Mass Movements Without Leaders: Lasting Phenomenon or Temporal Anomaly?

The protest movements that have gripped the Middle East since the beginning of the Arabic Spring (AS) have had success in toppling long-standing dictators and evoking pronounced changes in government. While these movements exhibit vast diversity in terms of composition, methods, identity and goals, occasionally diverging from one another in sharp deviations and disagreements, as a whole they have been able to successfully mobilize activism, instill change and encourage a greater political awareness among the population. However, will this change be lasting or temporal?

           

The rapid ascent of the AS protest movement from the fringes into the mainstream was successful in large part due to the use of new communications technology within what Manuel Castells, a sociologist specializing in research on communication and information refers to as the “expanding network society” (See Castells, Manuel). Social movements often begin at a local grass-roots level, but the democratizations of information and technology beginning in the 1970s (such as the internet) were transformative in nature. They altered permanently the means and methods by which these movements were facilitated, organized and sustained. "Groups around the world became suddenly able to act globally…coordinating action groups around the world”(See Castells, Manuel, p180). In essence, previously disconnected and dispersed individuals and groups could now interact with wide segments of other populations on an unprecedented scale. This is manifested in the use of “spectacles”; grand events and displays transmitted through mass media instruments to publicize issues of protest, raise awareness, provoke debate, and induce mobilization in the mainstream audience. An example of a spectacle would be the huge gatherings of hundreds of thousands of protestors in Cairo’s Tahrir Square during Egypt’s recent revolution. Castells refers to this as "reaching minds, (and) courting the State, (through) tap-dancing with the Media". This evokes Marshall McLuhan’s famous quote “The medium is the message”, the point of which is that the content of a message and the delivery technology of a message are synergistic. Mass media awakens consciousness among people. Concerns and affiliations with protest movements have become an important primary identity for many people (see Castells, Manuel, p180) throughout the Arab world and the globe at large.

           

            A characteristic of leaderless technology-driven mass protests is the speed at which protests form and develop. This is an advantage to the extent that leaderless mass protests cannot easily be defanged or defused in one fell swoop by the neutralizing of a protest leader by the government. However, while protests movements can generate immense momentum for change at a specific point in time, they often lack persistence— that is, they tend to fragment and disperse. Leaderless movements are vulnerable to appropriation by more organized and persistent entities. “Revolutionary movements lacking a vanguard are crushed by more entrenched and better-organized forces in the aftermath of massive social and political upheaval” (see Bradley, John, p79). An example of this is the Muslim Brotherhood’s seizure of leadership of the Egyptian Revolution (see previous blog post “Springtime for Egypt”). The Muslim Brotherhood, for example is an organization with a long history of public outreach, charitable work, and presence that extends throughout Egypt. In contrast, it is difficult for an ephemeral protest movement to create a sustainable presence.

           

            Visionaries such as Manuel Castells and Marshall McLuhan predicted the transformative convergence of media and technology on society. However, at least taking the Egyptian Revolution as example (and similar observations could be made about other recent Arab Spring revolutions), the factors of organizational presence, boots on the ground, community outreach and face to face interactions are crucial factors in creating and sustaining social change-- still more important than the magic of networking and social media, or leaderless protest movements spurred by technology. The Muslim Brotherhood came late to the revolution, was relatively unskilled at the use of social media in comparison to the young protestors of the Arab street, but nevertheless has been able to grasp the reins of government in Egypt. 

English Sources:

Bradley, John. (2012). “After The Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts.” New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Brisbane, Arthur. (November 12, 2011). “Who Is Occupy Wall Street?” The New York Times. Retrieved September 19, 2012, from: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/opinion/sunday/who-is-occupy-wall-street.html?_r=0

Castells, Manuel. (2004). “The Power of Identity 2^nd Edition.” Singapore: Blackwell Publishing.

