The electoral successes of Islamist parties in Arab Spring countries like Tunisia and Egypt have reshaped geo-politics and challenged the conventional wisdom of realist international relations ideas that democracies are inherently compatible with Western values and goals. To many experts, the balmy Arab Spring seems to have transmogrified into a chilly Islamist Winter (See “Totten, Michael”). Post Arab Spring democratically elected regimes like Egypt are leaning farther into neo-authoritarianism, fundamentalist political Islam, and are stepping up efforts to repress expressions of free speech and democratic plurality. Is the dream of the Arab Spring dying? Is it already dead?
Despite the recent successes of Islamist parties at the polls, the Arab Spring is more than just another ephemeral uprising of the proverbial "Arab Street". The changes that are occurring transcend politics, and are deeply rooted in challenges of modernity, globalism (economic and cultural), and the slow crumbling of traditional culture and local governing institutions. The root cause of the Arab Spring lies in pervasive dissatisfaction and unrest among ordinary people who are unable to earn a satisfactory living, care for their children, learn a trade or obtain an education, and who are no longer able to envision a happy future for themselves. The sad immolation of a Tunisian fruit vendor was the spark that ignited an irreversible process of populist-driven reform and democratization.
At the top layer of analysis, recent political successes by Islamic parties in the political sphere appear to support Western fears of an Islamist takeover of the Arab world. At a deeper level of analysis, it becomes apparent that the recent gains by Islamists are likely to be transitory. Much like the authoritarian regimes they are replacing, Islamist parties are unable to offer satisfactory solutions to the wide-ranging challenges of modernity and neoliberal globalism. In the face of an Arab Street that is more than ready to exercise it's right to protest regimes that are perceived to have lost legitimacy, these shortcomings will lead to questions on the efficacy of political Islam in its current form and will ultimately force a reformulation of the conceptions of political Islam and what it means to live in an Islamic Republic.
Prior to the Arab Spring, fundamentalist Islamic religious groups often cast themselves as the only opposition to authoritarian regimes and the only true alternative for change. In this capacity, as political outsiders, Islamists groups like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood were successful in sustaining moral legitimacy and popular support for their cause, marshaling opposition to authoritarian regimes and promoting principled stances on issues.
From a historical perspective the Arab Spring demonstrates the failure of Islamist groups to offer a narrative compelling enough to motivate people to undertake Islamic Revolution à la 1979 Iran. Protestors did not rise up against entrenched governments under the banner of Islam, the Muslim Umma, or any Islamist group (See “Olivier, Roy”). Rather people protested against long standing regimes calling for social justice, human rights and respect. Islamist electoral successes were made possible by riding the coat tails of the youth led non-religious liberal democratic movements that fomented the revolution rather than by any promise of an Islamic state. At the outset of the Egyptian Revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood did not offer its support, instead choosing to bide its time. When it became apparent that popular revolution was engulfing Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to co-opt the protests and dominate subsequent elections not by promoting Islamism, but rather by promoting a narrative of inclusivity and moderation. The Muslim Brotherhood has a long history of opportunism and political flexibility, which famously included reaching a mutually satisfactory political arrangement with the Mubarak regime (See Tadroz, Mariz). In the aftermath of the Egyptian Revolution, it seems apparent the Muslim Brotherhood has a strategic alliance, or at least some type of accommodation, with the Egyptian military and police leaders. In the end, it was the Muslim Brotherhood's organizational persistence trumping the active but leaderless protest movement (See previous post “Mass Movements…”) that allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to co-opt the Revolution.
Having obtained the presidency and a majority in parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood is no longer a fringe group. They are in the proverbial “Driver’s Seat”, and now must cater to all Egyptians, including more secular Muslims with varying degrees of faith, other religions, and unbelievers. Issues of modernity (Gay rights, sexual mores, evolutionary theory, feminine rights, family planning, etc.) cannot be ignored. The fact of the matter is that the modern world presents insurmountable quandaries to an organization that leads the state and attempts to impose a rigid fundamentalist ideology. Religious fundamentalists are a minority in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood must either moderate its policies, and live up to its rhetoric of moderation and inclusion, or most Egyptians will come to oppose the Muslim Brotherhood as an illegitimate and authoritarian successor to Mubarak.
