Jihad: It’s Not What You Think

                  Jihad, considered by some as the sixth pillar of Islam, has several meanings, depending on context as well as who is doing the interpreting.  In Arabic, the word "jihad" translates as "a struggle", "a fight", or "conflict". In the West, the term is often associated exclusively with the phrase "holy war" (See "Jihad"). The concept of jihad has been hijacked in large by violent Islamic fundamentalism. But, jihad in of itself is not a concept espousing of violence or hatred. Although the word "jihad" implies struggle and conflict, jihad can be better characterized as “striving in the way of God”(See “Jihad”), referring to the obligations of Muslims to be actively engaged in "struggling/striving to improve one's self or society" (See Esposito, John). "To implement their belief…to lead a good life…to develop Islamic society" (See Esposito, John). This struggle may even be a struggle within one's self against temptation and sin, or a struggle against the nature of other men and woman. For the majority of Muslims in day-to-day life, jihad has no connection with physical violence.

                  The grey area within the discussion of jihad, and the consequent embarking point for those who would alter its meaning is in the interpretation of jihad. The Qur'an does make allowance for jihad to be used as an active form of military struggle (The Jihad of the Sword) where arms are taken up against non-Muslims for the purpose of defense. These types of rulings historically have been very tightly controlled by ulemas (groups of religious scholars trained in Islamic law and jurisprudence) following a strict code and the precedence of historical fatwas. Examples of "approved" military struggle are the European incursions into the Middle East via the Crusades in the 1100s, and the struggle between Portugal and the then Islamic State of Spain in late 1180, as well as the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.  Modern jihadists use the basis of the above described thought, selectively focusing on the beliefs of certain key figures in history to manipulate the Jihad of the Sword, converting a military struggle for the protection of Muslims and defense of Islam into a political agenda.

                  Benjamin and Simon discuss the historical narrative of jihad, focusing on one of the most important figures to shape radical Islamic fundamentalism, Ibn Tamiyyah. He was a professor of Hanabali law in Damascus in the late 1200s, a rebel figure who sought to return Islam to its original sources, the Qur'an and the Sunnah. He believed in classic fundamentalism: a mythic return to an earlier ideal state, namely that the only perfect community had been Mohammed's Medina, and since that time the morality of Muslims had been slowly slipping because proper respect was not given to the Islamic faith or its teachings. He can be considered to have originated much of the ideology relating to modern Islamic fundamentalism today, including terroristic jihadism, and his writings serve as one of the primary documents to inspire radical fundamentalism. Three major contributions attributed to Tamiyyah that allowed for shaping of contemporary fundamentalism and giving reason to terroristic jihad is (See Benjamin, Daniel and Esposito, John):

1)   Final interpretation of Islamic scriptures had been achieved, and that further work would only produce heretical innovation (an interesting parallel to the Christian doctrine of inerrancy) (See Benjamin, Daniel,  p50).  By disallowing further interpretation, one negates all ability to reinterpret what Muhammed may have meant allowing jihadists to couch their beliefs in an unassailable theological position.

2)   Placing Jihad on the same level as the "five pillars" of Islam and creating an offensive jihad (See Benjamin, Daniel, p50).  This cloaks terroristic jihad in the trappings of core faith and seeks to legitimize violence of action.

3)   Creating a method by which to justify the issuance of jihads against members of the Islamic faith (See Benjamin, Daniel, p51). This is necessary to overcome the prohibition in the Qur'an of committing violence against other Muslims.

             These three tenets comprise the rationale used by contemporary jihadists to relate their struggle to original Islamic thought and justify a global jihad that would be capable of targeting anyone irrespective of faith.

