Political Parties in Africa: What Have You Done for Me Lately?

Political parties are foundational and essential features of representative government.  Their roles and functions are to essential to ensuring a fully functioning democracy as they serve as the central actor between the electorate and the government, exercise control over government, develop programs, and collect, consolidate, and articulate public needs and opinions to the policy making apparatus.  These roles and functions grant significant power to political parties.  The interesting question, however, is whether these roles apply to political parties in developing democracies.  More specifically, how does this apply in Africa?   

Many African states actively utilize competitive political parties; nevertheless, these parties are distinguishable from those seen in advanced democratic nations.  For example, African political parties often lack strong the institutional foundations that are found in the United States or Western Europe and instead are heavily dependent upon patronage and ethnicity.   To be clear, despite the use of political parties and even competitive electoral systems, most Africa states are described as semi-democracies or anocracies as the legacies of colonialism and violence continue to permeate the political landscape.  In short, despite overt commitment to representative and democratic government there are often covert actions that parties utilize that undermine these very commitments.  The consequence of dysfunctional democracy and party behavior is often conflict and instability.

African conflicts, wars, and insurgencies are unarguably intertwined with developmental stagnation and even failure.  In fact, some reports estimate Africa annually loses over $18 billion dollars as a result of violent conflict.  In states that are often characterized as fragile, failing, or failed these conflicts continue to undermine development and perpetuate political instability.  An examination of Nigerian politics illustrates the potential security and stability crises that can emerge from the party dysfunction.

Nigeria is the most populated nation in African, the fifth largest exporter of oil to the United States, and ranked number fourteen on the 2012 world’s most failed states list.  These facts alone indicate Nigeria’s importance not only to Africa but also to the international community.  Despite its importance, Nigeria has been plagued with violence and instability that many attribute to its political system and its political parties.  One report states that “politics and violence are synonymous in Nigeria.”  In fact, some reports accuse political parties of intentionally undermining peace and security by engaging with and in hiring “political thugs” to carry out political violence against the opposition.  The result of these activities has been to create a culture of fear, violence, and corruption that some have alleged resulted in the strengthening of Boko Haram.

In April 2012 Nigeria’s former National Security Adviser (NSA), Owoye Azazi accused the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) of creating the environmental conditions that gave rise to increased activity by Boko Haram.  The PDP adamantly refuted Azazi’s comments but unfortunately in July 2012 Azazi’s comments picked up steam and were reiterated by Senator Sadik Abubakar Yar’Adua.  Azazi does not provide evidence for his claims and there is arguably an amalgamation of causes that led to Boko Haram; nevertheless, his comments do illustrate the frustration over Boko Haram and the feeling that political parties have created instability such that Nigeria is ripe for the emergence of radical groups.  

Academic research indicates that political instability often leaves a “power vacuum” which encourages dissidents to mobilize and some assert even engage in guerilla warfare.  In Nigeria’s case corruption and the accompanying political violence is believed to have created the necessary socioeconomic conditions such as poverty and unemployment that encourage dissident mobilization. In fact, the Nigerian government, its political institutions, and its parties have allowed crime to run unabated and the result has been extreme violence.  

 

The use of political parties as an instrument of ensuring representative government is well established in Western Europe and the United States.  The significance of this role is not merely academic; indeed, competitive multiparty elections in Africa have been found to reduce the potential for rebellion and violence.  This is a result of the electorate believing that they have a voice in government.  Nevertheless, even when democratic elections are held they are often replete with fraud and violence.  Unfortunately, as Nigeria indicates this violence is often at the hands of politicians and parties themselves as they engineer political assassinations as well as encourage ethnic and communal violence.  Long term these sorts of behaviors have wide-ranging consequences including undermining the state’s ability to provide security thus facilitating instability that embolden groups like Boko Haram.

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Sources:       

Adekunle, Julius O.  “Political Violence, Democracy, and the Nigerian Economy.”  In   

    Democracy in Africa, edited  by Saliba Sarsar and Julius O. Adekunle, 89-110.  Durham,     

    North Carolina:  Carolina Academic Press, 2012.

Carey, Sabine, “Rebellion in Africa.”  Journal of Peace Research 44, no.11 (January 2007):   

     47:64.