Little progress has been made by the Muslim Brotherhood so far to resolve these challenges. Its narrative of inclusion and tolerance is widely perceived by Egyptians as insincere lip service and the narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood as a viable political-religious entity is now unraveling. For example, women’s rights advocates were alarmed at the drafting of the new constitution that does not guarantee women’s rights (See “Provocation in…”). Recently, an Islamist heavy Shura Council blamed female protestors for “subjecting themselves to rape when choosing to protest in places filled with thugs” (See Taha, Rana). In the face of such overt failures of social justice and a religious social agenda which is incompatible with many, perhaps most of the Egyptian people, the legitimacy of Morsi’s Presidency, the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam in general is doomed to failure unless new conceptual understandings of the world after the Arab Spring are taken into account.
If they are to survive in power, President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt will be forced to accommodate the reality of the modern world. Mohammed must go to the mountain. The mountain will not come to Mohammed.
Sources:
Ghezali, Rabah (January 18, 2012). “Arab Spring, Islamist Winter?” Huffington Post. Retrieved February 19, 2013, from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rabah-ghezali/arab-spring-islamist-wint_b_1212794.html
“Provocation In Anticipation of Law.” EgyNews (Arabic). Retrieved February 18, 2013, from: http://www.egynews.net/wps/portal/print?params=212732
Roy, Olivier (December 13, 2012). “The Myth Of The Islamist Winter.” New Statesman. Retrieved February 19, 2013, from: http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/middle-east/2012/12/myth-islamist-winter
Roy, Olivier (July 2012, 23/3). “The Transformation Of The Arab World.” Journal of Democracy. Retrieved February 17, 2013, from: http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/transformation-arab-world
Tadroz, Mariz (2012). “The Muslim Brotherhood In Contemporary Egypt.” New York: Routledge.
Taha, Rana Muhammad (February 11, 2013). “Shura Council Members Blame Women For Harrassment.” Daily News Egypt. Retrieved February 18, 2013, from: http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/02/11/shura-council-members-blame-women-for-harassment/
Totten, Michael. (January/February, 2012). “Arab Spring Or Islamist Winter?” World Affairs Journal. Retrieved February 18, 2013, from: http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/arab-spring-or-islamist-winter
Despite the recent successes of Islamist parties at the polls, the Arab Spring is more than just another ephemeral uprising of the proverbial "Arab Street". The changes that are occurring transcend politics, and are deeply rooted in challenges of modernity, globalism (economic and cultural), and the slow crumbling of traditional culture and local governing institutions. The root cause of the Arab Spring lies in pervasive dissatisfaction and unrest among ordinary people who are unable to earn a satisfactory living, care for their children, learn a trade or obtain an education, and who are no longer able to envision a happy future for themselves. The sad immolation of a Tunisian fruit vendor was the spark that ignited an irreversible process of populist-driven reform and democratization.
At the top layer of analysis, recent political successes by Islamic parties in the political sphere appear to support Western fears of an Islamist takeover of the Arab world. At a deeper level of analysis, it becomes apparent that the recent gains by Islamists are likely to be transitory. Much like the authoritarian regimes they are replacing, Islamist parties are unable to offer satisfactory solutions to the wide-ranging challenges of modernity and neoliberal globalism. In the face of an Arab Street that is more than ready to exercise it's right to protest regimes that are perceived to have lost legitimacy, these shortcomings will lead to questions on the efficacy of political Islam in its current form and will ultimately force a reformulation of the conceptions of political Islam and what it means to live in an Islamic Republic.
Prior to the Arab Spring, fundamentalist Islamic religious groups often cast themselves as the only opposition to authoritarian regimes and the only true alternative for change. In this capacity, as political outsiders, Islamists groups like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood were successful in sustaining moral legitimacy and popular support for their cause, marshaling opposition to authoritarian regimes and promoting principled stances on issues.
From a historical perspective the Arab Spring demonstrates the failure of Islamist groups to offer a narrative compelling enough to motivate people to undertake Islamic Revolution à la 1979 Iran. Protestors did not rise up against entrenched governments under the banner of Islam, the Muslim Umma, or any Islamist group (See “Olivier, Roy”). Rather people protested against long standing regimes calling for social justice, human rights and respect. Islamist electoral successes were made possible by riding the coat tails of the youth led non-religious liberal democratic movements that fomented the revolution rather than by any promise of an Islamic state. At the outset of the Egyptian Revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood did not offer its support, instead choosing to bide its time. When it became apparent that popular revolution was engulfing Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to co-opt the protests and dominate subsequent elections not by promoting Islamism, but rather by promoting a narrative of inclusivity and moderation. The Muslim Brotherhood has a long history of opportunism and political flexibility, which famously included reaching a mutually satisfactory political arrangement with the Mubarak regime (See Tadroz, Mariz). In the aftermath of the Egyptian Revolution, it seems apparent the Muslim Brotherhood has a strategic alliance, or at least some type of accommodation, with the Egyptian military and police leaders. In the end, it was the Muslim Brotherhood's organizational persistence trumping the active but leaderless protest movement (See previous post “Mass Movements…”) that allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to co-opt the Revolution.