             Another key figure in the evolution of Islamic fundamentalism and the concept of jihad is Seyyid Qutb and his text Milestones (See Qutb, Seyyid) that would serve to inspire jihadists. This text sought to outline a plan of action that if followed would bring a lapsed Islamic people back within the fold of Allah and create first an Islamic State and ultimately an Islamic World. Drawing from the religious writings of Ibn Tamiyyah and others as inspiration, Qutb characterized many Muslims as lapsed Muslims, suffering from jahiliyyah. Jahiliyyah is the state of man living godless existence or ignorance of God's teachings. The only way of saving these lapsed Muslims is to show them the error of their ways. This is accomplished by the creation of a group of proselytizers who while starting as only a few, grow in number as more and more formerly lapsed Muslims join this grouping to spread the word of Allah. This grouping of individuals is termed the Islamic Vanguard (in Qutb's time--the 1950's and 1960's, this was the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood). Many experts contend that this Islamic Vanguard, along with an immediate return and strict adherence to Sharia law will allow a community of believers to be formed. The community is loosely defined as groupings of pious Muslims who act as a whole to recruit more lapsed Muslims to build the strength of the community. Once a large enough body of Muslims is present (no number is ever quoted) in a number of separate communities, these separate communities may join to form a confederation. This confederations sole purpose is in the appointment of a Caliph to oversee and guide this organization to act as one to provoke a "global jihad". This global jihad, is the belief by Qutb that war and violence is not only necessary but inevitable and obligatory if an Islamic State is to be created. The struggle and strife faced by this Islamic confederation during the global jihad will serve as a testament to each individuals faith in Allah and the cause. At the conclusion of this global war of ideologies and ways of life, according to Qutb, all that will be left are the faithful Muslims and the soon to be converted apostates. The Islamic State and in short an Islamic World Order will be formed. This belief parallels fundamentalist Christian end-times theology that the world will some day be cleansed of non-believers.
 
             Since the 70’s the presence of radical jihad has almost always been related to the specific contexts of war, conflict, vestigial colonialism, or matters regarding Israel. With the advent of the Arab Spring, many countries in the Middle East now have democratically elected Islamist governments or governments friendly to Islamists: Iran, Turkey, and more recently Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Lebanon. These countries disavow and condemn violent extremist terrorism, although making an exception for self-defense and the rights of Palestinians to resist occupation by Israel. Elected Islamic leaders have the authority and legitimacy, a bully pulpit, to define modern Islam. These leaders explicitly disavow extreme and violent interpretations of Islamic fundamentalists.  The original forces which were the cauldron of violent fundamentalism (sublimated rage against colonialism, the challenge of modern science to traditional religious cosmology, etc.) have been greatly diminished. While it is to early to suggest that the days of radical jihadists are over, they have certainly been weakened by the events of the Arab Spring.

Sources:

Benjamin, Daniel and Steven Simon. (2002). “The Age of Sacred Terror.” New York: Random House

Bergesen, Albert. (2008). “The Seyyid Qutb Reader: Selected Writings on Politics, Religion and Society.” New York: Routledge

Chaliand, Gerard and Arnaud Blin. (2007). “The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda.” California: University of California Press

Esposito, John. (2002). “Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam.” New York: Oxford University Press.

"Jihad." Wikipedia. (nd). Retrieved October 18, 2012, from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jihad

 

Qutb, Seyyid. (2006). “Milestones.” Syria: Dar Al-Ilm.

Weak Insitutions and Ethnic Conflicts

            African politics is often marred by corruption, bribery, and violence that can be traced back to early pre and post-colonialism.  That is, often governments and parties are created and organized around the notions of clientelism and ethnic power sharing.  The consequences of these dysfunctional forms of representative democracy have not only meant an existence of poverty, disease, violence, and intimidation of ordinary citizens but are also inextricably linked to insurgencies, terrorist activities, rebellions, and conflict.  These problems pose international consequences and thus are of particular interest as national borders become increasingly porous and violence is more easily transferable.

            African political institutions as well as their political parties were largely assembled quickly and haphazardly.  To be sure, Africa never experienced the long democratic transition experienced by Western Europe.  In fact, Western Europe experienced the slow development of political parties that was based upon established political cleavages and which allowed for parties to develop strong organizational linkages to civil society. 

The result of the African truncated evolution has been the emergence of a weak system with weak institutions and arguably weak leaders.  In an effort to solidify and strengthen their support base, and in the absence of political linkages based upon traditional notions of political cleavages and ideology, many African leaders invoked patronage based systems.  These systems can essentially be characterized as one based upon political favors, governmental appointments, etc. to those individuals that thereafter support the government in return for these continued favors.  The results of this system necessarily suggest that leaders may never have full ideological commitment from their “supporters,” a fact that is readily recognized by leaders.    Research indicates that this sort of system creates a paranoid like phenomenon whereby African leaders are quick to eliminate individuals from government positions that are perceived as potentially dangerous to continued stability of the incumbent government.  In return, leaders engage in “ethnic stacking” or making appointments based largely upon ethnicity.   The result is that whole ethnic groups may be excluded from government positions and arguably from even minimal representation in the government.  If that were the end of the story perhaps a woeful lament of the inadequacies of representative democracy would suffice but unfortunately there are practical consequences to the elimination of whole subsets of society from governmental representation. 