Erdmann, Gero.  “Party Research: Western European Bias and the African Laybrinth.”  In Votes,   

    Money and Violence:  Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa, edited by      

    Matthias  Basedau, Gero Erdmann, and Andreas Mehler, 34-58.  Sweden:  University of

    Kwazulu-Natal  , South Africa, 2007.

Kuenzi, Michelle and Gina Lambright, “Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation in Africa’s    

     Electoral Regimes.”  Party Politics 11, no.4 (June 2005): 423-446.

http://allafrica.com/stories/201208010653.html

http://allafrica.com/stories/201011150795.html

http://allafrica.com/stories/201204290215.html

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/nigeria/120126/kano-boko-haram- violence%20?page=0,1

http://nationaldailyngr.com/featured-news/boko-haram-group-disagrees-with-pdp-over-azazi

http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/africas%20missing%20bils.pdf

  

http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/07/how-pdp-created-the-environment-for-boko-haram-to-thrive-by-senator-yaradua/

Egypt's Yen for Cash

        Since 1979, following the Camp David Accords, Egypt’s ancien regime has positioned itself as a staunch ally of the United States and the West. In the subsequent 30+ years, this state of affairs has remained unchanged. Each year Egypt received over $1 billion in American foreign aid while the United States retained an unwavering and unquestioning ally in a tumultuous region of the world. Until 2011 and the Egyptian Revolution of 25 January, the strength of this relationship seemed unbreakable. However, in the climate of the Arab Spring, blossoming democracies, and uncertain economies, Egypt now finds itself in a position to reshape the geo-political landscape of the Middle East and to pick it’s foreign relations to maximize benefit to herself.

        The United States can no longer count on being the de-facto benefactor of Egypt. While the long-established US/Egyptian relationship is not in danger of disappearing in the near future, there are other sponsors roaming the jungle of global realpolitik who may be eager and willing to ply an economically distressed Egypt with monetary and military aid to foment a future relationship. Egypt’s President Morsi has stated that he seeks to foster balanced diplomatic ties with countries long ignored by his predecessor (see “Egypt’s President…”). His first official visit outside of the region was to China rather than the United States, followed by a trip to Iran to participate in the Summit of Non-Aligned Countries, which the US had asked other countries to boycott. Morsi has also announced an upcoming trip to Brazil, one of the BRIC countries. Clearly, Egypt seems to be evolving  a more independent foreign policy (see “Egypt’s President…”), and China may aspire to be Egypt’s future sponsor for a number of reasons. This is clearly a potential threat to US interests in the region. China has become a global super power competitor to America. They hold over a trillion dollars of US debt and their ongoing purchases of US treasury bills underpin the US economy. The currency regime between China and the United States is important to the US standard of living because American consumers are able to purchase Chinese goods for cheap prices.

       

        Economically, Egypt’s 85 million plus population is an attractive market for China's export-oriented economy. Chinese companies are interested in establishing affiliated companies in Egypt to export to other Arab, African and European markets, which would afford Chinese companies tax exemptions and other preferential treatment (see “FM Holds…”). Additionally, Egypt’s electrical distribution network is inter-connected to a number of other nations, which would allow China to establish a strategic position through joint Chinese-Egyptian ventures in the field of electrical distribution and the emergent field of solar powered electricity generation (see “FM Holds…”). The Nile River represents billions of dollars in energy output which offers China opportunities in the form of dam and hydroelectric power construction projects. Most are in Sudan and Ethiopia but all affect the flow of the Nile River through Egypt. Creating a strong bond with Egypt will be helpful in protecting Chinese interests in the most populous country of the Arab world which will help protect Chinese interests when inevitable disputes among Nile Basin countries over Nile water sharing arise in the future.

        Strategically, a Chinese/Egyptian relationship would act as a bulwark against the expanding military presence of the West and America in the region. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, Jordan and other countries in the Middle East are allies of the United States. Egypt could be a powerful voice sympathetic to Chinese interests in the region. Further, a Chinese sponsored Egypt would be a counter to the presence of NATO in Libya and would further reinforce the already strong Chinese presence in Africa.

