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| "Africa Unchained: The Blueprint For Africa's Future" by George Ayittey (Source: Amazon.com) |
Determining whether a country, or a continent, is "poor" can be achieved by measuring criteria such as "extreme poverty" at $1.25 per day of income, or with an index based on a group of elements. Africa is poor by either of these measures. George Ayittey, in his book "Africa Unchained" describes the chronic poverty and underdevelopment in Africa in detail, observing that Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, although one of the richest areas in the world in natural resources such as minerals, is the poorest region in the world in terms of per capita GNP and poverty. The most recent UNDP Least Developed Countries Report for 2012 contains a map which shows that Ayittey's observations based on data from earlier years still holds true today (See "Human Development Indicies..."): 32 of the world's 49 countries classified by the United Nations as "least developed countries" are located in Africa (See "Least Developed Countries...").
Historical Context
George Ayittey observes that colonialist countries were industrialized countries who used colonies primarily to extract natural resources, and that as a result both economic development and social development was skewed and impeded (See Ayittey, p27). He points out that African independence leaders often used the excuse of requiring strong powers to implement state economic planning in order to seize property and establish dictatorial political regimes (See Ayittey, p29).
The "typical African" at the onset of the post-independence era was an agricultural peasant, focused on family, animistic in religion, and loyal to his village chief (See Ayittey, p12). The African peasant was no stranger to free markets: markets were a way of life for the Africa peasant long before the first colonialists arrived (See Ayittey, Chp 9). The African peasant was just as worthwhile a human being as was his Indian or Chinese counterpart, was just as conscientious and hard working, but whose traditions were not the history of empire, but rather a focus on local rule.
African natives have always been free enterprisers, going about their daily economic activities on their own volition. They do not queue before their rulers' palaces or huts for permission to engage in trade, fishing, or agriculture. They produce surpluses that are sold in free village markets, where prices are determined by bargaining, not dictates from the tribal government. Their traditional societies are generally peaceful and stable. They live not only in harmony with others but also with their natural environment including wildlife. They run their societies with their own unique political and economic institutions.
A careful study of their "primitive" societies reveals an astonishing degree of functionality: participatory forms of democracy, rule of customary law, and accountability. Their system of government was so open that some allowed participation by foreign merchants. No modern country, even the United States, can boast of such an open government.. Africa's traditional rulers were no despots, despite their characterization as such by European colonialists in order to justify various pacification campaigns.
The ruler was surrounded by various councils, bodies, and institutions to prevent abuses of power and corruption. Furthermore, the ruler was held accountable for his actions at all times and could be removed at any time if he was corrupt or failed to govern according to the will of the people. "Under most traditional African constitutions, bad or ineffective rulers were more readily removed from office than most modern constitutions allow. Divine kingship does not absolve a ruler from removal if he fails to live up to his responsibilities or constitutional duties. Important decisions were made only after necessary discussions and consultations had been made. A king had no right to make peace or war, make laws, or be directly involved in important negotiations such as treaties without the consent of their elders and/or elected representatives" (See Ayittey, p20-21)
Post-colonial African rulers tended toward a statist economic development model, rejecting capitalist free markets because capitalism was perceived to be the system of colonialist oppressors; they also rejected a mix which blended native African traditions because African rulers felt their own traditions were "primitive" or "backward". African independence leaders usually had little economic or managerial expertise, not to mention an "inferiority complex (See Ayittey, p84)." Four political ideologies emerged among newly independent African regimes: socialism, political pragmatism, military nationalism, and Afro-Marxism (See Ayittey, p60-61). The philosophy of African rulers often manifested itself in crude attempts at imitating the West: "If American farmers use tractors, so, too, must African farmers. If New York has skyscrapers, so, too, must Africa (See Ayittey, p84).
As to religious strife in Africa, Ayittey makes the interesting point that Christian-Muslim conflict in Africa is an historical anomaly: "Strictly from the black African historical perspective, the Arabs were no different from the Europeans. Both groups were invaders, colonizers, and slavers, who used their religions—Christianity and Islam—to convert, oppress, exploit, and enslave blacks (See Ayittey, p104)."
Vampire Elites And African Peasants
Overall, Africa is the poorest (inhabited) continent on Earth. Individual countries in Africa vary, of course, ranging from relatively prosperous countries bordering the Mediterranean to the poorest countries in the sub-Sahara. Ayittey's data, while somewhat dated (Sudan, for example is one of the poorest sub-Saharan countries. GDP per capital for 2012 is about $2,400 [See CIA "Country Comparison..."]) illustrates the relative poverty and lack of development which plague Africa, compared with the rest of the world.