            Research finds that the exclusion of ethnic populations is positively correlated with the emergence of conflict and civil war.  Unsurprisingly, the threat of conflicts and sectarian violence increases if the excluded group is large in membership or if they have engaged in previous conflicts and disputes with the government.  Of particular interest with respect to African states is that low GDP per capita has also been shown to be a significant explanatory factor in accounting for conflicts.  It must be noted that continued conflict hinders development and economic growth thus creating a vicious circle of poverty and conflict.  These results suggest the importance that not only official recognition of ethnic groups has on sustaining peace but also the importance of continued engagement with previously disaffected groups.   

            The violence in Mali provides a current contextual example of some of the risks associated with failing to fully integrate minority groups into governmental representation.  First, Mali is a fairly diverse nation, although not nearly as diverse as many other African states.  Nevertheless, U.S. government reports indicate between five and seven ethnic groups in the nation.  The Tuareg ethnic group accounts for between 5%-10% of the ethnic population.  Economically, Mali is ranked as one of the twenty-five poorest countries in the world.  Although Mali had been lauded as an African example of stable democracy reports indicate that many citizens believed the government was overrun with corruption and inequality.  These conditions seem to set the stage for the conflict.   

The Tuareg group is especially significant given their historical rebellions against the central government as well as their more recent and well-publicized conflict that led to extreme Islamist control of northern Mali.  Despite their recent campaign of violence historical research into the Tuaregs indicates the group has largely perceived the central government as an unavailable and inept instrument to address their regional concerns.  For example, Tuaregs assert that their nomadic lifestyle is in danger and increased NGO presence in the region has harmed them; however, their complaints were seemingly ignored or they were harshly retaliated against.  Nevertheless, despite their violent campaigns the Tuaregs have historically and publicly demanded recognition and negotiations with the central government.  Unfortunately, the security concerns in North Africa are such that the Tuareg rebellion was usurped by radical Islamist groups.  This brief examination of a modern African conflict does not merely indicate the danger of ethnic exclusion from representative democracy but rather also introduces the security concerns that weak governmental institutions create that encourage conflict, retard growth, and contribute to regional instability.

The danger from weak African institutions is receiving increasing attention from the international community as the number and intensity of conflicts escalates.  As calls for international humanitarian and military aid reverberate important contextual issues must be remembered.  Specifically, when addressing these conflicts underlying structural institutional deficiencies must be remembered while also simultaneously avoiding the haphazard importation of western European models of government. 

Sources:

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min, “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?:New Data and Analysis,” World Politics 62, no.1 (January 2010):87-119.

Keenan, Jeremy, “Tuareg Take Up Arms,” Review of African Political Economy 33, no.108, (June 2006):367-368.

Krings, Thomas, “Marginalisation and Revolt among the Tuareg in Mali and Niger,” GeoJournal 36, no. 1 (May 1995): 57-63.

Roessler, Philip, “Enemy Within:  Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa,” World Politics 63, no.2 (April 2011): 300-346.   

http://www.jdsurvey.net/afro/AnalizeQuestion.jsp 

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2828.htm

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html

http://www.cfr.org/north-africa/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717

http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/4772

Challenging The Sacred: A Patriarchal System In Jeopardy?

The tidal wave of the Arab Spring (AS) upturned the dictatorships of Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak from Egypt, and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. The AS continues to burn hotly even two years on, threatening other authoritarian regimes in the Middle East with ruin. While many view the AS as a triumph of democracy and the social justice movement, it also signifies a ground shift in another important area. Not only are the long-standing authoritarian regimes threatened, but so are the fundamentally patriarchal social, cultural, political and economic systems in the Middle East. 

In a patriarchal social system, the father is the final authority. Females and children are subservient and society is patrilineal. Patriarchy has existed since the dawn of civilization, although in the past century many cultures have become more egalitarian (See "Patriarchy"). In the Western world, according to Manuel Castells, a sociologist specializing in research on communication and information, there has been a marked decline in the “patriarchal family concept” (See Castells, Manuel, p192). This decline stems largely from the democratization of information, technology and the rise of globalization (See Castells, Manuel, p196). Two key trends which challenged the patriarchal system were: 1) the dissolution of the Patriarchal Family ("the nuclear family") and 2) the rise of the feminist movement, and women's liberation, by association gay and lesbian movements as well (See Castells, Manuel, p196). The availability of birth control, family planning, and the introduction of women into the workforce allowing women to achieve economic independence have also been very important factors in challenging the patriarchal system.

