African politics is
often marred by corruption, bribery, and violence that can be traced back to
early pre and post-colonialism. That is,
often governments and parties are created and organized around the notions of
clientelism and ethnic power sharing. The
consequences of these dysfunctional forms of representative democracy have not
only meant an existence of poverty, disease, violence, and intimidation of
ordinary citizens but are also inextricably linked to insurgencies, terrorist
activities, rebellions, and conflict.
These problems pose international consequences and thus are of
particular interest as national borders become increasingly porous and violence
is more easily transferable.
African political
institutions as well as their political parties were largely assembled quickly
and haphazardly. To be sure, Africa
never experienced the long democratic transition experienced by Western Europe. In fact, Western Europe experienced the slow
development of political parties that was based upon established political
cleavages and which allowed for parties to develop strong organizational
linkages to civil society.
The result of the African truncated evolution has been
the emergence of a weak system with weak institutions and arguably weak leaders.
In an effort to solidify and strengthen
their support base, and in the absence of political linkages based upon
traditional notions of political cleavages and ideology, many African leaders
invoked patronage based systems. These
systems can essentially be characterized as one based upon political favors,
governmental appointments, etc. to those individuals that thereafter support
the government in return for these continued favors. The results of this system necessarily
suggest that leaders may never have full ideological commitment from their
“supporters,” a fact that is readily recognized by leaders. Research indicates that this sort of system
creates a paranoid like phenomenon whereby African leaders are quick to
eliminate individuals from government positions that are perceived as
potentially dangerous to continued stability of the incumbent government. In return, leaders engage in “ethnic
stacking” or making appointments based largely upon ethnicity. The result is that whole ethnic groups may
be excluded from government positions and arguably from even minimal
representation in the government. If
that were the end of the story perhaps a woeful lament of the inadequacies of
representative democracy would suffice but unfortunately there are practical
consequences to the elimination of whole subsets of society from governmental
representation.
Research finds that
the exclusion of ethnic populations is positively correlated with the emergence
of conflict and civil war.
Unsurprisingly, the threat of conflicts and sectarian violence increases
if the excluded group is large in membership or if they have engaged in
previous conflicts and disputes with the government. Of particular interest with respect to
African states is that low GDP per capita has also been shown to be a
significant explanatory factor in accounting for conflicts. It must be noted that continued conflict
hinders development and economic growth thus creating a vicious
circle of poverty and conflict. These
results suggest the importance that not only official recognition of ethnic
groups has on sustaining peace but also the importance of continued engagement
with previously disaffected groups.
The violence in Mali provides
a current contextual example of some of the risks associated with failing to
fully integrate minority groups into governmental representation. First, Mali is a fairly diverse nation,
although not nearly as diverse as many other African states. Nevertheless, U.S. government reports indicate between
five and seven ethnic groups in the nation. The Tuareg
ethnic group accounts for between 5%-10% of the ethnic population. Economically, Mali is ranked as one of the twenty-five poorest countries in the world.
Although Mali had been lauded as an African example of stable democracy
reports indicate that many citizens believed the government was overrun with
corruption and inequality. These
conditions seem to set the stage for the conflict.
The Tuareg group is especially significant given their
historical rebellions against the central government as well as their more
recent and well-publicized conflict that led to extreme Islamist control of northern
Mali. Despite their recent campaign of
violence historical research into the Tuaregs
indicates the group has largely perceived the central government as an
unavailable and inept instrument to address their regional concerns. For example, Tuaregs assert that their
nomadic lifestyle is in danger and increased NGO presence in the region has
harmed them; however, their complaints were seemingly ignored or they were
harshly retaliated against. Nevertheless,
despite their violent campaigns the Tuaregs have historically and publicly
demanded recognition and negotiations with the central government. Unfortunately, the security concerns in North
Africa are such that the Tuareg rebellion was usurped by radical Islamist
groups. This brief examination of a
modern African conflict does not merely indicate the danger of ethnic exclusion
from representative democracy but rather also introduces the security concerns
that weak governmental institutions create that encourage conflict, retard
growth, and contribute to regional instability.
The danger
from weak African institutions is receiving increasing attention from the
international community as the number and intensity of conflicts
escalates. As calls for international
humanitarian and military aid reverberate important contextual issues must be
remembered. Specifically, when
addressing these conflicts underlying structural institutional deficiencies
must be remembered while also simultaneously avoiding the haphazard importation
of western European models of government.
Sources:
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min, “Why Do
Ethnic Groups Rebel?:New Data and Analysis,” World Politics 62, no.1 (January 2010):87-119.
Keenan, Jeremy, “Tuareg Take Up Arms,” Review of African Political Economy 33, no.108, (June
2006):367-368.
Krings, Thomas, “Marginalisation and Revolt among the Tuareg in Mali and Niger,” GeoJournal 36, no. 1 (May 1995):
57-63.
Roessler, Philip, “Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in
Africa,” World Politics 63, no.2
(April 2011): 300-346.
http://www.jdsurvey.net/afro/AnalizeQuestion.jsp
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2828.htm
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html
http://www.cfr.org/north-africa/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717
http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/4772
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