Having obtained the presidency and a majority in parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood is no longer a fringe group. They are in the proverbial “Driver’s Seat”, and now must cater to all Egyptians, including more secular Muslims with varying degrees of faith, other religions, and unbelievers. Issues of modernity (Gay rights, sexual mores, evolutionary theory, feminine rights, family planning, etc.) cannot be ignored. The fact of the matter is that the modern world presents insurmountable quandaries to an organization that leads the state and attempts to impose a rigid fundamentalist ideology. Religious fundamentalists are a minority in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood must either moderate its policies, and live up to its rhetoric of moderation and inclusion, or most Egyptians will come to oppose the Muslim Brotherhood as an illegitimate and authoritarian successor to Mubarak.
Little progress has been made by the Muslim Brotherhood so far to resolve these challenges. Its narrative of inclusion and tolerance is widely perceived by Egyptians as insincere lip service and the narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood as a viable political-religious entity is now unraveling. For example, women’s rights advocates were alarmed at the drafting of the new constitution that does not guarantee women’s rights (See “Provocation in…”). Recently, an Islamist heavy Shura Council blamed female protestors for “subjecting themselves to rape when choosing to protest in places filled with thugs” (See Taha, Rana). In the face of such overt failures of social justice and a religious social agenda which is incompatible with many, perhaps most of the Egyptian people, the legitimacy of Morsi’s Presidency, the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam in general is doomed to failure unless new conceptual understandings of the world after the Arab Spring are taken into account.
If they are to survive in power, President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt will be forced to accommodate the reality of the modern world. Mohammed must go to the mountain. The mountain will not come to Mohammed.
Sources:
Ghezali, Rabah (January 18, 2012). “Arab Spring, Islamist Winter?” Huffington Post. Retrieved February 19, 2013, from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rabah-ghezali/arab-spring-islamist-wint_b_1212794.html
“Provocation In Anticipation of Law.” EgyNews (Arabic). Retrieved February 18, 2013, from: http://www.egynews.net/wps/portal/print?params=212732
Roy, Olivier (December 13, 2012). “The Myth Of The Islamist Winter.” New Statesman. Retrieved February 19, 2013, from: http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/middle-east/2012/12/myth-islamist-winter
Roy, Olivier (July 2012, 23/3). “The Transformation Of The Arab World.” Journal of Democracy. Retrieved February 17, 2013, from: http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/transformation-arab-world
Tadroz, Mariz (2012). “The Muslim Brotherhood In Contemporary Egypt.” New York: Routledge.
Taha, Rana Muhammad (February 11, 2013). “Shura Council Members Blame Women For Harrassment.” Daily News Egypt. Retrieved February 18, 2013, from: http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/02/11/shura-council-members-blame-women-for-harassment/
Totten, Michael. (January/February, 2012). “Arab Spring Or Islamist Winter?” World Affairs Journal. Retrieved February 18, 2013, from: http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/arab-spring-or-islamist-winter
Nice post and solid analysis. While I agree with everything you wrote, I can’t help but feel that the average Egyptian, Tunisian or maybe even American remains supremely gullible to the latest snake-oil salesman. I used to have a bumper sticker on my truck that read “If you want peace, work for justice.” From my dim understanding of Islamic party politics, this is exactly what they are promising to address. These clerics-turned-politicians can now claim that their vision of justice carries a divine mandate and is superior to the corrupt forms of western justice. Islamist parties may be “unable to offer satisfactory solutions to the wide-ranging challenges of modernity and neoliberal globalism” but they can still promise such solutions (and they can also blame the west/US/secular world for hindering their progress). In their vision, Mohammed doesn’t need to walk to the ‘Walmart mountain of western capitalist consumption and individual freedom,’ but rather to the mountain of true faith (which is whatever they say it is).
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