       

        Morsi seems open to soliciting sponsorship from China and perhaps Russia, driven by economic necessity. Even before the onset of the Egyptian Revolution, the economy of Egypt was in recession, and has now been crippled. Reforms are desperately needed. The high rate of unemployment, one of the factors that triggered the onset of the Egyptian Revolution, continues to grow. By official government estimates the unemployment rate is above 12% and unofficial estimates put the unemployment rate at much higher levels (see “Egypt’s unemployment…”). Egyptian tourism, a $12 billion a year industry in 2010 was down 30% in the wake of the Egyptian Revolution and may suffer further declines in European tourism after the election of an Islamist president. Foreign investment has declined. Egypt needs over $40 billion in investment to raise the growth rate from 4% to 5% in 2012 (see “PM: Egypt needs…”), 1.8% off from the 5.8% rate in 2010 (see “Egypt GDP...”). Continued rolling electrical blackouts across Egypt are inciting protests against the new government (see Cunningham, Erin), along with double-digit food price inflation (another contributing factor in the Egyptian Revolution, see “Food Price Watch”) and an overall lack of potable water further contribute to Egypt’s economic and social woes.

        Morsi faces crises on many fronts: economic, political, and international. Morsi must play all sides of the fence or risk losing political support at home. He has accepted multiple aid packages from Saudi Arabia (see “Saudia Arabia Approves…”) despite historical animosity between the two countries. While in China, a "frenemy" of the US, Morsi secured $200 million dollars in credit for the National Bank of Egypt, numerous agreements in trade and agriculture (see Bodeen, Christopher), along with a lifting of a Chinese travel ban to Egypt (see “Chinese Ban…”) to stimulate tourism. At the same time, the US pledged to forgive $1 billion dollars in Egyptian debt as well as promising $375 million in financing and loan guarantees to support American companies setting up shop in Egypt as well as backing “Egyptian Democracy”. Morsi also has parleyed with the IMF to receive a $4.8 billion dollar loan (see “IMF requires…”) notwithstanding local protests. All of these actions suggest that Egypt will broaden its circle of diplomatic and economic alliances, while seeking to re-adjust its long-standing alliance with the US.

English Sources:

Bodeen, Christopher. (August 28, 2012). “China, Wary of Arab Spring, Hosts Egypt’s Morsi.” ABC News. Retrieved September 3, 2012, from: http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/china-wary-arab-spring-hosts-egypts-morsi-17092516#.UEg_L3hgP19

“Chinese President in Waiting Cancels Meeting with Clinton.” Big News Network. (September 5, 2012). Retrieved September 5, 2012, from: http://www.bignewsnetwork.com/index.php?sid/208918665/scat/c08dd24cec417021/ht/Chinese-president-in-waiting-cancels-meeting-with-Clinton

Cunningham, Erin. (August 28, 2012). “Egypt’s Other Power Struggle.” Global Post. Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/egypt/120823/power-struggle-electricity-blackouts-morsi

“Egypt GDP Growth Rate.” Trading Economics. (n.d.). Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/gdp-growth

“Egypt’s President Seeks ‘Balanced’ Diplomacy.” China Daily. (September 6, 2012). Retrieved September 6, 2012, from: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2012-09/06/content_15737139.htm

“Egypt’s Unemployment Rate Rises to 12.4%.” Egypt Independent. (February 18, 2012). Retrieved September 3, 2012, from: http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypts-unemployment-rate-rises-124

“FM Holds Intensive Consultations in China.” Arab Republic of Egypt Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (March 3, 2012). Retrieved September 3, 2012, from: http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/Minister/News/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?Source=6781921f-3993-444a-859e-ee26ce851de8&newsID=e805b7f9-15d0-4968-b729-6b56f1575374

“Food Price Watch.” The World Bank. (April, 2011). Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://www.worldbank.org/foodcrisis/foodpricewatch/april_2011.html

Karam, Stephanie. (translated September 2, 2012). “Morsi’s Trip Reveals Clues to an Evolving Foreign Policy.”  Al Monitor. Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/08/egypt-drawing-up-new-foreign-pol.html

Myers, Steven. (September 3, 2012). “To Back Democracy, U.S. Prepares to Cut $1 Billion from Egypt’s Debt.” The New York Times. Retrieved September 3, 2012, from: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/world/middleeast/us-prepares-economic-aid-to-bolster-democracy-in-egypt.html?pagewanted=all