Sifry, Micah. (November 14, 2011). “How Technology is Reorganizing Protests Movements.” CNN. Retrieved September 19, 2012, from: http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-14/tech/tech_web_occupy-wall-street-sifry_1_wall-street-movement-jenny-beth-martin-mark-meckler?_s=PM:TECH

Arabic Sources:

“Egypt Awaits the Biggest Protest Movement Against the Muslim Brotherhood.” Al-Nahar. (August 24, 2012). Retrieved September 20, 2012, from: http://www.alnaharegypt.com/nhar/art90227-cat7.html

“Egypt: Veiled Presenter Appears for the First Time on Official Television.” BBC Arabic. (September 3, 2012). Retrieved September 19, 2012, from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2012/09/120902_egypt_female_presenter_veil.shtml

Political Parties in Africa: What Have You Done for Me Lately?

Political parties are foundational and essential features of representative government.  Their roles and functions are to essential to ensuring a fully functioning democracy as they serve as the central actor between the electorate and the government, exercise control over government, develop programs, and collect, consolidate, and articulate public needs and opinions to the policy making apparatus.  These roles and functions grant significant power to political parties.  The interesting question, however, is whether these roles apply to political parties in developing democracies.  More specifically, how does this apply in Africa?   

Many African states actively utilize competitive political parties; nevertheless, these parties are distinguishable from those seen in advanced democratic nations.  For example, African political parties often lack strong the institutional foundations that are found in the United States or Western Europe and instead are heavily dependent upon patronage and ethnicity.   To be clear, despite the use of political parties and even competitive electoral systems, most Africa states are described as semi-democracies or anocracies as the legacies of colonialism and violence continue to permeate the political landscape.  In short, despite overt commitment to representative and democratic government there are often covert actions that parties utilize that undermine these very commitments.  The consequence of dysfunctional democracy and party behavior is often conflict and instability.

African conflicts, wars, and insurgencies are unarguably intertwined with developmental stagnation and even failure.  In fact, some reports estimate Africa annually loses over $18 billion dollars as a result of violent conflict.  In states that are often characterized as fragile, failing, or failed these conflicts continue to undermine development and perpetuate political instability.  An examination of Nigerian politics illustrates the potential security and stability crises that can emerge from the party dysfunction.

Nigeria is the most populated nation in African, the fifth largest exporter of oil to the United States, and ranked number fourteen on the 2012 world’s most failed states list.  These facts alone indicate Nigeria’s importance not only to Africa but also to the international community.  Despite its importance, Nigeria has been plagued with violence and instability that many attribute to its political system and its political parties.  One report states that “politics and violence are synonymous in Nigeria.”  In fact, some reports accuse political parties of intentionally undermining peace and security by engaging with and in hiring “political thugs” to carry out political violence against the opposition.  The result of these activities has been to create a culture of fear, violence, and corruption that some have alleged resulted in the strengthening of Boko Haram.

In April 2012 Nigeria’s former National Security Adviser (NSA), Owoye Azazi accused the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) of creating the environmental conditions that gave rise to increased activity by Boko Haram.  The PDP adamantly refuted Azazi’s comments but unfortunately in July 2012 Azazi’s comments picked up steam and were reiterated by Senator Sadik Abubakar Yar’Adua.  Azazi does not provide evidence for his claims and there is arguably an amalgamation of causes that led to Boko Haram; nevertheless, his comments do illustrate the frustration over Boko Haram and the feeling that political parties have created instability such that Nigeria is ripe for the emergence of radical groups.  

Academic research indicates that political instability often leaves a “power vacuum” which encourages dissidents to mobilize and some assert even engage in guerilla warfare.  In Nigeria’s case corruption and the accompanying political violence is believed to have created the necessary socioeconomic conditions such as poverty and unemployment that encourage dissident mobilization. In fact, the Nigerian government, its political institutions, and its parties have allowed crime to run unabated and the result has been extreme violence.  

 

The use of political parties as an instrument of ensuring representative government is well established in Western Europe and the United States.  The significance of this role is not merely academic; indeed, competitive multiparty elections in Africa have been found to reduce the potential for rebellion and violence.  This is a result of the electorate believing that they have a voice in government.  Nevertheless, even when democratic elections are held they are often replete with fraud and violence.  Unfortunately, as Nigeria indicates this violence is often at the hands of politicians and parties themselves as they engineer political assassinations as well as encourage ethnic and communal violence.  Long term these sorts of behaviors have wide-ranging consequences including undermining the state’s ability to provide security thus facilitating instability that embolden groups like Boko Haram.

