Combating Violent
Extremism and Insurgency in Mali and Nigeria
(Map of West
Africa showing Mali and Nigeria). Retrieved February 3, 2013 from
http://www.rescue.org/blog/africa-conflict-mali-meets-worsening-food-crisis?ms=gg_nonb_zzz_zzzz_an_zzzzzz&gclid=CL-pp9uQmLUCFfSlPAodJR8ATw
With
the recent escalating military actions by the French forces against the Tuareg
rebel group (the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) in Mali and
the deadly radical Islamist sect, Boko Haram, in Nigeria, violent extremism and
insurgency show no lasting sign of abating. Most African leaders ignore the
internal domestic factors that promote violence in their countries; rather,
they perpetually seek international intervention to the crisis at hand. They restrict
the analysis of the issues solely to the dangers and threats extremist groups
pose to the rest of the continent, particularly, the linking up of these terrorist
groups with Al-Qaeda in other to merit and command the attention of the
international community. For example, the Nigerian President, Goodluck
Jonathan, told a panel at the recent 2013 World Economic Forum in Davos,
Switzerland that “if violent extremism is not contained in Nigeria, definitely
it will spill into other countries in West Africa…..It is one of the reasons we
have to move fast” (Reuters, 2013).
The
missing link here is a clear focus on identifying the internal domestic factors
that continually fan the flames of extremism in Africa, particularly in Mali
and Nigeria. These factors include endemic elite corruption, pervasive use of
extremist groups by politicians and political parties to win elections, bad
governance, military brutality, continued economic challenges, weak state capacity,
ethnic divisions, and incessant international influence. It seems appropriate
to critically examine the causal efficacy of these triggering factors with a
view to find lasting solutions to the impasse of violent extremism and
insurgency in Mali and Nigeria.
The
premise of insurgency, very broadly speaking, is that armed groups seeking to
overthrow an existing government can do so over the long term, using a variety
of violent and non-violent tactics that include terrorism (Zalman, 2009).
Terrorism has been defined “to be any premeditated violent act perpetrated
against civilian non-combatants by sub-national or international groups,
clandestine agents or individuals sympathetic to larger terrorist groups and
movements, with the intent to influence a target audience larger than the
intended victims toward or against a particular policy action” (Cox et al.,
2009). This further illustrate the actions of the rebel group called the
National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) in Mali that seeks to establish
an independent state in their home region of Northern Mali, a region that is
pre-supposedly rich in uranium and oil.
Likewise, the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria has introduced abysmal depths of
insurgency characterized by orchestrated bomb attacks, large-scale suicide
attacks on innocent churches, mosques, and coordinated hostage taking and shootings
to make known their demands of establishing undiluted Sharia law in Nigeria.
Researchers
have made several attempts to sue for lasting peace in both Nigeria and Mali, and
these efforts have resulted in the emergence of different theories on the
subject. Prominent among the theories are: frustration-aggression and relative
deprivation (Dollard et al., 1939; Gurr, 1970 & 2000), state-failure (Rotberg,
2002 &2003; Zartman, 1995), and resource curse theories (Bannon and Collier,
2003). The state-failure thesis argues that nation-states exist to provide a
decentralized method of delivering political goods to persons living within
designated parameters of the state. Nation- states are further responsible to
answer to the legitimate concerns and demands of their citizens (Rotberg, 2003).
It is rather unfortunate that most governments in Africa are negligent and
irresponsible to their citizens. Rotberg contends that nation-states fail
because they are convulsed by internal violence, and as a result are unable to provide
security and positive political goods to their citizens. These political goods
include security, education, health care, infrastructures, employment
opportunities, and a legal framework for law and order (Rotberg 2002 pg. 87). It
thus becomes very clear that once the state is lacking in performing its civic
responsibilities to the citizens, it loses credibility and legitimacy before
the very eyes of their citizens. Thus, many of these citizens will then
naturally transfer their loyalty and allegiance to more responsive authority
other than the state (which include religious groups and civil right
movements), while other disgruntled turn to terrorism.
General
Carter Ham, Commander of the United States African Command (AFRICOM), cautions
African governments not to rely solely on the use of excessive military force
to fight the war against terror in Africa. He laments that “though there is
perhaps some necessity for some military action, the solution lies in the
non-military solution and activities that would address the underline causes of
the dissatisfactions which include good governance” (Guardian Newspaper,
February 01 2013). Ultimately, the continuous use of military force seems preferable
in dousing the tension of extremism in Mali and Nigeria, but protracted
military effort is not going to eradicate the long-term problem as this is
capable of leaving another negative dimension to an endless warfare on the
continent. Violent extremism and insurgents thrive in an environment charged
with hopelessness and African governments must begin to be more responsive to
the socio-economic well-being of the people, and further engage systematic means
of mediating disputes without recourse to the protracted use of armed
insurrection.
Works Cited
Bannon, I., &
Collier, P. (2003). Normal Resources and
Violent Conflict: Options and Actions, DC:
World
Bank.
Cox, D.,
Falconer, J., & Brain Stackhouse (2009). Terrorism, Instability, and Democracy in Asia and
Africa. Northeastern
University Press Boston.
Dollard, J., Doob,
L., Miller, N., Mowrer, O.H., & Robert Sears (1939). Frustration and Aggression. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Onuorah, M. (2013, February 1). US
General Cautions African Government Against Over Reliance on
Military For War
Against Terror. Guardian. Retrieved
from http://ngrguardiannews.com
Gurr, T. (2000). People
versus states: Minorities at Risk in the New Century. Washington DC: United
States
Institute for Peace.
Gurr, T.
(1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton:
Prince University Press.
Rotberg, R.
(2003). State Failure and State Weakness
in Time of Terror, DC: Brookings Institution Press
Rotberg, R. (2002).
The New Nature of Nation-State Failure.
The Washington Quarterly 25(3): 85-96.
Zalman, A. (2009). Now that the
“War is Out”. Retrieved from
Reuters. 2013.
US, Africa say Mali Action counters
growing Islamist Threat.
Zartman, I. (1995).
Collapsed States: The Disintegration and
Restoration of Legitimate Authority. DC:
Lynne
Rienner Publishers.
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