Saturday, March 29, 2014

Organized Crime in Kazakhstan

                It has been well established that organized crime is one of the prime movers in the drug trade within Central Asia, and as I have discussed previously, it has been speculated that similar groups are responsible for the rise in human trafficking within the country. However, given their secretive nature, little is known about the character of these groups. I have pulled together what is readily available from academic and media sources, which gives a basic understanding of these groups in Kazakhstan.
                Van Dijk (2007) constructed the Composite Organize Crime Index, which combines the assessed perception of organized crime prevalence, state corruption, money-laundering, and the size of the black market, from data drawn from annual World Economic Forum surveys, the Merchant International Group’s investment risk assessments, World Bank Institute studies, and official crime statistics.[1] Within this index, as of 2007, Kazakhstan was rated at 100 on a 1-113 scale. Among former Soviet and communist states, Kazakhstan placed below Albania at 110, was on par with Russia and Ukraine, but was significantly higher than the Kyrgyz Republic at 80, and Uzbekistan and Belarus at 75. The index is now seven years old and the prevalence of organized crime in Kazakhstan may be contemporarily different. However, the lack of a significant national crackdown on organized crime and the continuing flow of narcotics from Afghanistan to Russia indicate that these criminal groups are likely still quite active.
                Recent analysis of organized crime in Kazakhstan is difficult to obtain; however, Curtis (2002) provides useful results from his field research into the ethnic composition of such criminal groups in the early 2000s. He conducted interviews with locals across the region who had either knowledge or personal experience with the drug trade. Interestingly, Chechens were reported to be the most common ethnic group involved in narcotics trafficking in Central Asia (and Russia and the Caucasus in general). While Russian criminal groups previously dominated these regions, in 1993 Chechen smugglers emerged and utilized the large Chechen diaspora (a result of Stalin’s deportations in the 1940s) to provide a cover for their trade. Strong relationships with locals were built over time, and the Russian mafia was pushed out of much of the drug trade in Central Asia. Curtis reports that the Russians moved more into the smuggling of “seafood, automobiles, and timber”, leaving narcotics to the Chechens. While some have proposed that the rise of the Chechen groups was an attempt to fund the ongoing conflict in Chechnya, Curtis claims individual profit has always been the primary motive. More recently, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek criminal groups have moved into the rapidly expanding narcotics trade, and are likely more prominent now. The drop in the price of heroin in the early 2000s boosted the number of users, and the increase in Afghan production following the ousting of the Taliban has both increased supply and demand across the region over the past decade.[2]
                The decline of the original Russia-based criminal groups in drug trafficking was instigated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent decline of the “symbiotic relationship” between the criminal groups and the government, which had provided tacit official acceptance and protection of the organizations in exchange for a degree of governmental control over certain activities. The privatization of the Soviet economy in the 1990s also opened the door to competition. A lack of regulation and rule of law allowed various criminal gangs to proliferate and profit from the black market, official corruption, and the establishment of protection payments on legitimate businesses, commonly referred to as the ‘roof’ or крыша, across the former Soviet Union. The considerable presence of Chechen businessmen across the FSU allowed them to organize and successfully push back against the extortion. However, their collective strength also allowed many to move into the protection racket themselves and further into organized crime. The prominent Chechen guerilla Ruslan Gelayev was reported to have emerged and progressed within Chechen protection rackets before establishing himself within the separatist movement.[3]
                The established Chechen criminal groups have faced additional competition in the drug trade from members of governmental agencies. Members of the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of the Interior’s security forces, and private security forces have used their authority and capabilities to establish their own protection rackets in both legitimate enterprises and on the criminal gangs themselves. The continued presence of Russian security forces across the FSU has allowed them to maintain a strong presence within the drug trade by providing protection in return for a share of the profits. Security officials may even be running several of the criminal organizations themselves.[4]
                Additional research indicates that these official rackets are more likely in Kazakhstan than traditional extortion by independent criminal groups. Roberts et al. (2003) conducted surveys of business owners and managers in Kazakhstan from 2000 - 2001. They found that when the “mafia” was mentioned, it generally referred to the “shadows of official state structures.” Official corruption ranged from tacitly ignoring narcotics trafficking to direct participation in the trade, and likely was prevalent into the highest offices. Moreover, businesses looking for a reliable ‘roof’ from harassment were more likely to make protection payments to government officials as opposed to gangsters. However, their research did find that this ‘bureaucratic extortion’ was less common in Kazakhstan than it was in Russia.[5]



[1] Van Dijk, Jan. 2007. “Mafia Markers: Assessing Organized Crime and its Impact Upon Societies.” Trends in Organized Crime 10, 39-56  
[2] Curtis, Glenn E. 2002. “Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, And Chechnya.” Narcotics Trafficking in Former Soviet Union -  Federal Research Division, Library of Congress Report.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Roberts, Ken and Jochen Tholen, Takir Balykbaev and Daulet Duisenbekov. 2003. “Post-Soviet Management: Evidence from Kazakhstan.” Journal for East European Management Studies 8(3), 319-331

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