Will The Mountain Come To Mohammed?

          The electoral successes of Islamist parties in Arab Spring countries like Tunisia and Egypt have reshaped geo-politics and challenged the conventional wisdom of realist international relations ideas that democracies are inherently compatible with Western values and goals. To many experts, the balmy Arab Spring seems to have transmogrified into a chilly Islamist Winter (See “Totten, Michael”). Post Arab Spring democratically elected regimes like Egypt are leaning farther into neo-authoritarianism, fundamentalist political Islam, and are stepping up efforts to repress expressions of free speech and democratic plurality. Is the dream of the Arab Spring dying? Is it already dead?

           Despite the recent successes of Islamist parties at the polls, the Arab Spring is more than just another ephemeral uprising of the proverbial "Arab Street". The changes that are occurring transcend politics, and are deeply rooted in challenges of modernity, globalism (economic and cultural), and the slow crumbling of traditional culture and local governing institutions. The root cause of the Arab Spring lies in pervasive dissatisfaction and unrest among ordinary people who are unable to earn a satisfactory living, care for their children, learn a trade or obtain an education, and who are no longer able to envision a happy future for themselves. The sad immolation of a Tunisian fruit vendor was the spark that ignited an irreversible process of populist-driven reform and democratization.

          At the top layer of analysis, recent political successes by Islamic parties in the political sphere appear to support Western fears of an Islamist takeover of the Arab world. At a deeper level of analysis, it becomes apparent that the recent gains by Islamists are likely to be transitory. Much like the authoritarian regimes they are replacing, Islamist parties are unable to offer satisfactory solutions to the wide-ranging challenges of modernity and neoliberal globalism. In the face of an Arab Street that is more than ready to exercise it's right to protest regimes that are perceived to have lost legitimacy, these shortcomings will lead to questions on the efficacy of political Islam in its current form and will ultimately force a reformulation of the conceptions of political Islam and what it means to live in an Islamic Republic.

           Prior to the Arab Spring, fundamentalist Islamic religious groups often cast themselves as the only opposition to authoritarian regimes and the only true alternative for change. In this capacity, as political outsiders, Islamists groups like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood were successful in sustaining moral legitimacy and popular support for their cause, marshaling opposition to authoritarian regimes and promoting principled stances on issues.

          From a historical perspective the Arab Spring demonstrates the failure of Islamist groups to offer a narrative compelling enough to motivate people to undertake Islamic Revolution à la 1979 Iran. Protestors did not rise up against entrenched governments under the banner of Islam, the Muslim Umma, or any Islamist group (See “Olivier, Roy”). Rather people protested against long standing regimes calling for social justice, human rights and respect. Islamist electoral successes were made possible by riding the coat tails of the youth led non-religious liberal democratic movements that fomented the revolution rather than by any promise of an Islamic state. At the outset of the Egyptian Revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood did not offer its support, instead choosing to bide its time. When it became apparent that popular revolution was engulfing Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to co-opt the protests and dominate subsequent elections not by promoting Islamism, but rather by promoting a narrative of inclusivity and moderation. The Muslim Brotherhood has a long history of opportunism and political flexibility, which famously included reaching a mutually satisfactory political arrangement with the Mubarak regime (See Tadroz, Mariz). In the aftermath of the Egyptian Revolution, it seems apparent the Muslim Brotherhood has a strategic alliance, or at least some type of accommodation, with the Egyptian military and police leaders. In the end, it was the Muslim Brotherhood's organizational persistence trumping the active but leaderless protest movement (See previous post “Mass Movements…”) that allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to co-opt the Revolution.

           Having obtained the presidency and a majority in parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood is no longer a fringe group. They are in the proverbial “Driver’s Seat”, and now must cater to all Egyptians, including more secular Muslims with varying degrees of faith, other religions, and unbelievers. Issues of modernity (Gay rights, sexual mores, evolutionary theory, feminine rights, family planning, etc.) cannot be ignored. The fact of the matter is that the modern world presents insurmountable quandaries to an organization that leads the state and attempts to impose a rigid fundamentalist ideology. Religious fundamentalists are a minority in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood must either moderate its policies, and live up to its rhetoric of moderation and inclusion, or most Egyptians will come to oppose the Muslim Brotherhood as an illegitimate and authoritarian successor to Mubarak.