“PM: Egypt needs LE 267 Bn Investments in 2012.” Egypt State Information Service. (September 5, 2012). Retrieved September 5, 2012, from: http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Story.aspx?sid=63717

“Saudi Arabia Approves $430 mln in New Aid to Egypt.” Reuters. (June 8, 2012). Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE8570CW20120608

Arabic Sources:

Amer, Hala. (August 23, 2012). “IMF requires Fundamental Structural Reform Program to lend to Egypt.” Al-Hayat. Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://alhayat.com/Details/428442

“Chinese Ban on Traveling to Egypt Lifted.” Al-Arabiya. (September 3, 2012). Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/09/03/235818.html

“Egypt…Foreign Activity and an Ambiguous Political Scene.” The Gulf. (August 31, 2012). Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://www.alkhaleej.ae/portal/4ab9fb0b-6f80-4a67-a15e-cd8284d1f89e.aspx

“Food Price Watch.” The World Bank. (April, 2011). Retrieved September 4, 2012, from: http://www.albankaldawli.org//foodprices/foodpricewatch/april_2011.html

Salman, Talal. “Morsi in Peking and Tehran: Egypt – The Revolution and it’s Anticipated Role.” The Ambassador. (n.d.). Retrieved September 3, 2012, from: http://www.assafir.com/Article.aspx?EditionId=2241&ChannelId=53754&ArticleId=2642&Author=%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84

Political Transitions in Africa

 

On August 20, 2012 Ethiopia’s long standing leader, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi died.   The ensuing days were marked by a calm and peaceful transfer of power by the ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolution Democratic Front (EPRDF), to acting Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn.  Speculation exists that the demise of Meles Zenawai may potentially lead to instability in Ethiopia as well as the region as a power struggle is underway beyond the public’s view.  The EPRDF dismisses these claims and resolutely contends that the transition to the new prime minister has fully occurred.  The EPRDF also offers assurances that Ethiopia’s foreign policy position will remain unchanged.  This is significant as Ethiopia is a central actor in the new African Union whose roles and ambitions in Africa are enormous.  The ability of the EPRDF to transfer power quietly, quickly, and without violence to Meles Zenawi’s predecessor provides a positive forecast for Ethiopia, the region, and the African Union.  

Similarly, the long standing democratic state of Ghana also lost President John Atta Mills on July 24, 2012.  Ghana had been praised by the United States for representing hope in Africa.  Mills in particular had been credited with “consolidating democracy in Ghana and being crucial in establishing the political party system in Ghana.”  Immediately following Mills’ death and with little fanfare, Vice President John Dramani Mahama assumed the presidency. Interestingly and in contrast to Ethiopia’s interim political leader, Mahama will only serve as president until the regularly scheduled presidential elections are held in December 2012.  The rapid assumption of office by the Vice President as well as the December elections is indicative of Ghana’s steadfast adherence to its 1992 constitutional requirements.  Elections Chief, Kwadwo Afar-Gyan, stated the following:  “the election calendar remains unchanged-it is purely a party matter.”   Nevertheless, one must wait until December to see if the elections are actually held.

 Senegal held a highly competitive and hotly debated presidential election in March 2012 when its political leader, President Abdoulaye Wade ran for reelection.  Wade had run for president only after a legal challenge and a court decision found that he could seek reelection thereby failing to retroactively apply constitutional amendments of term limits to Wade.  Yet, after the results of the election indicated his loss President Wade dutifully adhered to Senegalese law and stepped down.  Wade’s actions are significant because he sought legal action to determine his ability to seek reelection and also peacefully conceded defeat.   These nations and their peaceful political transitions and observance of their respective constitutional provisions stands in marked contrast to other African states who are threatened with instability.  

            On August 20, 2012 the Somali government shifted from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to a new parliament.  The TFG had worked with elders to nominate over two hundred parliamentary members.  Numerous reports indicate that this selection process was riddled with corruption as elders were minimalized throughout the process and bribed in order to ensure particular individuals were selected for parliament.  Several media articles note that the new parliament is already plagued by illegitimacy as it has been marred with dishonesty and a lack of transparency.  This has led some to question the long term sustainability of the parliament as well as to question whether a fragile stability can be achieved.   In fact, stability in Somalia has been largely absent and the lack of a legitimate government has produced a gap that al’Shabaab has tried to capitalize upon.  Although al’Shabaab is weakened in some regards it is still a threat to the stability of the new Somali government and to the region at large.  Several reports indicate that the terrorist group may attempt to use the new political system to advance its goals.   

