I proposed in the previous blog to
use drug seizure data from the UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) to assist
in measuring the level of state stability within each Kazakh province.[i]
Drug trafficking flourishes in regions with low enforcement of the rule of law,
and it is reasonable that human trafficking should also. Additionally, the
human trafficking literature has suggested that drug traffickers have moved
into moving humans alongside or instead of drugs, therefore anywhere we see a
high incidence of drug trafficking, there could be a higher risk of the same
agents engaging in human trafficking. To pursue the validity of this argument,
I have gone through several articles on the subject, and I come away with preserved
belief in the usefulness of drug trafficking as an indicator.
Shelley argues that drug
trafficking often becomes entwined with human trafficking.[ii]
Trafficked victims are often used as drug couriers went sent to foreign
destinations, providing recipients with both the drugs and a victim to exploit.
Aside from profiting on the sale, traffickers also utilize drugs throughout the
entire trafficking process as a way to subdue the victim, increase endurance
for longer work hours, and to discourage running way by facilitating victim
addiction. Drug traffickers have been encouraged to move into the human
trafficking market by increasing competition and danger within drug market, and
low startup costs and risks in the human market. Traffickers generally seek a diversified
source of profits, and human trafficking is extremely profitable.
The more recent expansion of the
human trade has brought established drug organizations into human trafficking,
rather than vice versa. These organizations already have considerable financial
resources built up from the lucrative drug trade, and they are able to bring in
logistical resources previously used for running drugs. These resources can be
put to work moving both drugs and humans, creating more profitable economies of
scale. Transport of humans is both more and less difficult than moving drugs.
Moving people requires safe houses, adequate sustenance, and people are more
difficult to hide. However, traffickers are often able to hide their victims in
plain sight, within existing migration flows. Moreover, as discussed
previously, trafficking victims are often lured willingly on false pretenses to
their destinations before being seized by traffickers.
As important as the means of
transport are, equally necessary are the facilitators working in the legitimate
world. In both drug and human trafficking, criminal organizations must enlist
the support of collaborators in border guards, law enforcement, immigration officials,
lawyers, accountants, bankers, and real estate agents who provide the false travel
documents, safe houses, laundering the profits, and turn a blind eye to
successfully move their product. Shelley provides a persuasive argument for the
likelihood of criminal involvement in both the drug and human trades
simultaneously. High profits and lower risk should make human trafficking irresistible
for such organizations. While different products, both require similar
transport networks and official corruption that would allow established
organizations to engage in both. Given the possibility of drug traffickers
moving people along established drug routes, I have pursued further information
regarding the drug trade in the region.
Townsend provides a detailed
description of the drug trade in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan that
brings opiates from Afghanistan north.[iii]
His examination of Kazakhstan reveals several relevant details. After
conducting field research in the early years of the 2000s, he saw a growing
professionalism within the drug organizations, with increasingly streamlined
transportation networks and more sophisticated methods of concealment. These
organizations have discovered the routes of least resistance, particularly
along the porous Kyrgyz/Kazakh border. Traffickers can both walk across and
bring large vehicles through, within the established networks of fuel smuggling
from Kazakhstan.
The main crossings are to the north
and west of Bishkek (see map at bottom), where they continue on to Almaty,
taking advantage both of better roads and the large consumer market in the Almaty
province. Opiates are stockpiled outside the city, and then broken down to
supply low-level dealers. From Almaty, drugs are distributed further along the Almaty-Taldyqorghan-Georgievka
and Almaty-Balkash-Astana roads. Almaty also provides access to rail networks,
both northwest to Astana and north to Georgievka, each with links to Russia.
Organizations both use established routes repeatedly and switch quickly between
available options, as dictated by destination, geography, law enforcement, and
the adaptability of their transport links. The geography of Kyrgyzstan requires
that all traffic heading from Osh to Bishkek to use the same road for much of
the route, whereas traffickers crossing the more open areas of Kazakhstan have
more choices. Additionally, a trend that has likely increased since Townsend
published in 2006 is the expansion of the drug trade to the Xinjiang province
in western China, which has had a large and growing market. At the time of
publication, heroin prices in Xinjiang were 4-5 times higher than in Central
Asia, and the markets are much closer and more accessible than those in Western
Russia or Europe. Townsend theorized that the crossings at Khorgos and Dostuk
along the Kazakh/China border would be likely targets.
Townsend provides additional detail
that is important to understanding the intricacies of the drug trade, and
likely of the human trade, in Central Asia. However, he disagrees that drug
organizations could easily move into human trafficking. “Human trafficking is
quite a different business again and given the logistics of drug trafficking
described here, it is difficult to believe that the same groups moving opiates
would also be optimized for organizing illegal immigration.” Yet, he does agree
that the same official facilitators are necessary to traffic both. Based on his
conclusions, it is safe to say that while I cannot automatically assume that
active drug traffickers in Kazakhstan are also likely engaged in human
trafficking, I can conclude that the facilitating factors that enable the drug
trade will also enable the human trade. Therefore, any province with a high
incidence of drug trafficking will be at a higher risk of human trafficking due
to the existence of these risk factors in the area.
[i] http://drugsmonitoring.unodc-roca.org
[ii] Shelley,
Louise. 2012. The Relationship of Drug and Human Trafficking: A Global
Perspective. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
[iii]
Townsend, Jacob. 2006. “The Logistics of Opiate Trafficking in Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.” China and
Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4(1), 69-91
No comments:
Post a Comment