           Little progress has been made by the Muslim Brotherhood so far to resolve these challenges. Its narrative of inclusion and tolerance is widely perceived by Egyptians as insincere lip service and the narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood as a viable political-religious entity is now unraveling. For example, women’s rights advocates were alarmed at the drafting of the new constitution that does not guarantee women’s rights (See “Provocation in…”). Recently, an Islamist heavy Shura Council blamed female protestors for “subjecting themselves to rape when choosing to protest in places filled with thugs” (See Taha, Rana). In the face of such overt failures of social justice and a religious social agenda which is incompatible with many, perhaps most of the Egyptian people, the legitimacy of Morsi’s Presidency, the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam in general is doomed to failure unless new conceptual understandings of the world after the Arab Spring are taken into account.

           If they are to survive in power, President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt will be forced to accommodate the reality of the modern world. Mohammed must go to the mountain. The mountain will not come to Mohammed.



Sources: 

Ghezali, Rabah (January 18, 2012). “Arab Spring, Islamist Winter?” Huffington Post. Retrieved February 19, 2013, from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rabah-ghezali/arab-spring-islamist-wint_b_1212794.html

“Provocation In Anticipation of Law.” EgyNews (Arabic). Retrieved February 18, 2013, from: http://www.egynews.net/wps/portal/print?params=212732

Roy, Olivier (December 13, 2012). “The Myth Of The Islamist Winter.” New Statesman. Retrieved February 19, 2013, from: http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/middle-east/2012/12/myth-islamist-winter

Roy, Olivier (July 2012, 23/3). “The Transformation Of The Arab World.” Journal of Democracy. Retrieved February 17, 2013, from: http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/transformation-arab-world

Tadroz, Mariz (2012). “The Muslim Brotherhood In Contemporary Egypt.” New York: Routledge.

Taha, Rana Muhammad (February 11, 2013). “Shura Council Members Blame Women For Harrassment.” Daily News Egypt. Retrieved February 18, 2013, from: http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/02/11/shura-council-members-blame-women-for-harassment/

Totten, Michael. (January/February, 2012). “Arab Spring Or Islamist Winter?” World Affairs Journal. Retrieved February 18, 2013, from: http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/arab-spring-or-islamist-winter

NIGERIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE: FOREVER FRAGILE? BY J.N.C HILL – A REVIEW

                

NIGERIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE: FOREVER FRAGILE? BY J.N.C HILL – A REVIEW

               

In 2012 J.N.C. Hill, a senior lecturer in the Defense Studies Department at King’s College London UK, has written a thought provoking book titled “Nigeria since Independence: Forever Fragile?”. Hill chronologically examines Nigeria since its independence and argues that Nigeria is a “failed state” because the writ of its government does not run the length and breadth of its territory and also lacks in providing her citizens with “the public goods or social services which includes law and order, basic healthcare, primary education, and impartial justice” (Hill Pg. 2). He focuses on the concept of state failure and contends that “state failure is frequently cited as the principal cause of all manner of political abuses, economic hardships, social ills and cultural injustices suffered by peoples and communities throughout Africa and beyond” (Hill Pg. 17). 

Hill explains how changes to the international moral environment ushered in by the Second World War led to the establishment of a “new sovereignty” regime that gave rise to many states in Africa, including Nigeria. However, many of these states lacked the capabilities to exercise de facto sovereignty, but nevertheless, continued to be recognized by the international community. Today, “there are states that exist as legal entities, but which lack the governments and state institutions to have any day-to-day reality for portions of the populations that live within their borders” (Hill Pg. 20). Hill utilizes the concept of state failure to describe what has happened, what is going on, and what is likely to occur in Africa.

Hill explains that though Nigeria came close enough to disintegration during the Biafra civil war of 1967, it has avoided breaking up. This was when the southeastern province of Biafra seceded from the federation for two and a half years before it was eventually readmitted in 1970. Furthermore, he identifies three main forces that paradoxically serve as vital mechanisms for both the disintegration and unity of Nigeria. These forces also arbitrarily fan the flames of insurgency and violent extremism that perpetually threaten the stability and unity of Nigeria.