Many countries in Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, have experienced economic declines in the post-colonial era, occurring in the 1960's and 1970's. Poverty increased dramatically.
"The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's (UNCTAD) Report, Least Developed Countries, 2002, noted that both the extent and depth of poverty have increased dramatically in Sub-Saharan Africa:
"The proportion of people in 29 African countries living below $2 per day increased from 82 percent in the late 1960s to 87.5 percent in the late 1990s. For those in extreme poverty—under $1 per day—the increase was from 55.8 per cent to 64.9 percent. The number of African[s] living in extreme poverty rose dramatically from 89.6 million to 233.5 million over the same period". The report noted that not only is poverty widening in Africa, but it is also becoming more severe." (See Ayittey, Chp 4-5)
According to Ayittey, foreign investors lost interest in Africa, (See Ayittey, Chp 4-5) until recent years when China and India undertook major investment initiatives in the region. Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, was racked with war and conflict that displaced large numbers of people and devastated entire countries (See Ayittey, Chp 2-5). The United Nations Development Programme Report (2003) noted the perilous state of sub-Saharan Africa:
The report noted that while most of the worlds economies expanded in the 1990s, people in 54 developing countries had become poorer; the majority of these countries were in Africa. (See Ayittey, Chp 5)
Ayittey observed that in the post-colonial era extending up to the present day, even considering economic and regulatory reforms and other improvements undertaken by a number of "success stories", most African countries have not been able to stimulate substantial economic growth or attract foreign investment. Ayittey cites civil wars and other political instability, failure by states to follow their own rules, incompetence, corruption, an inferiority complex on the part of leaders, a compulsive desire to modernize whether or not technology made sense, as glaring weaknesses which hindered development and deterred foreign investment interest. He describes the mentality of a "Religion of Development," (See Ayittey, p87) which for many African independence leaders was a poor substitute for genuine economic planning.
This religion of development propelled African nationalist leaders and elites to opt for obtusely expensive and inappropriate capital-intensive techniques of production when simple, less costly techniques were available. It also contributed to the neglect and consequent decline of African agriculture. Peasant agriculture was too "backward" and was simply excluded from the grandiose plans drawn up by the elites to industrialize Africa. Nor was any role envisaged for Africa's peasant majority—the Atingas. Derided as "uneducated," "slow to change," and "bound by tradition," they and their "primitive implements" were shunned. In fact, many of their other traditional practices in the rural sector—such as traditional medicine—were ostracized as well. In many countries the natives were debarred from many economic fields. (See Ayittey, p87-88)
Over all, the pervasive deficiency common to most African states was a lack of freedom, which had a paralyzing effect on the economy and social development. Ayittey also catalogues examples of incompetence and hypocrisy of Africa's leaders, who East Africans describe as "wabenzi", "men of Mercedez Benz (See Ayittey, p13)." "An uncomfortable and ugly truth about Africa", says Ayittey, "is the fact that present African governments are, in many countries, far more invidious and worse than the hated, authoritarian colonial state" that preceded them (See Ayittey, p45). He points out that the qualities and skills needed for liberation struggle are not the same as those needed to run the economy. Discussing, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Ayittey concludes the old guard revolutionary leaders were a major obstacle to Africa's post-independence success:
Perhaps, something good after all can be said about African leaders—when they are out of power and senile! But can Africa afford to wait that long for current sit-tight leaders to grow "wise"—once out of office— before talking about sound economic policies that help the people? And at 80 years of age, how much more old must Robert Mugabe grow to acquire "wisdom"? (See Ayittey, p9-10)
Ayittey provides vivid examples of economic and leadership failure on the part of African leaders, such as the announced launch of a space program by Nigeria in 2001 and the expenditure in Zimbabwe by Robert Mugabe of $469 million (See Ayittey, p11-14) in 2001 for "luxury cars for use by the president and his wife" and other officials. African leaders suffered from a psychological desire to prove themselves to the West, and defensively and unhelpfully injected liberation ideology into the debate (See Ayittey, p11-15). Examples of how society in general became affected through misgovernance of African leaders were children sold into slavery, a pervasive lack of political freedom (Africa has a higher "despot density" than any other continent), the prevalence and concentration of HIV/AIDs, the repression of dissent, and many other plagues tormenting those not lucky enough to be among the elite (See Ayittey, p11-16). Incompetent and corrupt leadership does not occur in isolation, as if cultured in a petri dish. The problem of misgovernance is intertwined inextricably with culture, history, and other factors such as artificial political boundaries, inconsistent or unhelpful interventions, wars and internal conflict, the uprooting and displacement of large numbers of people, lack of pre-existing infrastructure, industry, and international trade relationships, cultural and political fragmentation, corruption and mismanagement.