.   

Sources:       

Adekunle, Julius O.  “Political Violence, Democracy, and the Nigerian Economy.”  In   

    Democracy in Africa, edited  by Saliba Sarsar and Julius O. Adekunle, 89-110.  Durham,     

    North Carolina:  Carolina Academic Press, 2012.

Carey, Sabine, “Rebellion in Africa.”  Journal of Peace Research 44, no.11 (January 2007):   

     47:64.

Erdmann, Gero.  “Party Research: Western European Bias and the African Laybrinth.”  In Votes,   

    Money and Violence:  Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa, edited by      

    Matthias  Basedau, Gero Erdmann, and Andreas Mehler, 34-58.  Sweden:  University of

    Kwazulu-Natal  , South Africa, 2007.

Kuenzi, Michelle and Gina Lambright, “Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation in Africa’s    

     Electoral Regimes.”  Party Politics 11, no.4 (June 2005): 423-446.

http://allafrica.com/stories/201208010653.html

http://allafrica.com/stories/201011150795.html

http://allafrica.com/stories/201204290215.html

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/nigeria/120126/kano-boko-haram- violence%20?page=0,1

http://nationaldailyngr.com/featured-news/boko-haram-group-disagrees-with-pdp-over-azazi

http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/africas%20missing%20bils.pdf

  

http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/07/how-pdp-created-the-environment-for-boko-haram-to-thrive-by-senator-yaradua/

Egypt's Yen for Cash

        Since 1979, following the Camp David Accords, Egypt’s ancien regime has positioned itself as a staunch ally of the United States and the West. In the subsequent 30+ years, this state of affairs has remained unchanged. Each year Egypt received over $1 billion in American foreign aid while the United States retained an unwavering and unquestioning ally in a tumultuous region of the world. Until 2011 and the Egyptian Revolution of 25 January, the strength of this relationship seemed unbreakable. However, in the climate of the Arab Spring, blossoming democracies, and uncertain economies, Egypt now finds itself in a position to reshape the geo-political landscape of the Middle East and to pick it’s foreign relations to maximize benefit to herself.

        The United States can no longer count on being the de-facto benefactor of Egypt. While the long-established US/Egyptian relationship is not in danger of disappearing in the near future, there are other sponsors roaming the jungle of global realpolitik who may be eager and willing to ply an economically distressed Egypt with monetary and military aid to foment a future relationship. Egypt’s President Morsi has stated that he seeks to foster balanced diplomatic ties with countries long ignored by his predecessor (see “Egypt’s President…”). His first official visit outside of the region was to China rather than the United States, followed by a trip to Iran to participate in the Summit of Non-Aligned Countries, which the US had asked other countries to boycott. Morsi has also announced an upcoming trip to Brazil, one of the BRIC countries. Clearly, Egypt seems to be evolving  a more independent foreign policy (see “Egypt’s President…”), and China may aspire to be Egypt’s future sponsor for a number of reasons. This is clearly a potential threat to US interests in the region. China has become a global super power competitor to America. They hold over a trillion dollars of US debt and their ongoing purchases of US treasury bills underpin the US economy. The currency regime between China and the United States is important to the US standard of living because American consumers are able to purchase Chinese goods for cheap prices.

       

        Economically, Egypt’s 85 million plus population is an attractive market for China's export-oriented economy. Chinese companies are interested in establishing affiliated companies in Egypt to export to other Arab, African and European markets, which would afford Chinese companies tax exemptions and other preferential treatment (see “FM Holds…”). Additionally, Egypt’s electrical distribution network is inter-connected to a number of other nations, which would allow China to establish a strategic position through joint Chinese-Egyptian ventures in the field of electrical distribution and the emergent field of solar powered electricity generation (see “FM Holds…”). The Nile River represents billions of dollars in energy output which offers China opportunities in the form of dam and hydroelectric power construction projects. Most are in Sudan and Ethiopia but all affect the flow of the Nile River through Egypt. Creating a strong bond with Egypt will be helpful in protecting Chinese interests in the most populous country of the Arab world which will help protect Chinese interests when inevitable disputes among Nile Basin countries over Nile water sharing arise in the future.