The three main factors are namely; federalism (the process of building and developing Nigeria’s state structures and political practices), oil and its associated revenue (generated by the rents the Federal Government charges oil companies and its sale on the international market) and the armed forces (its operations and activities and as a major institution of the Nigerian state).  Hill argues that federalism has been both a force for good and evil for the Nigerian nation. He analyses four major ways in which federalism impedes the flourishing of Nigerians. First, federalism fuels the ethnic tensions and religious hatreds that are undermining the quality of life of Nigerians. Secondly, it has disempowered and disadvantaged tens of thousands of Nigerians all over the country by dictating that certain public goods are only available to those people living in their state of origin. This is not compulsorily the state in which they live or were born, but to that which they formally belong. “By permitting this, federalism is not only compromising the standards of living and life opportunities of many Nigerians, it is also encouraging sectarianism and undermining the country’s unity” (Hill Pg.45).

Thirdly, federalism freezes Nigerians’ political rights as it rotates senior position in government, armed forces and other national institutions, and agencies between the main ethnic groups. Thus, democracy is subverted as only those individuals from the right ethnic groups access certain posts of leadership in the country. And fourth, federalism has greatly increased the cost of government and also created many new opportunities for corruption and graft in Nigeria. Despite its contributions to Nigeria’s failure, Hill maintains that federalism also unifies the country in three important ways; first, it is weakening the ethnic and regional loyalties that have long threatened the country’s unity; second, it helps build a sense of nationhood; and thirdly, federalism helps to banish sectarianism from Nigeria’s political life.

Hill also traces the political violence, corruption, and failure in contemporary Nigeria to oil production and revenue. The extraction of oil in Nigeria consequently undermines the quality of life and living standards of thousands of Niger-Delta residents of Nigeria through environmental pollution and destruction of the ecosystem. He charges that “Nigeria’s oil is deeply divisive and a major contributor to Nigeria’s failure as a state. Not only is it helping to undermine the Federal Government’s willingness and ability to promote the flourishing of all Nigerian citizens, but it is also driving the insurgencies” (Hill Pg. 73). Oil in Nigeria is both a source of great wealth and international political prestige and also the root cause of many of the ills that plague the country.

Prominent among these plagues are the rise of insurgent groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the deadly Boko Haram sect that has continued to undermine the efforts of the Federal Government. Oil is equally a contributor to Nigeria’s unity in that other non-oil producing states in Nigeria depend on oil revenue as long as the country remains together. The international community also relies on Nigeria as an energy provider and remains unwilling to recognize new states in Africa. Thus, oil sustains the unification of Nigeria. Hill also examines the contradictory roles the armed forces play in contributing to Nigeria’s failure. “By failing to defeat the insurgent groups ranged against it and abusing the civil political and human rights of ordinary Nigerians, it has stoked popular anger and antipathy towards the state driving some individuals and communities into the arms of groups like the MEND and Boko Haram, which are undermining the Federal Government’s ability to control its sovereign territory” (Hill pg. 99).

Hill’s book thoroughly showcases Nigeria’s failure and continued unity as a product of complex and contradictory roles of three major mechanisms – federalism, oil, and armed forces. Hill has shown that though Nigeria is successfully a failed state, its persistent failure is yet to lead to collapse and disintegration. His analysis significantly contributes to the ongoing debates over state failure and Nigeria’s threatened existence as one of the largest democracies in Africa.

Work cited

Hill, J.N.C.  Nigeria since Independence: Forever Fragile? New York: Macmillan, 2012. Print

The Afterglow is Gone

Protestors clash with police in front of the Presidential Palace (Source: AP)

“I voted for Morsi. I thought the Brotherhood, more than any group, would have understood the concept of injustice and tried to fix it, but they failed.”
-- Egyptian protestor Ahmed Metwalli speaking from Tahrir Square on February 2, 2013 (Source: Dawn.com)

          Small events can spark major revolutions. Just as the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand initiated a chain of incidents that would result in the First World War, an act of self-immolation in 2010 in protest against a corrupt Tunisian government would change the geo-political landscape of the Middle East and North Africa. The Arab Spring was a tsunami of revolutionary fervor crested by a decentralized youthful protest movement that spread quickly from Tunisia to Egypt, Libya and other countries. The toppling of long standing dictators and their corrupt regimes generated social and political euphoria throughout the Middle East. Many countries held their first free democratic elections, bringing long suppressed political groups to center stage. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood seized the reigns of power winning a number of referendums and elections that ultimately culminated in 2012 with the election of President Mohammed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood backed candidate. Across much of the Arab World, widespread feelings of jubilation and hope for a brighter, more free and more prosperous future reigned.