            In West Africa, Mali also has been plagued by recent instability as a military coup unseated the long-standing stable and democratic government.  The absence of government and governance permitted Tuareg rebels in the northern part of the nation to gain territorial control which quickly passed to foreign Islamic fighters.  These fighters have solidified their hold in northern region of Mali imposing Shariah law while the Mali military has maintained a grip over the capital.  The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) recently asked for assistance noting that the instability in Mali is a problem that extends beyond the Mali borders.  ECOWAS actions highlight the regional danger that these radical foreign fighters pose for even stable governments.   This is especially significant given the instability that is plaguing northern Nigeria.  

            Achieving political stability in Africa has proven to be challenged as recent events have shown.  Nevertheless, there are states that have created stability through a strong commitment to their respective laws and constitutional provisions.  Whether Ghana and Ethiopia can maintain stability in the aftermath of these political transitions of power still remains to be seen.

           

Sources:

Abdi Ismail Samatar “UN Corrupts Somali Political Transition,” Aljazeera.com, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/07/201273094746839247.html.

Ayante, Abdi.  “Somalia: Al-Shabaab and Post-Transition Somalia,” http://allafrica.com/stories/201209031458.html.  

Judicial Services of Ghana, 1992 Constitution of Ghana,  http://www.judicial.gov.gh/constitution/chapter/chap_8.htm.

Maasho, Aaron. “Ethiopia – new prime minister will stay in office until 2015.”  Reuters Africa,  http://africajournalismtheworld.com/tag/ethiopian-peoples-revolutionary-democratic-front-eprdf/. 

 

New York Times.  “Mali.”  http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/mali/index.html.

Nossiter, Adam.  “John Atta Mills, President of Ghana, dies at 68,” New York Times, July 24, 2012.

“Senegal's President-elect Macky Sall hails 'new era',” BBC News Africa, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17508098.

“Somalia's first parliament since 1991 inaugurated in Mogadishu,” The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/20/somalia-first-parliament-inaugurated.

“Somalia’s Political Restart,” Aljazeera.com,  http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/08/201282115497642471.html.

“Tough challenges for Ethiopia's new leader,” ahramonline, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/9/51864/World/International/Tough-challenges-for-Ethiopias-new-leader-Hailemar.aspx.

Verhoeven, Harry. “Zenawi: The titan who changed Africa,” Aljazeera.com, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/08/2012821115259626668.html.

Springtime for Egypt

             Mr Lukyanov is a noted Russian political commentator. Writing in "Russia Beyond the Headlines/Gazeta.ru", he speculates on Egypt's post Arab Spring role in the Middle East. I've contributed my own thoughts in an essay following his article. 

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Russia Beyond the Headlines/Gazeta.ru
www.rbth.ru
August 12, 2012
The world ignores Egypt at its own peril
While the major global players are focused on Damascus, a power play is going on in Cairo that could have a more significant effect.
By Fyodor Lukyanov, Gazeta.ru

While the world's eyes are riveted on the Syrian cities of Damascus and Aleppo, Egypt is witnessing developments whose significance for the regional and global future is much greater than even the civil war in Syria.

President Muhammed Mursi, who has just been sworn in, has set about redrawing Egypt's political map with incredible speed. The sacking of the heads of the Egyptian junta ­ Defense Minister Hussein Tantawi and chief of the general staff Sami Annan ­ coupled with the canceling of constitutional amendments granting broad powers to the army, indicate that the Muslim Brothers are in no mood to seek a compromise with the former authorities.

With 80 million residents, Egypt is the Arab world's most populous country and Cairo has historically been one of the region's leading capitals. What happened there, as a rule, while not exactly setting a model for the political development of the entire community, made a strong imprint on it. It was the toppling of Hosni Mubarak a year and a half ago and not the earlier events in Tunisia that really triggered the Arab Spring.

