While political parties are often
considered a cornerstone of representative democracy their role in African politics
is markedly different than in Western democracies. In fact, while parties often serve as a
stabilizing function during political elections and at times of conflicts,
African parties often fail to provide this steadying role. These parties largely fail to supply a means
of institutionalized democracy, representation, or conflict resolution. To be sure, not all African political
parties are identical to each other.
Some scholars have attempted a general classification scheme that clusters
parties into two distinct groups: old
and new. Older parties are those that
emerged from independence movements and new parties are those that have developed
from the remnants of different opposition groups that have fused together. The
purpose of such a classification scheme is an attempt to organize and
categorize parties that often times quickly emerge and fade within the course
of one election while other parties have staying power. While conceptually well-ordered such a scheme
does not entirely account for the shared colonial and neo-patrimonial
histories. The effects of this shared past
has ensured the similar evolution of parties such that many are characterized as
weak bureaucracies, weak organizations, and have very low membership. Parties are often used as vehicles of
political opportunism and are largely controlled through bribes and corruption. If African political parties are weak,
corrupt, and largely ineffective at providing basic democratic representation
then why do they even matter? More
importantly, what are the implications and effects of political parties that
fail to ensure basic democratic representation?
Some evidence suggests that weak
party systems encourage political violence because they do not permit full
political participation and representation by newly mobilizing groups. The point here is that as similarly situated
and organized groups become increasingly removed from political participation
or representation they will become more inclined to assume extreme positions
and take measures that demand their needs be heard. This is of particular interest in African
politics because as previously noted many nations are characterized by weak
party system, extensive ethnic and religious cleavages, as well as increasing
extremist movements or anti-system opposition.
In January 2012, the Tuareg rebels
in Mali initiated a small rebellion that has since morphed into what some are
calling a humanitarian crisis or “Africa's Afghanistan.” The Tuaregs have long been at odds with the
central government as the result of their “political marginalization.” Unfortunately, the rebellions that began in
1962 and resurfaced intermittently thereafter are markedly different from the
2012 rebellion. One reason is that the
current rebellion is the amalgamation of several different groups: Tuaregs
fighters recently returned from Libya joined up with local fighters and even
Malian army deserters to create the Mouvement National de Libération de
l'Azawad (MNLA). Thereafter, MNLA merged with the jihadist Islamist
group Ansar al-Din. Ansar al-Din in turn
was in an alliance with Islamic group, Jamat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi
Afriqqiya (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa - MUJAO). In only four months after firing the first
shots the rebels had declared the independence of Azawad.
Recent
reports suggest that “Africa's Afghanistan”
is an incorrect assessment of the actual forces at play in the Mali rebellion;
nevertheless, what is clear is that the Tuareg rebels had been largely removed
from political representation and participation. Given certain contextual conditions, such as
resources, funding, and a weakened central government, the rebellion was able
to fully operationalize. The situation
in Mali has increasingly transformed such that the MLA wishes to engage in
peaceful discussions with the Mali government; however, its former Islamic
allies are now largely in control of the region.
Though the
trajectory has now changed, the initial impetus for the rebellion is said to
have grown from political marginalization as well as increased discontent with
political corruption in the Mali government.
In fact, Mali has been labeled an illegitimate democracy that functioned
primarily by “making secret deals to put in power whoever could best defend
their interests. Little by little, the Malian state became the private property
of the political class and its accomplices in the civil service and in business.” Others assert that while Mali’s economy
benefited private and elite interests the age-old cleavage that pits rural
peasants against the urbanized populous was revived and festered until the
rebellion occurred. The latent aspects of
this situation indicate that inadequate democratic representation may be a critical explanatory factor. Thus, the important
questions and answers rest not merely in superficial critiques of the economic disparities
but rather in the underlying conditions in the political system at large and
the party system in particular.
Sources:
Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa (United
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press,
1997).
E. Gyimah-Boadi, “Political Parties, Elections, and
Patronage,” in Votes, Money, and Violence:
Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa. Matthias Basedau, Gero Erdmann, Andreas
Mehler. (South Africa: University of
KawZulu-Natal Press, 2007), 21-34.
James A. Piazza, “Rooted
in Poverty: Terrorism, Poor Economic, Development, and Social Cleavages.” Terrorism and Political Violence
18
(2006):159–177.
http://forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2012/06/04/democracy-mali-true-festival-robbers/
http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2012/09/30/feature-01
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17635437
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/03/201232211614369240.html
http://allafrica.com/stories/201209300110.html
http://allafrica.com/stories/201210050809.html
http://www.cfr.org/africa/boko-haram/p25739
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