           Over two years on from the onset of the Arab Spring, the optimistic views held by many are now wearing thin, and the shadow of winter and reality seems to have eclipsed the euphoria once felt by many. Tunisia’s Islamist government has “acknowledged the prospect of civil war…” breaking out between Islamists and modernists (See “Tunisia’s Islamist government…”). Chaos reigns in Libya. Infighting within the Libyan General National Congress and continued clashes between rival militias and Islamist groups threaten “another revolution” (See Gumuchian,Marie-Louise) and a growing potential breeding ground for Islamic Jihadi militants (See Michael, Maggie). An Islamist backlash from the current conflict in Mali threatens the already fragile Libyan government due to weapons and fighters funneled through Libya to Mali, Syria and other countries. Yemen is embroiled in a struggle against armed militant groups, is on the verge of a food crisis and the government exerts little control outside the capital of Sanaa and a few other major cities (See Al Zuhayyan, Abdulrahman). The Syrian "revolution" has become more civil war than revolution, and is widely seen as a proxy war between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran (See “Foreign Policy: Proxy…”).

           Ironically, the most stable countries within the region seem to have been ruthless dictatorships that acted decisively in the face of the Arab Spring to crush dissent (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Algeria), to bribe citizens with money, free food, loan interest forgiveness and other freebies to stop pro-democracy activism (Kuwait, United Arab Emirates), to implement immediate “reforms” (the permanence of which remains in question) and make accommodations with other existing political parties in an effort to cling to power (Morocco, Jordan).

           In Egypt, the people are marking the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution with widespread protests. There is an increasing sentiment of discontent with the government, led by President Morsi and a parliament dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Political opposition to the Muslim Brother's persistent efforts to “Islamacize” Egypt has revealed an unmistakable authoritarian streak in the new Islamist regime. Mubarak-like dictates cementing Morsi’s word as the final authority in government, a perceived Brotherhoodization of the state and mass media, a worsening economy, along with little real positive change in day-to- day life has left many previously hopeful Egyptians jaded and disillusioned (See previous blog post “Meet the New Boss…”). Amid the planting of 10,000 trees for the Muslim Brotherhood social welfare campaign “Together We Build Egypt”-- Egyptian internal strife reached a head last week as more than 60 people were killed in protests in the coastal city of Port Said and hundreds injured in other anti state/anniversary marches in 12 other governorates. Martial law and a curfew was declared in 3 governorates by President Morsi; these dictates were openly defied by protestors.

          The Muslim Brotherhood now faces what may prove to be insurmountable challenges. There is an essential contradiction that is inherent in the fundamental nature and goals of the Muslim Brotherhood itself. Although its rise to power was made possible by democratic elections, , Muslim Brotherhood ideology clearly tends toward an authoritarian religious state. Islamist authoritarianism coupled with the failure to restore a healthy economy, continuing social justice issues, and rampant corruption is eroding the Muslim Brotherhood's popularity, and is calling its very legitimacy into question. The narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood during the revolution was the promise of unity, honesty, transparency and reform, a people’s revolution rather than an Islamic one (See “Ikhwanweb: Egypt’s Revolution"). Immediately after President Morsi’s election, he sought to allay the fears of an impending Islamic State in the vein of Saudi Arabia. He espoused a narrative of moderation, an environment of inclusiveness, religious tolerance and democratic plurality. These promises have not translated into action and once again Egyptians are taking matters in their own hands.

           In response to the President’s dictatorial constitutional edicts of 22 November 2012 (See previous blog post “Meet the New Boss…”) the National Salvation Front was formed. Led by Nobel laureate Mohammed El Baradei, and former presidential candidates Amr Moussa and Hamdeen Sabahi, the National Salvation Front has framed themselves as the de-facto opposition umbrella group to President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. Espousing a position of non-violent opposition, they have created a coalition that was expected to run for seats in the parliamentary elections set for April. In the wake of violent protests seen in the last few weeks, the National Salvation Front has moved towards a more assertive stance calling for President Morsi to step down from power (See “Egypt’s Opposition Backs Morsi Exit Call”). Though the National Salvation Front has presented an increasingly hardliner approach, to some protestors these demands are not enough.