That is why everybody wondered from the very beginning what model would take root in Egypt. Three variants were proposed: the Turkish model (power of the military plus a modernization agenda or moderate and relatively progressive Islamists), the Iranian model (a radical Islamic state) and the Algerian model (brutal suppression of democratically elected Islamists by the military).

The Kemal Ataturk model of the 20th century was quickly cast aside because the conditions for it are not present in Egypt. In Turkey, the military acted as a force for renewal after the collapse of an empire, while in Egypt they embody the former regime, even though they have tried to dissociate themselves from Mubarak.

The Iranian scenario was also dismissed as irrelevant early on, because Iran's system is intimately linked with Shiite Islam. Even if Egypt opts for an Islamic state, it will be a different one.

An Islamic but essentially democratic model still has a chance, according to the Muslim Brothers, but in reality, an Algerian scenario is more likely.  Everyone is waiting with bated breath to see how the military top brass react to Mursi's attack. In 1991, the Algerian army annulled the results of elections that were set to deliver victory to the Islamic Salvation Front and thus plunged the country into a 10-year-long civil war that claimed more than 100,000 lives, but prevented the Islamists from gaining power.

Even if the Egyptian military decide to do this, success is not guaranteed. The world has changed greatly in the last 20 years. In 1991, the Algerian generals could count on a quiet solution ­ they knew no one would care about their actions or interfere in their methods. Today, however, should Egypt take this path, both the Islamic world and the West would react extremely negatively. Besides, Egyptian society, as the parliamentary and presidential elections have shown, wants democratic procedures and change, so a military regime would have little support.

If the Muslim Brothers and Muhammed Mursi consolidate their power, there could be the start of a profound realignment of forces and influence in the Middle East. To give one example, the current situation with Israel will not endure, although Cairo is likely revise its policies over time rather than sever the agreements abruptly.

It is unlikely that any of the current Middle Eastern leaders would risk provoking a war with the Jewish state, even if it is a popular idea on the Arab streets. However, the overall erosion of rules of conduct might trigger a series of incidents on Israel's perimeter, engendering a response that might potentially drag it into a confrontation with everyone.

Washington, of course, has leverage in the shape of the $2 billion it has channeled to Cairo since its accords with Israel were reached. Because the Egyptian economy is in free fall, the Muslim Brothers' government would be loath to forego that money.

Yet the process of general geopolitical change might lead to a change of sponsors. The key players in the Arab Spring are the Gulf monarchies, whose influence has soared in the last year and a half. The oil kingdoms' financial clout enables them to support Egypt as strongly as the United States does.

The most acute collision in the near term is connected with Iran, because eliminating the menace of a nuclear Tehran and reducing Iran's influence is, for all the regional players, the main goal and one element of achieving it is confrontation in Syria.

As long as the Iranian problem exists, the interests of the conservative monarchies, the revolutionary regimes, the United States and Israel coincide. But if that problem is resolved one way or another, the common agenda will fall apart and the tacit temporary accord between Saudi Arabia and Israel will come to an end. And then much, if not everything, would depend on Egypt, its inner state and orientation in the world.

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            I was fortunate enough (or unfortunate, depending on one's point of view) to be at American University in Cairo during the Arab Spring. Egyptian's refer to these events as "The Revolution of 25 January". Lukyanov's article provided a starting point for an essay on my own thoughts on the subject.

Springtime for Egypt

William Tombaugh

24 August 2012

            The eyes of the world are fixed on Syria. Western incursion into Syria may be just around the corner. Escalating violence in Syria is capturing the headlines. However, Fyodor Lukyanov believes the more peaceful seismic power shift reverberating in Egypt will also produce fault lines which re-shape the Middle East.  
            
             Lukyanov suggests that Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (MB) led by President Morsi may be able to wrest control from the military junta and consolidate power within Egypt, resulting in a “profound realignment of forces and influences in the Middle East”. With the recent firing of defense minister Tantawi along with six other high ranking military officials by Morsi, the reversal of a constitutional declaration limiting presidential powers and the end of the veto power of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and with celebratory chants from the Egyptian Arab Spring of “Go Away Field Marshall” still echoing in Tahrir Square, the military’s role as interim government caretakers may soon be over. Lukyanov predicts a likely last gasp attempt by the military (the "Algerian" model) to assert control, but agrees that conditions in today's Egypt make it unlikely that the military will succeed in such an attempt, considering the deep momentum for democratic reform in Egypt, not to mention the international condemnation that such an action would immediately provoke.  

