Saturday, May 10, 2014

Summary of Findings

                During my research this semester I have delved deeper into how human trafficking functions in Kazakhstan, and made several interesting findings on the primary actors in the drug trafficking and human trafficking/smuggling organizations, obtained more information on the methods these groups rely on, found official governmental support and complicity within these illegitimate markets, described the role of clan politics in perpetuating official corruption, and finally analyzed what the Kazakh government has done to address the problem.
The literature indicates that the human trade has likely brought established drug organizations into human trafficking. These organizations already have the needed financial resources built up from their profits in the drug trade, and they are able to utilize existing means of transport previously used for running drugs. Their logistical resources can be put to work moving either drugs or humans, and enable them to create more profitable economies of scale.
Nonetheless, smuggling people differs significantly from smuggling drugs. People are difficult to hide. For this reason, traffickers and smugglers try to sneak people past authorities in the open whenever possible. The Yasiel Puig case showed that with the proper paperwork, it is much easier to move an individual across borders, as they essentially become a legal immigrant.[1] However, obtaining the needed paperwork typically requires the cooperation of corrupt officials.
As crucial as the means of transport are to smuggling people, equally important are the facilitators who have legitimate occupations. In both drug and human trafficking, criminal organizations must enlist the support of collaborators in border guards, law enforcement, immigration officials, lawyers, accountants, bankers, and real estate agents who are called upon to provide the false travel documents, safe houses, profit laundering, and willful ignorance to successfully move their product, for which they are amply rewarded.
Trafficking and smuggling organizations have been extremely adaptable and clever at moving their products. To bring their product into and out of Kazakhstan, these organizations have discovered the routes of least resistance that lie along the porous Kyrgyz/Kazakh border. Lightly traveled areas are often sought to avoid detection by law enforcement, but traffickers have also relied on the established networks of fuel smuggling from Kazakhstan, which allows them to bring large vehicles through and thus more cargo. Narcotics are typically brought across the border in larger batches, stockpiled outside of large cities such as Astana, and are then broken down to supply low-level dealers.               
The membership of these illegitimate organizations has shifted over time. The original Russia-based criminal groups who dominated drug trafficking in Central Asia during Soviet times went into decline following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent decline of the “symbiotic relationship” these organizations had with the government. Soviet officials had provided tacit official acceptance and protection of the trafficking organizations in exchange for their acceptance of a degree of governmental control over the level and locations traffickers did business in. The privatization of the Soviet economy in the 1990s also allowed serious competition to emerge. The lack of regulation and rule of law resulted in various criminal gangs across Central Asia seeking profit from the black market and establishing protection rackets on legitimate businesses, and an increase in the number of government officials seeking to exploit their position for personal gain by collaborating with traffickers.
Official corruption ranges from tacitly ignoring narcotics trafficking to direct participation in the trade, and likely has been prevalent into the highest offices. Beyond participating in the black market, many officials have also engaged in establishing protection rackets. Many contemporary businesses in Kazakhstan must pay for a reliable ‘roof’ in order to avoid harassment, and the best guarantor has become government officials as opposed to gangsters. These official rackets are more likely in Kazakhstan than traditional extortion by independent criminal groups. However, this ‘bureaucratic extortion’ is still less common in Kazakhstan than it is in Russia.
Official corruption has been further enabled by the prevalence of clan politics in Kazakhstan. After independence, zhuz and clan distinctions have become intrinsically tied to power and goods distribution. To gain access to the lucrative posts in state bureaucracy that allow access to extortion rackets and rents from the extractive industries, elites continue to rely on their clan connections. Through these ties they distribute the spoils to their key supporters in this patron-client system in order to maintain their position. Local elites push their kin-based connections to potential supporters, and emphasize the likely benefits to be received in reward for their support. Additionally, they use scare tactics to emphasize the need for clan-based loyalty to protect fellow members from the ambitions of competing clans.
The clan-based identities have persevered despite the declared push in the Soviet Union for erasing class distinctions by the Communist Party. Individual Kazakhs still strongly identify with their historical zhuz. Under the Communist system, these identities became crucial in an era of scarcity. Individuals relied on familial networks to not only secure employment, but also to obtain basic goods and services. Contemporary elites are able to access, and manipulate this near universal possession of extensive individual genealogical knowledge that has become as easy identifier and rallying point to utilize for their own individual goals.
The prevalence of official corruption has made the effort to curb both human and drug trafficking weak and inefficient. The Kazakh government was initially slow to address the development of human trafficking during the 1990s, only the growth of problems such as the spread of HIV/AIDS that accompanied the rise finally instigated action.[2] The government has made efforts to enact effective legislation and increase law enforcement capabilities. Additional funding has been invested into training courses to aid law enforcement in identifying, investigating and prosecuting human traffickers, and efforts have been made to improve international coordination with neighboring law enforcement agencies. However, the investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases decreased from 2011 through 2012. While the legislation, funding, and training appear to illustrate a genuine intent to combat the problem, a lack of results speaks to serious issues. Trafficking-focused NGO’s have continued to complain of antiquated tactics used by law enforcement and a general lack of concern for trafficking victims.
A lack of enforcement will continually hamper any attempt to enact effective rules and regulations. Given the likely levels of profit officials involved in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking reap from the trade, it will be difficult to comprehensively address the problem. At its core, any attempt to build an efficient response to trafficking must overcome high levels of corruption across the Kazakh state.


Sources

Curtis, Glenn E. 2002. “Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, And Chechnya.” Narcotics Trafficking in Former Soviet Union - Federal Research Division, Library of Congress Report.

 Roberts, Ken and Jochen Tholen, Takir Balykbaev and Daulet Duisenbekov. 2003. “Post-Soviet Management: Evidence from Kazakhstan.” Journal for East European Management Studies 8(3), 319-331

Schatz, Edward. 2000. “The Politics of Multiple Identities: Lineage and Ethnicity in Kazakhstan.” Europe-Asia Studies 52(3): 489-506

Schatz, Edward. 2005. “Reconceptualizing Clans: Kinship Networks and Statehood in Kazakhstan.” Nationalities Papers 33(2)

Shelley, Louise. 2012. The Relationship of Drug and Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

Townsend, Jacob. 2006. “The Logistics of Opiate Trafficking in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4(1), 69-91

Van Dijk, Jan. 2007. “Mafia Markers: Assessing Organized Crime and its Impact Upon Societies.” Trends in Organized Crime 10, 39-56 
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