From L to R: Hamdeen Sabahi, Mohammed El Baradei and Amr Moussa the leaders of the National Salvation Front (Source: Ahram Online)

          Revolutions are often bloody and chaotic. They also often produce unintended side effects. One side effect of the Arab Spring has been a "great awakening" of the ordinary people of the Middle East, the so-called "Arab Street". Throughout the Middle East there is now a heightened political consciousness where people are aware of the possibility of change and are more ready to confront government authoritarianism in both peaceful and violent protest. In other words, the threat of an angered Arab Street rising up against Morsi in a “althowra athaneeya” (The Second Revolution) in Egypt is a real threat to the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi’s regime. The popular social networking site Facebook hosts the “althowra athaneeya almisreah” (See "The Second Egyptian Revolution") page that comments daily on the developments ongoing in Egypt and seeks to bring together Egyptians, much as Facebook and Twitter allowed the Arab Street to coalesce and act during the first Egyptian Revolution against Hosni Mubarak’s regime.

"The Second Egyptian Revolution" page keeps daily tabs on events and seeks to bring Egyptians together (Source: Facebook)

Facebook comment from "The Second Egyptian Revolution" page capturing the frustration with the current government, making comparisons between President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood with the former regime (Source: Facebook)

          The unforeseen appearance of an “Egyptian Black Bloc” among protestors after incidents of police brutality against demonstrators in December of 2012 further complicates the tenuous political situation within the country and adds another unpredictable element to an already potentially explosive mix. The “Black Bloc” is the general name for anonymous individuals gathering to protest against corruption and tyranny. Originally used as a tactic in 1977 demonstrations against the Brokdorf Nuclear Power Plant in Germany, the tactic of anonymous black-dressed individuals protesting has since spread throughout the world (See “Black Bloc") and similar activism took place during the first Egyptian Revolution with protestors appropriating the Guy Fawkes mask previously used by the activist group “Anonymous”. The Egyptian Black Bloc has been framed by President Morsi as a militia manipulated by malign outside forces, by the Muslim Brotherhood as “thugs” inciting violence and turmoil within the country (See Michael, Maggie, “Masked…”) and being tacitly supported by the opposition. The Egyptian Black Bloc appears to cast themselves as “defenders of the protestors” and an anti-Morsi/Muslim Brotherhood element that is willing to act when other opposition groups do not. Presumably, the Egyptian Black Bloc sees the actions of groups like the National Salvation Front and other opposition as ineffectual given the state of failed reforms while liberal opposition groups view the Egyptian Black Bloc as unneeded incitement towards more violence and instability. Saad Zhagloul, a renowned Egyptian revolutionary and statesman in the 1920s is quoted as saying, “The Egyptian voices will be heard, and if not heard, it will be only because the blood already shed has not been enough…” It seems that Egyptians are willing to return to the fight and reclaim what is now seen by many as a stolen revolution (See Zaheer, Salma).

Black Bloc in Tahrir during recent protests against the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi (Source: Reuters)

          Plato observed that "extreme liberty" (e.g, protest and revolution) naturally leads to tyranny. The reflexive response of a regime facing the challenge of street demonstrations and violent opposition to its authority is to impose ever-harsher measures in the name of order and stability. Seemingly on cue, Egypt’s Shura Council (the upper house of the Parliament) is set to discuss a draft anti-protest/anti thuggery law that would “grant police a free hand to disrupt and disperse street protests” and grant the interior ministry the right to forbid demonstrations, public gatherings, and meetings at their discretion (See Essam El-Din, Gamal). Given the already brutal tendencies demonstrated by the Egyptian Police when “fettered” by law in the past weeks, including the suspected torturing to death of one protestor (See Kingsley, Patrick), one can only imagine the police methods of quelling civil unrest when given free reign to do as they may by a harried regime and the unintended consequences of such actions; small events can spark major revolutions.

 

According to the Egyptian Interior Ministry "police forces have not been able to fight violent street protests in recent days" (Source: Text Al-Ahram/Video Al-Haya News via Youtube)

          This may be the pivotal moment where the fate of the Egyptian Revolution is decided. President Morsi and Egypt are at a crossroads. One path leads to neoliberal democracy. The other descends to chaos, strife and a potential bloody second Egyptian Revolution. It seems that in the short term President Morsi is likely to attempt the tactics used by other authoritarian regimes to crush dissent but in the long term will have to compromise with the opposition if he and the Muslim Brotherhood intends to stay in power--- and are allowed to remain in power.