        Strategically, a Chinese/Egyptian relationship would act as a bulwark against the expanding military presence of the West and America in the region. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, Jordan and other countries in the Middle East are allies of the United States. Egypt could be a powerful voice sympathetic to Chinese interests in the region. Further, a Chinese sponsored Egypt would be a counter to the presence of NATO in Libya and would further reinforce the already strong Chinese presence in Africa.

       

        Morsi seems open to soliciting sponsorship from China and perhaps Russia, driven by economic necessity. Even before the onset of the Egyptian Revolution, the economy of Egypt was in recession, and has now been crippled. Reforms are desperately needed. The high rate of unemployment, one of the factors that triggered the onset of the Egyptian Revolution, continues to grow. By official government estimates the unemployment rate is above 12% and unofficial estimates put the unemployment rate at much higher levels (see “Egypt’s unemployment…”). Egyptian tourism, a $12 billion a year industry in 2010 was down 30% in the wake of the Egyptian Revolution and may suffer further declines in European tourism after the election of an Islamist president. Foreign investment has declined. Egypt needs over $40 billion in investment to raise the growth rate from 4% to 5% in 2012 (see “PM: Egypt needs…”), 1.8% off from the 5.8% rate in 2010 (see “Egypt GDP...”). Continued rolling electrical blackouts across Egypt are inciting protests against the new government (see Cunningham, Erin), along with double-digit food price inflation (another contributing factor in the Egyptian Revolution, see “Food Price Watch”) and an overall lack of potable water further contribute to Egypt’s economic and social woes.

        Morsi faces crises on many fronts: economic, political, and international. Morsi must play all sides of the fence or risk losing political support at home. He has accepted multiple aid packages from Saudi Arabia (see “Saudia Arabia Approves…”) despite historical animosity between the two countries. While in China, a "frenemy" of the US, Morsi secured $200 million dollars in credit for the National Bank of Egypt, numerous agreements in trade and agriculture (see Bodeen, Christopher), along with a lifting of a Chinese travel ban to Egypt (see “Chinese Ban…”) to stimulate tourism. At the same time, the US pledged to forgive $1 billion dollars in Egyptian debt as well as promising $375 million in financing and loan guarantees to support American companies setting up shop in Egypt as well as backing “Egyptian Democracy”. Morsi also has parleyed with the IMF to receive a $4.8 billion dollar loan (see “IMF requires…”) notwithstanding local protests. All of these actions suggest that Egypt will broaden its circle of diplomatic and economic alliances, while seeking to re-adjust its long-standing alliance with the US.

English Sources:

Bodeen, Christopher. (August 28, 2012). “China, Wary of Arab Spring, Hosts Egypt’s Morsi.” ABC News. Retrieved September 3, 2012, from: http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/china-wary-arab-spring-hosts-egypts-morsi-17092516#.UEg_L3hgP19

“Chinese President in Waiting Cancels Meeting with Clinton.” Big News Network. (September 5, 2012). Retrieved September 5, 2012, from: http://www.bignewsnetwork.com/index.php?sid/208918665/scat/c08dd24cec417021/ht/Chinese-president-in-waiting-cancels-meeting-with-Clinton

Cunningham, Erin. (August 28, 2012). “Egypt’s Other Power Struggle.” Global Post. Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/egypt/120823/power-struggle-electricity-blackouts-morsi

“Egypt GDP Growth Rate.” Trading Economics. (n.d.). Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/gdp-growth

“Egypt’s President Seeks ‘Balanced’ Diplomacy.” China Daily. (September 6, 2012). Retrieved September 6, 2012, from: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2012-09/06/content_15737139.htm