While the strength of the patriarchal system has been eroded in the West, the same cannot be said of the Middle East. The AS has triggered a resurgence in the feminist movement. Women served at the frontline during the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions—marching, protesting, and dying with their male counterparts in the pursuit of social justice and freedom from oppression. With the dissolution of authoritarian regimes, newly drafted constitutions and laws to instill egalitarian ideals and women serving in legislatures, the future for women’s rights seems to be bright.

              Mona Eltahawy, a columnist and activist argues in “Why Do They Hate Us?” (See Eltahawy, Mona) that while political and social revolutions are occurring all over the Middle East, a war of oppression is still being waged on women in the Middle East-- despite the AS. “Political revolutions will not succeed unless they are accompanied by revolutions of thought – social, sexual, and cultural revolutions that topple the Mubaraks (sic) in our minds as well as our bedrooms.” (See Eltahawy, Mona). Her article has been decried by many (some of them feminists as well) as oversimplifying the relationships of women in patriarchal Islam. It has sparked hot debate. It seems that there is a wakening activism in the ME gaining momentum from the successes of the AS, where more and more women are embracing the goal of ending oppression by “men stuck in the seventh century” (See Eltahawy, Mona, describing the state of the Egyptian Parliament) and the redefining of woman's identity to affirm the long held goal of every feminist movement: "equality between men and women" (See Castells, Manuel, p234). 

The tone of Eltahawy’s writing is anger and frustration in the fact that there is world-wide media coverage of human rights in the Middle East with selective attention paid to a relatively small number of countries whereas the oppression of women is taking place systematically throughout the region. Female workers being beaten in Saudi Arabia (See Quiano and Basu), seemingly state sanctioned female rape in Tunisia (See “Tunisia Woman Accused”…), and the infamous “virginity tests” conducted during the Egyptian Revolution by the military (See “From Virginity Test to…”) are but a few examples. The attention given to women is far less than it deserves considering the seriousness of the ongoing and systemic abuses endured by them, so women must be continually persistent in their struggle for equality.

The advent of the AS has re-invigorated long struggling feminist movements in the Middle East and the toppling of authoritarian regimes has created a new environment in which issues involving women can be promoted and nurtured. On the other hand, there is a real risk that the ascent of Islamist parties to power may play a reactionary role in limiting women's rights, or at least the Western conception of women's rights, in Egypt and other countries. Will this movement ultimately liberate women's culture and women's minds to the extent that they will contravene long held social mores in Middle Eastern patriarchal societies (such as the place of women in the household and the workplace)? It is too early to tell, but there will certainly continue to be great upheaval in the societal mores of the Middle East.

Sources:

Castells, Manuel. (2004). “The Power of Identity 2nd Edition.” Singapore: Blackwell Publishing.

"Debating The War on Women." Foreign Policy. (April 24, 2012). Retrieved October 4, 2012, from: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/24/debating_the_war_on_women

Eltahawy, Mona. (May/June 2012). “Why Do They Hate Us?” Foreign Policy. Retrieved October 4, 2012, from: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/23/why_do_they_hate_us?page=0,1 

"Patriarchy." Wikipedia. (nd). Retrieved October 3, 2012, from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriarchy 

Quiano, Kathy and Moni Basu. (November 19, 2010). "Indonesian Maid Dies After Abuse In Saudi Arabia, Rights Group Says." CNN World. Retrieved October 5, 2012, from: http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-19/world/indonesia.saudi.maid.abuse_1_saudi-arabia-indonesian-maid-jeddah?_s=PM:WORLD 

"Tunisia Woman Accused Of Indecency After Alleged Rape By Police." Los Angeles Times. (October 2, 2012). Retrieved October 5, 2012, from: http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/10/tunisia.html

Wilson, Willow. (September 3, 2012). "From Virginity Test To Power." The Guardian. Retrieved October 5, 2012, from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2012/sep/03/virginity-test-to-power


 