In a revolution, as in a novel, the most difficult part to invent is the end.

-- Alexis de Tocqueville

  
Sources:

Al Zuhayyan, Abdulrahman (January 5, 2013). “World Has A Lot At Stake In Yemen.” Arab News. Retrieved February 3, 2013, from: http://www.arabnews.com/world-has-lot-stake-yemen

“Black Bloc.” (N.D.) Wikipedia. Retrieved February 3, 2013, from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_bloc

El Tablawy, Tarek and Mariam Fam (January 24, 2013). “Cairo Slum-Dwellers Despair of Mursi On Uprising Anniversary.” Bloomberg News. Retrieved February 2, 2013, from: http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-01-23/cairo-slum-dwellers-despair-of-mursi-on-uprising-s-anniversary

“Egypt’s Opposition Backs Morsi Exit Call.” Al-Jazeera. Retrieved February 3, 2013, from: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/02/201322163950716415.html

“Egypt Protest Targets Morsi Palace As Violence Flares.” Dawn.com. Retrieved February 3, 2013, from: http://dawn.com/2013/02/01/egypt-protest-targets-morsi-palace-as-violence-flares/

Essam El-Din, Gamal. (February 3, 2013). “Shura Council Discusses Laws ‘To Control Protests And Confront Thuggery’.” Al-Ahram. Retrieved February 3, 2013, from: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/63966/Egypt/Politics-/Shura-Council-discusses-laws-to-control-protests-a.aspx

“Foreign Policy: Proxy War Between Saudi Arabia and Iran.” (N.D.) Al-Quds (Arabic). Retrieved February 1, 2013, from: http://www.alquds.com/news/article/view/id/346348

“Ikhwanweb: Egypt’s Revolution Is A People’s Revolution With No Islamic Agenda.” Ikhwanweb. Retrieved December 30, 2012, from: http://www.ikhwanweb.com/print.php?id=27963

Kingsley, Patrick. (February 4, 2013). “Egyptian Protester Dies After Suspected Police Torture.” The Guardian. Retrieved February 4, 2013, from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/04/egyptian-protester-dies-suspected-torture

Michael, Maggie (January 26, 2013). “Fears Grow That Libya Is An Incubator For Turmoil.” Yahoo News. Retrieved January 31, 2013, from: http://news.yahoo.com/fears-grow-libya-incubator-turmoil-195835295.html

Michael, Maggie (January 28, 2013). “Masked ‘Black Bloc’ A Mystery In Egypt Unrest.” Associated Press. Retrieved February 3, 2012, from: http://world.time.com/2013/01/28/masked-black-bloc-a-mystery-in-egypt-unrest/

Morrow, Adam and Khaled Al-Omrani (January 31, 2013). “Egypt faces ‘Mubarak-like’ Morsi.” Asia Times. Retrieved January 31, 2013, from: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/OA31Ak01.html

“Tunisia’s Islamist Government Warns of Civil War with Modernists.” World Tribune. (January 14, 2013). Retrieved February 2, 2013, from: http://www.worldtribune.com/2013/01/14/tunisias-islamist-government-warns-of-civil-war-with-modernists/

Gumuchian, Marie-Louise (January 31, 2013). “Two Years On, Benghazi Threatens ‘Another Revolution’ In Libya.” Reuters. Retrieved January 31, 2013, from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/01/us-libya-benghazi-idUSBRE91002N20130201

Ottaway, Marina (July 31, 2012). “Morrocco: Can The Third Way Succeed?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved February 3, 2012, from: http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/07/31/morocco-can-third-way-succeed/d3op

Sen, Ashish Kumar (January 24, 2013). “Egyptian Youths Are Ready For Another Revolution.” The Washington Times. Retrieved February 3, 2012, from: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/24/egyptian-youths-are-ready-for-another-revolution/?page=1

Zaheer, Salma (January 22, 2013). “Abu Hamid: The Brotherhood Is The Biggest Devil And They Stole The Revolution.” Al-Destour (Arabic). Retrived February 2, 2013, from: http://dostor.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1/132636-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%88%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9

Combating Violent Extremism and Insurgency in Mali and Nigeria

Combating Violent Extremism and Insurgency in Mali and Nigeria

(Map of West Africa showing Mali and Nigeria). Retrieved February 3, 2013 from http://www.rescue.org/blog/africa-conflict-mali-meets-worsening-food-crisis?ms=gg_nonb_zzz_zzzz_an_zzzzzz&gclid=CL-pp9uQmLUCFfSlPAodJR8ATw