“Egypt’s Unemployment Rate Rises to 12.4%.” Egypt Independent. (February 18, 2012). Retrieved September 3, 2012, from: http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypts-unemployment-rate-rises-124

“FM Holds Intensive Consultations in China.” Arab Republic of Egypt Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (March 3, 2012). Retrieved September 3, 2012, from: http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/Minister/News/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?Source=6781921f-3993-444a-859e-ee26ce851de8&newsID=e805b7f9-15d0-4968-b729-6b56f1575374

“Food Price Watch.” The World Bank. (April, 2011). Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://www.worldbank.org/foodcrisis/foodpricewatch/april_2011.html

Karam, Stephanie. (translated September 2, 2012). “Morsi’s Trip Reveals Clues to an Evolving Foreign Policy.”  Al Monitor. Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/08/egypt-drawing-up-new-foreign-pol.html

Myers, Steven. (September 3, 2012). “To Back Democracy, U.S. Prepares to Cut $1 Billion from Egypt’s Debt.” The New York Times. Retrieved September 3, 2012, from: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/world/middleeast/us-prepares-economic-aid-to-bolster-democracy-in-egypt.html?pagewanted=all

“PM: Egypt needs LE 267 Bn Investments in 2012.” Egypt State Information Service. (September 5, 2012). Retrieved September 5, 2012, from: http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Story.aspx?sid=63717

“Saudi Arabia Approves $430 mln in New Aid to Egypt.” Reuters. (June 8, 2012). Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE8570CW20120608

Arabic Sources:

Amer, Hala. (August 23, 2012). “IMF requires Fundamental Structural Reform Program to lend to Egypt.” Al-Hayat. Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://alhayat.com/Details/428442

“Chinese Ban on Traveling to Egypt Lifted.” Al-Arabiya. (September 3, 2012). Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/09/03/235818.html

“Egypt…Foreign Activity and an Ambiguous Political Scene.” The Gulf. (August 31, 2012). Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://www.alkhaleej.ae/portal/4ab9fb0b-6f80-4a67-a15e-cd8284d1f89e.aspx

“Food Price Watch.” The World Bank. (April, 2011). Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://www.albankaldawli.org//foodprices/foodpricewatch/april_2011.html

Salman, Talal. “Morsi in Peking and Tehran: Egypt – The Revolution and it’s Anticipated Role.” The Ambassador. (n.d.). Retrieved September 3, 2012, from: http://www.assafir.com/Article.aspx?EditionId=2241&ChannelId=53754&ArticleId=2642&Author=%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84

Political Transitions in Africa

 

On August 20, 2012 Ethiopia’s long standing leader, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi died.   The ensuing days were marked by a calm and peaceful transfer of power by the ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolution Democratic Front (EPRDF), to acting Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn.  Speculation exists that the demise of Meles Zenawai may potentially lead to instability in Ethiopia as well as the region as a power struggle is underway beyond the public’s view.  The EPRDF dismisses these claims and resolutely contends that the transition to the new prime minister has fully occurred.  The EPRDF also offers assurances that Ethiopia’s foreign policy position will remain unchanged.  This is significant as Ethiopia is a central actor in the new African Union whose roles and ambitions in Africa are enormous.  The ability of the EPRDF to transfer power quietly, quickly, and without violence to Meles Zenawi’s predecessor provides a positive forecast for Ethiopia, the region, and the African Union.  

Similarly, the long standing democratic state of Ghana also lost President John Atta Mills on July 24, 2012.  Ghana had been praised by the United States for representing hope in Africa.  Mills in particular had been credited with “consolidating democracy in Ghana and being crucial in establishing the political party system in Ghana.”  Immediately following Mills’ death and with little fanfare, Vice President John Dramani Mahama assumed the presidency. Interestingly and in contrast to Ethiopia’s interim political leader, Mahama will only serve as president until the regularly scheduled presidential elections are held in December 2012.  The rapid assumption of office by the Vice President as well as the December elections is indicative of Ghana’s steadfast adherence to its 1992 constitutional requirements.  Elections Chief, Kwadwo Afar-Gyan, stated the following:  “the election calendar remains unchanged-it is purely a party matter.”   Nevertheless, one must wait until December to see if the elections are actually held.

