It has
been well established that organized crime is one of the prime movers in the
drug trade within Central Asia, and as I have discussed previously, it has been
speculated that similar groups are responsible for the rise in human trafficking
within the country. However, given their secretive nature, little is known
about the character of these groups. I have pulled together what is readily
available from academic and media sources, which gives a basic understanding of
these groups in Kazakhstan.
Van
Dijk (2007) constructed the Composite Organize Crime Index, which combines the assessed
perception of organized crime prevalence, state corruption, money-laundering,
and the size of the black market, from data drawn from annual World Economic
Forum surveys, the Merchant International Group’s investment risk assessments,
World Bank Institute studies, and official crime statistics.[1]
Within this index, as of 2007, Kazakhstan was rated at 100 on a 1-113 scale.
Among former Soviet and communist states, Kazakhstan placed below Albania at
110, was on par with Russia and Ukraine, but was significantly higher than the
Kyrgyz Republic at 80, and Uzbekistan and Belarus at 75. The index is now seven
years old and the prevalence of organized crime in Kazakhstan may be contemporarily
different. However, the lack of a significant national crackdown on organized
crime and the continuing flow of narcotics from Afghanistan to Russia indicate
that these criminal groups are likely still quite active.
Recent
analysis of organized crime in Kazakhstan is difficult to obtain; however,
Curtis (2002) provides useful results from his field research into the ethnic
composition of such criminal groups in the early 2000s. He conducted interviews
with locals across the region who had either knowledge or personal experience
with the drug trade. Interestingly, Chechens were reported to be the most
common ethnic group involved in narcotics trafficking in Central Asia (and
Russia and the Caucasus in general). While Russian criminal groups previously
dominated these regions, in 1993 Chechen smugglers emerged and utilized the
large Chechen diaspora (a result of Stalin’s deportations in the 1940s) to
provide a cover for their trade. Strong relationships with locals were built
over time, and the Russian mafia was pushed out of much of the drug trade in
Central Asia. Curtis reports that the Russians moved more into the smuggling of
“seafood, automobiles, and timber”, leaving narcotics to the Chechens. While
some have proposed that the rise of the Chechen groups was an attempt to fund
the ongoing conflict in Chechnya, Curtis claims individual profit has always
been the primary motive. More recently, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek criminal
groups have moved into the rapidly expanding narcotics trade, and are likely
more prominent now. The drop in the price of heroin in the early 2000s boosted
the number of users, and the increase in Afghan production following the
ousting of the Taliban has both increased supply and demand across the region
over the past decade.[2]
The
decline of the original Russia-based criminal groups in drug trafficking was
instigated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent decline of
the “symbiotic relationship” between the criminal groups and the government,
which had provided tacit official acceptance and protection of the
organizations in exchange for a degree of governmental control over certain
activities. The privatization of the Soviet economy in the 1990s also opened
the door to competition. A lack of regulation and rule of law allowed various
criminal gangs to proliferate and profit from the black market, official
corruption, and the establishment of protection payments on legitimate
businesses, commonly referred to as the ‘roof’ or крыша, across the former Soviet Union. The considerable presence of
Chechen businessmen across the FSU allowed them to organize and successfully
push back against the extortion. However, their collective strength also allowed
many to move into the protection racket themselves and further into organized
crime. The prominent Chechen guerilla Ruslan Gelayev was reported to have
emerged and progressed within Chechen protection rackets before establishing
himself within the separatist movement.[3]
The
established Chechen criminal groups have faced additional competition in the
drug trade from members of governmental agencies. Members of the Federal
Security Service, the Ministry of the Interior’s security forces, and private
security forces have used their authority and capabilities to establish their
own protection rackets in both legitimate enterprises and on the criminal gangs
themselves. The continued presence of Russian security forces across the FSU
has allowed them to maintain a strong presence within the drug trade by
providing protection in return for a share of the profits. Security officials
may even be running several of the criminal organizations themselves.[4]
Additional
research indicates that these official rackets are more likely in Kazakhstan
than traditional extortion by independent criminal groups. Roberts et al.
(2003) conducted surveys of business owners and managers in Kazakhstan from
2000 - 2001. They found that when the “mafia” was mentioned, it generally
referred to the “shadows of official state structures.” Official corruption
ranged from tacitly ignoring narcotics trafficking to direct participation in
the trade, and likely was prevalent into the highest offices. Moreover,
businesses looking for a reliable ‘roof’ from harassment were more likely to
make protection payments to government officials as opposed to gangsters.
However, their research did find that this ‘bureaucratic extortion’ was less
common in Kazakhstan than it was in Russia.[5]
[1]
Van Dijk, Jan. 2007. “Mafia Markers: Assessing Organized Crime and its Impact
Upon Societies.” Trends in Organized
Crime 10, 39-56
[2]
Curtis, Glenn E. 2002. “Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates,
Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics
Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, And Chechnya.” Narcotics Trafficking in Former Soviet Union - Federal Research Division, Library of Congress
Report.
[3]
Ibid.
[4]
Ibid.
[5] Roberts,
Ken and Jochen Tholen, Takir Balykbaev and Daulet Duisenbekov. 2003. “Post-Soviet
Management: Evidence from Kazakhstan.” Journal
for East European Management Studies 8(3), 319-331
No comments:
Post a Comment