             The lack of concrete reforms during the 18-month military led transition period, recent instability in the Sinai Peninsula and Egyptian-Israeli border, and the advanced age of the falool General Tantawi ("falool" is colloquial Egyptian Arabic referring to the ancien régime) have offered President Morsi the political excuse he needed to more fully grasp the reins of power. The continued acquiescence of the military to this transition suggests coordinated effort between the military and the MB. The Egyptian military has dominated Egyptian politics since the Nasser era and is widely perceived by Egyptians as a protector of the people. It is too early to predict the withdrawal of military involvement in Egyptian politics, but it is clear that a sea change on the political scene is occurring.

Additionally, the factor of economics keeps the military quiescent. The United States provides $2 billion per year in aid to Egypt, which goes towards the purchase of American grain and to the military. After re-structuring its economy to meet IMF conditions, Egypt is no longer self-sufficient in food. It is speculated that the military establishment holds upwards of a 20% stake in the Egyptian economy (see “Inside Story...”). This financial interest is represented in the numerous military owned clubs, hotels, restaurants, factories, and other commercial ventures that are present throughout Egypt. A coup attempt would have devastating effects on Egypt's already-teetering economy, endangering military economic interests as well as the already enfeebled tourism industry. 

With the ouster of military rule, the lack of an Egyptian constitution, and the non-existence of a parliament, it appears that both legislative and executive powers are being drawn into the hands of Morsi. The military seems to be cooperating with Morsi, but there is growing opposition among Egyptians who were the original participants of Egypt's Arab Spring, liberal democratic Egyptians who favor democratic reform. Morsi is obviously aware of these concerns and responded to Egyptian Copts, emphasizing tolerance and inclusiveness, and assuring Copts they would remain part of the fabric of the Egyptian nation (see Malah, Nadia).

It is interesting to observe that the leaderless spontaneous protests which began the Egyptian revolution and which were fronted largely by young Egyptians interested in liberal democracy, have been co-opted by the well entrenched MB. Perhaps a lesson is that protest movements without leaders and organizational support are likely to be ephemeral. Lenin famously insisted that the masses need a vanguard (the Party) to lead the revolution to eliminate the old social order and build anew. The gradually increasing assertion of power by the MB has led to fears of an oppressive Islamist state. An example of this concern is the recent call for mass protest against the "Brotherhoodization" of the state (see Shukrallah, Salamah).

The MB’s short-term intentions in Egypt remain opaque. A decade earlier, the MB was rumored to have made a deal with the Mubarak regime to withdraw from politics and not to publicly protest against the dictatorship (see “Egypt: Islamism…”), although individual MB members would often go off the reservation by organizing public protests or running for parliament. Ironically, the MB was absent at the outset of the Egyptian revolution, and advised their followers not to participate. However, when it became clear that the demonstrations had widespread support, the MB dived headlong into the fray. Clearly, the MB made an opportunistic calculation that the demonstrations were about to achieve escape velocity. The MB initially stated they would not field a presidential candidate (see “Egypt’s Brotherhood may…” and Lynch, Marc). However, they later changed their mind and submitted two candidates. The MB has shown itself to be pragmatic, opportunistic, cautious, and ambitious. A political chameleon. 

The MB has historically been consistent in its long-term goal: the establishment of an Islamic Sharia state (see “Profile: Egypt’s…”). In the short term they are unlikely to embark on a hasty program of radical change that would fracture Egyptian society-- religious, sectarian or otherwise. This would also hold true for its current relationships with foreign countries, including Israel. Lukyanov is correct that over time, a change in the relationship with Israel seems inevitable. There are issues that have the potential to spin out of control, such as the border in Sinai and Gaza. As Egypt and other Arab states develop their technology and economies, there will be ongoing tensions with Israel, unless a comprehensive peace is achieved. Over the longer term there is no certainty that the alliance between Egypt and the U.S. that has existed since the Camp David Accords will continue to exist. At present there is no stable status quo. Nothing is certain in the ME-- except change. 