 Senegal held a highly competitive and hotly debated presidential election in March 2012 when its political leader, President Abdoulaye Wade ran for reelection.  Wade had run for president only after a legal challenge and a court decision found that he could seek reelection thereby failing to retroactively apply constitutional amendments of term limits to Wade.  Yet, after the results of the election indicated his loss President Wade dutifully adhered to Senegalese law and stepped down.  Wade’s actions are significant because he sought legal action to determine his ability to seek reelection and also peacefully conceded defeat.   These nations and their peaceful political transitions and observance of their respective constitutional provisions stands in marked contrast to other African states who are threatened with instability.  

            On August 20, 2012 the Somali government shifted from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to a new parliament.  The TFG had worked with elders to nominate over two hundred parliamentary members.  Numerous reports indicate that this selection process was riddled with corruption as elders were minimalized throughout the process and bribed in order to ensure particular individuals were selected for parliament.  Several media articles note that the new parliament is already plagued by illegitimacy as it has been marred with dishonesty and a lack of transparency.  This has led some to question the long term sustainability of the parliament as well as to question whether a fragile stability can be achieved.   In fact, stability in Somalia has been largely absent and the lack of a legitimate government has produced a gap that al’Shabaab has tried to capitalize upon.  Although al’Shabaab is weakened in some regards it is still a threat to the stability of the new Somali government and to the region at large.  Several reports indicate that the terrorist group may attempt to use the new political system to advance its goals.   

            In West Africa, Mali also has been plagued by recent instability as a military coup unseated the long-standing stable and democratic government.  The absence of government and governance permitted Tuareg rebels in the northern part of the nation to gain territorial control which quickly passed to foreign Islamic fighters.  These fighters have solidified their hold in northern region of Mali imposing Shariah law while the Mali military has maintained a grip over the capital.  The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) recently asked for assistance noting that the instability in Mali is a problem that extends beyond the Mali borders.  ECOWAS actions highlight the regional danger that these radical foreign fighters pose for even stable governments.   This is especially significant given the instability that is plaguing northern Nigeria.  

            Achieving political stability in Africa has proven to be challenged as recent events have shown.  Nevertheless, there are states that have created stability through a strong commitment to their respective laws and constitutional provisions.  Whether Ghana and Ethiopia can maintain stability in the aftermath of these political transitions of power still remains to be seen.

           

Sources:

Abdi Ismail Samatar “UN Corrupts Somali Political Transition,” Aljazeera.com, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/07/201273094746839247.html.

Ayante, Abdi.  “Somalia: Al-Shabaab and Post-Transition Somalia,” http://allafrica.com/stories/201209031458.html.  

Judicial Services of Ghana, 1992 Constitution of Ghana,  http://www.judicial.gov.gh/constitution/chapter/chap_8.htm.

Maasho, Aaron. “Ethiopia – new prime minister will stay in office until 2015.”  Reuters Africa,  http://africajournalismtheworld.com/tag/ethiopian-peoples-revolutionary-democratic-front-eprdf/. 

 

New York Times.  “Mali.”  http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/mali/index.html.

Nossiter, Adam.  “John Atta Mills, President of Ghana, dies at 68,” New York Times, July 24, 2012.

“Senegal's President-elect Macky Sall hails 'new era',” BBC News Africa, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17508098.

“Somalia's first parliament since 1991 inaugurated in Mogadishu,” The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/20/somalia-first-parliament-inaugurated.

“Somalia’s Political Restart,” Aljazeera.com,  http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/08/201282115497642471.html.

“Tough challenges for Ethiopia's new leader,” ahramonline, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/9/51864/World/International/Tough-challenges-for-Ethiopias-new-leader-Hailemar.aspx.

Verhoeven, Harry. “Zenawi: The titan who changed Africa,” Aljazeera.com, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/08/2012821115259626668.html.