Implications of Weak Party Systems

While political parties are often considered a cornerstone of representative democracy their role in African politics is markedly different than in Western democracies.  In fact, while parties often serve as a stabilizing function during political elections and at times of conflicts, African parties often fail to provide this steadying role.  These parties largely fail to supply a means of institutionalized democracy, representation, or conflict resolution.   To be sure, not all African political parties are identical to each other.  Some scholars have attempted a general classification scheme that clusters parties into two distinct groups:  old and new.   Older parties are those that emerged from independence movements and new parties are those that have developed from the remnants of different opposition groups that have fused together. The purpose of such a classification scheme is an attempt to organize and categorize parties that often times quickly emerge and fade within the course of one election while other parties have staying power.  While conceptually well-ordered such a scheme does not entirely account for the shared colonial and neo-patrimonial histories.  The effects of this shared past has ensured the similar evolution of parties such that many are characterized as weak bureaucracies, weak organizations, and have very low membership.  Parties are often used as vehicles of political opportunism and are largely controlled through bribes and corruption.  If African political parties are weak, corrupt, and largely ineffective at providing basic democratic representation then why do they even matter?   More importantly, what are the implications and effects of political parties that fail to ensure basic democratic representation? 

Some evidence suggests that weak party systems encourage political violence because they do not permit full political participation and representation by newly mobilizing groups.  The point here is that as similarly situated and organized groups become increasingly removed from political participation or representation they will become more inclined to assume extreme positions and take measures that demand their needs be heard.  This is of particular interest in African politics because as previously noted many nations are characterized by weak party system, extensive ethnic and religious cleavages, as well as increasing extremist movements or anti-system opposition.  

In January 2012, the Tuareg rebels in Mali initiated a small rebellion that has since morphed into what some are calling a humanitarian crisis or “Africa's Afghanistan.”   The Tuaregs have long been at odds with the central government as the result of their “political marginalization.”  Unfortunately, the rebellions that began in 1962 and resurfaced intermittently thereafter are markedly different from the 2012 rebellion.  One reason is that the current rebellion is the amalgamation of several different groups: Tuaregs fighters recently returned from Libya joined up with local fighters and even Malian army deserters to create the Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA).   Thereafter, MNLA merged with the jihadist Islamist group Ansar al-Din.  Ansar al-Din in turn was in an alliance with Islamic group, Jamat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa - MUJAO).  In only four months after firing the first shots the rebels had declared the independence of Azawad.

            Recent reports suggest that “Africa's Afghanistan” is an incorrect assessment of the actual forces at play in the Mali rebellion; nevertheless, what is clear is that the Tuareg rebels had been largely removed from political representation and participation.  Given certain contextual conditions, such as resources, funding, and a weakened central government, the rebellion was able to fully operationalize.  The situation in Mali has increasingly transformed such that the MLA wishes to engage in peaceful discussions with the Mali government; however, its former Islamic allies are now largely in control of the region.  

            Though the trajectory has now changed, the initial impetus for the rebellion is said to have grown from political marginalization as well as increased discontent with political corruption in the Mali government.  In fact, Mali has been labeled an illegitimate democracy that functioned primarily by “making secret deals to put in power whoever could best defend their interests. Little by little, the Malian state became the private property of the political class and its accomplices in the civil service and in business.”  Others assert that while Mali’s economy benefited private and elite interests the age-old cleavage that pits rural peasants against the urbanized populous was revived and festered until the rebellion occurred.  The latent aspects of this situation indicate that inadequate democratic representation may be a critical explanatory factor.  Thus, the important questions and answers rest not merely in superficial critiques of the economic disparities but rather in the underlying conditions in the political system at large and the party system in particular. 

Sources:

Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa (United Kingdom:  Cambridge University Press, 1997).

E. Gyimah-Boadi, “Political Parties, Elections, and Patronage,”  in Votes, Money, and Violence:  Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa. Matthias Basedau, Gero Erdmann, Andreas Mehler.  (South Africa: University of KawZulu-Natal Press, 2007), 21-34.

James A. Piazza, “Rooted in Poverty: Terrorism, Poor Economic, Development, and Social Cleavages.”  Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (2006):159–177.

http://forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2012/06/04/democracy-mali-true-festival-robbers/

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http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/03/201232211614369240.html

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http://allafrica.com/stories/201210050809.html

http://www.cfr.org/africa/boko-haram/p25739