Ayittey believes that corrupt regimes and vampire elites are not an organic offshoot of African culture, but rather an "implant on the African body" which mimic features of prior European colonial regimes (See Ayittey, p57 quoting Herbert Vilakazi). Ayittey observes, however, that "Incredible as it may sound to many, the colonialists did not really introduce any new institutions into Africa. What they introduced were merely more efficient forms of already existing institutions -- both good and bad (See Ayittey, p116). The root problems and the root solutions, according to Ayittey, lie within Africans themselves. Ordinary Africans must be given economic freedom and the protection of property rights, which is a necessary step to encourage entrepreneurial behavior and investment. Ayittey argues that small-scale investment by entrepreneurial Africans is needed, along with foreign investment in the major economic sectors of agriculture, mining, manufacturing, education, health care, telecommunications, and infrastructure.
Turning things around requires development or economic growth, and the key to growth is investment—both foreign and domestic. Investment then is the way out of Africa's economic miasma and grinding poverty. (See Ayittey, p5)
Foreign aid and international intervention have often been unsuccessful in Africa. In fact, Ayittey approvingly quotes another observer, "Foreign aid has done more harm to Africa than we care to admit (See Ayittey, p130)." This is largely because such aid had to be funneled through corrupt elites, or because foreigners did not understand the complexity of "cultural practices, beliefs, and the complexities of the traditional system (See Ayittey, p124)."
The fiscal sector in Africa mirrors the problems experienced in other areas. Foreign investors have found Africa unattractive even though returns on investment in Africa are the highest in the world, averaging almost 30% in the 1990's. This lag in foreign investment is due to the negative perception of Africa's stability from civil war, corruption, lack of transparency and other internal problems. (As noted above, a change in this is the large investments made by China and India.) African regimes have persistently run high budget deficits, because of inadequate economic development (low tax base) and out-of-control government expenditures (See Ayittey, p137). An exception is the case of regimes with large oil export revenues. Sudan, for example, prior to splitting into two countries routinely enjoyed budget surpluses due to oil revenues.
The fundamental problem, then, is not "Atingas", the ordinary African man, but rather are the corrupt and incompetent despots and "vampire elites" who have raped Africa and used conflict and dictatorship to perpetuate their own rule and wealth, making Africa a "mafia state (See Ayittey, p22)." Misgovernance creates then a second set of problems, what Ayittey terms "Second Generation Problems", where incompetent management of the economy and society produces problems that feed off each other, such as the decline of agriculture, crumbling infrastructure and mainstream acceptance of corruption as a way of life (See Ayittey, p24).
Property Rights And Freedom
The heart of the matter is that economic freedom must exist for common people (not just urban Africans, but also "the peasant majority, who produce the real wealth of Africa" [See Ayittey, p20]). This boils down to property rights. Ayittey poses Atingas, "Africa's peasant", to demonstrate the economic impact on the average African of abuse and exploitation of property rights by local and national leaders, coupled with the destruction and dislocation associated with internal conflict. The issue of property rights is not merely an economic issue. The right to own property is enshrined in Article 11 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by the General Assembly Resolution in 2007 (See "United Nations Declaration..."). Property rights are an indispensible element in freedom.
The economist Hernando De Soto advocates that a well-developed legal and cultural system protecting property rights is the mysterious ingredient needed for a capitalist system to be productive and work effectively (See De Soto, Hernando). Both the right to legally own property, and the right to control such property, are essential property rights and are the factor which motivates entrepreneurial productivity.
Ayittey emphasizes that economic freedom is not merely an "abstract and esoteric" concept, but rather is something we all live with (or without) in our daily lives. If the government arbitrarily confiscates property, conscripts individuals for involuntary service, dictates prices, restricts occupations, prohibits certain commodities and mandates the use of worthless currency, economic freedom does not exist, and therefore the entrepreneurial development which is essential for economic growth will be impeded. In other words, in Africa economic freedom requires that the people of Africa are liberated: the myriad abuses historically prevalent throughout most of Africa must end (See Ayittey, p16).
Solutions
Ayittey and others have described the "elitism" that Africa must overcome to achieve economic growth, which requires a new generation of African leadership. "Hippos" must be replaced by "Cheetahs." African problems must be solved by Africans. Africa must be developed by Africans. The best development model is what Ayittey terms the "Atinga Model", drawing on native African traditions and strengths, such as the KISS approach to agriculture and traditional markets. If it isn't broken, don't bother to fix it. Development is not synonymous with industrialization and scientific methods. Abjure abject imitation of the West and a discarding of the "Elite Mentality" (See Ayittey, p386) must occur. The African common man, "Atinga", must be liberated.