With the recent escalating military actions by the French forces against the Tuareg rebel group (the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) in Mali and the deadly radical Islamist sect, Boko Haram, in Nigeria, violent extremism and insurgency show no lasting sign of abating. Most African leaders ignore the internal domestic factors that promote violence in their countries; rather, they perpetually seek international intervention to the crisis at hand. They restrict the analysis of the issues solely to the dangers and threats extremist groups pose to the rest of the continent, particularly, the linking up of these terrorist groups with Al-Qaeda in other to merit and command the attention of the international community. For example, the Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, told a panel at the recent 2013 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland that “if violent extremism is not contained in Nigeria, definitely it will spill into other countries in West Africa…..It is one of the reasons we have to move fast” (Reuters, 2013).

The missing link here is a clear focus on identifying the internal domestic factors that continually fan the flames of extremism in Africa, particularly in Mali and Nigeria. These factors include endemic elite corruption, pervasive use of extremist groups by politicians and political parties to win elections, bad governance, military brutality, continued economic challenges, weak state capacity, ethnic divisions, and incessant international influence. It seems appropriate to critically examine the causal efficacy of these triggering factors with a view to find lasting solutions to the impasse of violent extremism and insurgency in Mali and Nigeria.

The premise of insurgency, very broadly speaking, is that armed groups seeking to overthrow an existing government can do so over the long term, using a variety of violent and non-violent tactics that include terrorism (Zalman, 2009). Terrorism has been defined “to be any premeditated violent act perpetrated against civilian non-combatants by sub-national or international groups, clandestine agents or individuals sympathetic to larger terrorist groups and movements, with the intent to influence a target audience larger than the intended victims toward or against a particular policy action” (Cox et al., 2009). This further illustrate the actions of the rebel group called the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) in Mali that seeks to establish an independent state in their home region of Northern Mali, a region that is pre-supposedly rich in uranium and oil.  Likewise, the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria has introduced abysmal depths of insurgency characterized by orchestrated bomb attacks, large-scale suicide attacks on innocent churches, mosques, and coordinated hostage taking and shootings to make known their demands of establishing undiluted Sharia law in Nigeria.

Researchers have made several attempts to sue for lasting peace in both Nigeria and Mali, and these efforts have resulted in the emergence of different theories on the subject. Prominent among the theories are: frustration-aggression and relative deprivation (Dollard et al., 1939; Gurr, 1970 & 2000), state-failure (Rotberg, 2002 &2003; Zartman, 1995), and resource curse theories (Bannon and Collier, 2003). The state-failure thesis argues that nation-states exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political goods to persons living within designated parameters of the state. Nation- states are further responsible to answer to the legitimate concerns and demands of their citizens (Rotberg, 2003). It is rather unfortunate that most governments in Africa are negligent and irresponsible to their citizens. Rotberg contends that nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence, and as a result are unable to provide security and positive political goods to their citizens. These political goods include security, education, health care, infrastructures, employment opportunities, and a legal framework for law and order (Rotberg 2002 pg. 87). It thus becomes very clear that once the state is lacking in performing its civic responsibilities to the citizens, it loses credibility and legitimacy before the very eyes of their citizens. Thus, many of these citizens will then naturally transfer their loyalty and allegiance to more responsive authority other than the state (which include religious groups and civil right movements), while other disgruntled turn to terrorism.

General Carter Ham, Commander of the United States African Command (AFRICOM), cautions African governments not to rely solely on the use of excessive military force to fight the war against terror in Africa. He laments that “though there is perhaps some necessity for some military action, the solution lies in the non-military solution and activities that would address the underline causes of the dissatisfactions which include good governance” (Guardian Newspaper, February 01 2013). Ultimately, the continuous use of military force seems preferable in dousing the tension of extremism in Mali and Nigeria, but protracted military effort is not going to eradicate the long-term problem as this is capable of leaving another negative dimension to an endless warfare on the continent. Violent extremism and insurgents thrive in an environment charged with hopelessness and African governments must begin to be more responsive to the socio-economic well-being of the people, and further engage systematic means of mediating disputes without recourse to the protracted use of armed insurrection.

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