cannot really play a significant role.

A spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines on the 16th said that China urges the Philippine side to immediately withdraw all vessels in the waters of the Huangyan Island and restore the status of pease and tranquility of the area. China holds that Huanyan Island waters is a traditional fishing ground of Chinese fishermen.


Sources:

"外交部官员:中美最大猜忌己方政权性质被改" (Foreign Ministry official: China and the United States' biggest concerns are the danger of changes in regime types)

"中方与国际社会达共识 强烈谴责朝发射卫星" (China and the international community reached consensus on a strong condemnation of the DPRK's decision to launch a satellite)

"中俄海上军演:将组成混合编队穿越日本海峡" (Sino-Russian military exercises at sea: will form a mixed formation across the Strait of Japan)

"菲国挑事属自不量力 消灭其海军不费吹灰之力" (Philippine does not know its limit, it is easy to destroy their navy)

"中方:菲仍留20余船并在我南海考古令人惊讶" (China: It is surprising that the Philippines still keep more than 20 archeology boats in the South China Sea)