To take Africa to the next level, a completely new approach or paradigm is required. The new paradigm turns the old one completely upside-down. It shatters myths, places Atingas full-square at the center, and starts from the bottom up, rather than the old "top-down" approach. Furthermore, it seeks to liberate Atingas from the chains of tyranny, mismanagement, misgovernance, ignorance, disease, and abject poverty. Instead of elites marching off to the villages to "teach" Atingas, perhaps it is rather Atingas who can teach the dysfunctional elites a thing or two about agriculture and governance. (See Ayittey, p24-25)
Nepotism and favoritism are banes of ruling elites in Africa, which in addition to being immoral have the deleterious economic effect of putting valuable resources into the hands of the inefficient and incompetent (See Ayittey, p310). Corruption in all its forms must be eliminated, or at least substantially reduced. A U.N. report estimated that "90% of the sub-Saharan part of the continent's gross domestic product (much of it illicitly earned), was shipped to foreign banks in 1991 alone". Corruption, incompetence, nepotism, dependence of foreign hand-outs, knee-jerk blaming of the West for economic problems are all interrelated. Ayittey argues that like an automobile, a society is comprised of "an amazing amalgam of systems", all of which must function together. "Much of the failure of government policies in Africa can be explained by corruption because it goes hand in hand with administrative inefficiency (See Ayittey, p316)." Ayittey's main point, emphasized throughout the book, is that African elites must either accept responsibility and undertake radical changes or step out of the way. They must stop "badgering the West" and blaming their own incompetence on external forces, and instead find solutions within African traditions and values.
The fact is, the resources Africa desperately needs to launch into self-sustaining growth and prosperity can be found in Africa itself. The problem is intellectually stigmatized leadership, which is programmed to look only one way—outside Africa, principally in the West—for such resources, which results in hopeless aid dependency. (See Ayittey, p324)
Clearly, to eliminate poverty, achieve stable economic growth, and meliorate the rest of Africa's persistent economic problems, a wider solution is required than to try to adjust this part of the automobile or tweak that part. Systemic overhaul is needed. A new approach. Ayittey believes this must be accomplished in four steps (See Ayittey, p330).
1. Change the driver (replace corrupt, incompetent leaders)
2. Rebuild dysfunctional systems (police, military, judiciary, banking system, civil service, electoral system, rule of law, accountability, property rights, etc.)
3. Create a stable, safe environment (end wars, banditry, provide infrastructure such as water, electricity, phone service, health care, education).
4. Lay down a "development strategy" (action plan, road map)
The onset of the Arab Spring in many Northern African countries, globalism, the revolution of information technology and communications, an international consensus on universal standards for human rights and other freedoms (required to enter treaties and trade relationships, etc.), and other developments pose both an opportunity and a challenge for Africa. If Africa responds by embracing change in a way that integrates native culture and strengths, the result can be nothing less than what Ayittey terms an "African Renaissance (See Ayittey, p417)." Solutions will be difficult to achieve, because transformation requires fundamental shifts in power. The solutions, though, are common sense: invest in cottage industries, agriculture and food distribution (providing incentives for Atingas), encourage small-scale development in the transportation sector, entrepreneurial investment in social sector ventures and other projects (See Ayittey, p66). In sum, finding solutions to Africa's poverty ultimately involves a journey within the hearts and minds of Africans themselves, not asking for more money or expert advisors from the West.
The blueprint for Africa's economic recovery can be found in Africa's own backyard: In its own indigenous economic institutions, which have been castigated as "backward and primitive." These institutions comprise free enterprise, free village markets, and free trade. All that is required is to take what is there, build or improve upon the existing institutions, and unleash the creative and entrepreneurial energies of the African people.
Sources:
Ayittey, George B.N. (2006). "Africa Unchained." New York: Palgrave MacMillan
Central Intelligence Agency. (2013). “Country Comparison: GDP Per Capita”. The World Factbook. Retrieved March 20, 2013 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html
De Soto, Hernando. (2000). "The Mystery of Capital." New York: Basic Books.
United Nations. (2012) "Least Developed Countries Report 2012: The State and Development of Governance." UNCTAD/LDC/2009. Retrieved on March 23, 2013 from: http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ldc2012_en.pdf
United Nations Development Programme. (2012) "Human Development Indices World Map." Retrieved March 20, 2013 from http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/map/