 Iran is perceived as a threat by Israel, Saudi Arabia/the Gulf States, Europe, and the United States. Egypt as well as other countries are less concerned with Iran (see “Egypt’s Morsi to make…”). The Syrian conflict is a part of a larger effort against Iran and does of course influence alliances and policies that affect Egypt. For example, political developments in Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank may strongly affect Egypt’s relationship with the United States and Israel. Instability has repercussions that are hard to predict.

             Egypt accounts for almost 40% of the total population of Arab countries, and has historically viewed itself as the natural leader of the Arab nation. It is easy to agree with Lukyanov that Egypt will play a major role in Middle Eastern affairs, with or without the largesse of the United States. He also raises the possibility that there could be "a change of sponsors" in the ME. Saudi Arabia may be able to offer some support to Egypt in the short term for opportunistic issues such as Palestinian aid or security measures, but there is historical animosity between Egypt and Saudi Arabia that is likely to influence ongoing relations between the countries, even with the advent of a MB regime in Egypt. In the early post-war years, during the Cold War, Russia supplied Egypt with military and economic aid. The Aswan Dam is a memorial of Russian aid to Egypt. Russia is now re-asserting itself in the ME, and may be an alternative to the United States. China has very aggressively expanded her presence on the African continent and is another potential sponsor.

              The only certainty is change. The Arab Spring is its harbinger.

English Sources:

“Egypt’s Brotherhood may bid for President.” The Jerusalem Post, (March 21, 2012). Retrieved August 22, 2012, from: http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=262807

“Egypt: Islamism and the State.” The American Foreign Policy Council’s World Almanac of Islamism. (n.d.). Retrieved August 22, 2012, from: http://almanac.afpc.org/Egypt

“Egypt’s Morsi to make historic trip to Tehran.” Al Jazeera English, (n.d.). Retrieved August 22, 2012, from: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/08/2012818182526548301.html

“Inside Story: Can Morsi break the military’s hold on Egypt?” Al Jazeera English, (n.d.). Retrieved August 21, 2012, from: http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/08/2012813135019322491.html

Lukyanov, Fyodor. (August 21, 2012). “The world ignores Egypt at its own peril.” Russia Beyond the Headlines. Retrieved August 21, 2012, from: http://rbth.ru/articles/2012/08/21/the_world_ignores_egypt_at_its_own_peril_17539.html

Lynch, Marc. (April 2, 2012). “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Presidential Gambit.” Foreign Policy. Retrieved August 22, 2012, from: http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/04/01/the_muslim_brotherhoods_presidential_gambit

“Profile: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood” BBC News, (n.d.). Retrieved August 22, 2012, from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12313405

Shukrallah, Salamah. (August 23, 2012). “Egypt revolutionaries to steer clear of Friday’s anti-Brotherhood rally.” Ahram Online English. Retrieved August 23, 2012, from: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/51025/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-revolutionaries-to-steer-clear-of-Fridays-an.aspx

 “Empire: Egypt: A second republic?” Al Jazeera English, (n.d.). Retrieved August 21, 2012, from: http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/empire/2012/07/2012711163519717268.html

Arabic Sources:

“Egypt: Presidential coup overthrows the rule of the military.” The Ambassador, (n.d.). Retrieved August 21, 2012, from: http://www.assafir.com/Article.aspx?ArticleId=1218&EditionId=2228&ChannelId=53429

Khalifa, Abdel Raouf. (August 23, 2012). “Mahmoud Alsharef: Demonstrations tomorrow aim to embarrass the president elect and prevent the implementation of his programs.” Ahram Digital. Retrieved August 23, 2012, from: http://digital.ahram.org.eg/Policy.aspx?Serial=1002503

Malah, Nadia. (June 27, 2012). “Doctor Louis Grace: Morsi’s letter reassuring the Copts they are a part of the fabric of the nation.” Ahram Digital. Retrieved August 22, 2012, from: http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=944240&eid=1218

“Morsi’s decisions change the political landscape in Egypt: Absolute power for the president not available to Mubarak!” The Ambassador, (August 14, 2012). Retrieved August 21, 2012, from: http://www.assafir.com/MulhakArticle.aspx?EditionId=2235&MulhakArticleId=604966&MulhakId=4261