The Zhuz in Kazakh Politics

                Previously, I have focused on analyzing Kazakh data strictly along provincial lines (fourteen oblasts and the two cities of Astana and Almaty). However, crossing provincial boundaries are regional ethnic ties that permeate Kazakh politics and are generally classified at their broadest levels as Hordes or zhuz (жүз). Often referred to as tribes, these confederations are divided into the Great (Ұлы жүз), Middle (Орта жүз), and Junior (Кiшi жүз). Each zhuz is sub-divided further into groups usually denoted as “clans”, with further sub-divisions down to individual lineages. The significance of these associations within the heavily clientelist politics of Kazakhstan could be influential in my analysis of human trafficking risk within the provinces. As I discussed in previous posts, individuals become more susceptible to human traffickers if they face a severe lack of opportunity in their home region. Particularly young people, with little social or employment prospects at home, are more likely to take risky jobs abroad that can ensnare them in foreign trafficking rings, or engage in other risky behavior domestically such as drug trafficking or prostitution. Patron-client networks in Kazakhstan may favor members of one zhuz over another based on access to officials in power, and if so this could have a considerable impact on available opportunities and resources to members of a zhuz without powerful patrons.

                Schatz (2000, 2005) provides an informative account of the resurgence of clan politics following independence in Kazakhstan, and the role the zhuz play today. Despite the professed push for erasing class distinctions in the Soviet Union, individual Kazakh identification with their historical zhuz was not eliminated. Instead, these identities became crucial in an era of scarcity under the Communist system. Individuals relied on familial networks to not only secure good positions, but also to obtain basic goods and services. Into modern times, the near universal possession of extensive individual genealogical knowledge created easily accessible, and manipulatable, identifiers for members to connect with one another. The average Kazakh is expected to accurately know and be able to orally trace their genealogical lineage going back to at least the seventh generation. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, early elite efforts at nation-building utilized these ethnic identities to increase a societal sense of “Kazakhness” independent of their Soviet past, and to build their own individual power bases for political gain. Elites used their lineage connections to establish a link with as many supporters as possible, over time this became “a virtual bidding war” that pushed these ethnic markers to the forefront of Kazakh politics (Schatz, 2005). Despite early elite intentions to build a unifying Kazakh identity by encouraging Kazakhs to embrace their zhuz, the exploitation of these associations by elites heavily politicized these identifications and polarized society along zhuz and clan lines. As political elites ascended into power and maintained their positions based on these associations, they grew increasingly more salient as the spoils and rewards of office were increasingly limited to members of the zhuz in power.

                Post-independence, zhuz and clan distinctions have become intrinsically tied to power and goods distribution. To gain access to lucrative posts in state bureaucracy that provide access to rents from the extractive industries, elites continue to rely on their clan connections, and distribute the spoils to their key supporters in this patron-client system. Local elites push their kin-based connections to potential supporters, and emphasize the likely benefits to be received in reward for support, and the need for clan-based loyalty to protect members from the aspirations of competing clans. President Nazarbaev and his family are a prime example. At the center of power for the entirety of Kazakhstan’s independence, he has been in a prime position to privilege both family members and his fellow members of the Great zhuz. A pattern of political appointments and key contracts by him have tended to favor extended family and core members of his zhuz. However, Nazarbaev’s core concern of preventing any regionalist movements built on excluded clan loyalties that might challenge national integrity and his hold on power, led to a policy of clan balancing within the provinces that to a degree has worked to push the clan out of regional politics. Given the strength of their position, provincial governors have been rotated regularly to prevent any from building a rival power base. Few served longer than two years in office before being moved to other state posts.

               

                Despite Nazarbaev’s intentions, clan association is still a crucial political factor at the regional level. Governors are usually from whatever clan is dominant in the region. Schatz (2005) provides an example:

“Most found it hard to imagine a situation in which, for example, the governor of Atyrau region could be a non-Zhetiru or the governor of South Kazakhstan region could be a non-Dulat.”

Upon assuming power, governors often quickly moved to reward their supporters and fill the bureaucracy with loyalists (Schatz, 2005):

“For example, upon assuming office in 1995 the governor of Zhambyl region removed 140 employees, replacing 80% of them with members of the Zhanys subdivision of the Dulat division (Great zhuz clan). In Torghai region the new governor promoted the members of his clan Zhoghary-Shekty of the Arghyn division (Middle zhuz), at the expense of traditionally predominant Uzyn and Qulan-Qypshaq subdivisions (also Middle zhuz). In the South Kazakhstan region, local subethnic patronage networks ensnared members of the lucrative extractive industries, who had a stake in the region’s oil refinery.”

It was difficult for governors from non-local clans to succeed, as sub-par performance was instantly ascribed to their clan association, and support would vanish quickly.

                Schatz (2005) provides an analysis of the respective positions of the three zhuz both within the elite population and within state bureaucracy, and how these positions have evolved since independence. He only looks at rural-born elite as zhuz identification is the easiest to identify for Kazakhs from rural portions of the country, where zhuz membership is still geographically associated. His analysis has shown that over time, the Great zhuz has consistently been disproportionately represented in state bureaucracy compared to their demographic position, with the Junior zhuz continually relegated to the weakest position. The Junior zhuz has been historically excluded from powerful positions, which could be partially attributable to the physical distance between Junior power centers in the west of the country and the Soviet-era capital of Almaty (a map illustrating the general location of the zhuz and their clans is included at the bottom). Great and Middle zhuz members have also been generally better educated and trained since the Soviet period. Although initially excluded to some degree from power, the Middle zhuz has been pulled into an alliance with the Great zhuz, as illustrated by the relocation of the capital city from Almaty in Great zhuz territory, to Astana in Middle zhuz territory, and significant incorporation of Middle zhuz members into state power structures. The following graphs provided by Shatz (2005) illustrate the disproportionate representation of the Great and Middle zhuz in the Kazakh elite (Table 2), and the shift in zhuz representation after the alliance between the Great (also referred to as Elder) and Middle zhuz (Tables 3 and 4).

Schatz, Edward. 2000. “The Politics of Multiple Identities: Lineage and Ethnicity in Kazakhstan.” Europe-Asia Studies 52(3): 489-506

Schatz, Edward. 2005. “Reconceptualizing Clans: Kinship Networks and Statehood in Kazakhstan.” Nationalities Papers 33(2)